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As modernity began to rapidly change and influence European culture, many nineteenth 
and twentieth-century writers and intellectuals struggled to identify themselves with this 
modern paradoxical context. As a result, the modern stranger was conjured up out of the 
uncanny depths of secularized modernity. Although a subject whose makeup is 
continually shifting, the modern stranger still exists as a strong allegory for secularized 
modernity, particularly because of its unsolidified and liminal characteristics. Along with 
its doppelgänger the monster, the stranger reflects not only uncanny otherness but the 
horrors and anxiety of realizing the potential imperfections and weaknesses of the 
individual, society, and their utopian imaginings. My project investigates the paradoxical, 
utopian and negative-utopian makeup of the modern stranger as an outcome of 
secularizing and modernizing changes in what is typically regarded as Western, 
predominately European, Judeo-Christian culture and history, beginning with the advent 
of modernity. By examining the liminal sphere located between the secular and sacred 
that I argue has characterized modernity itself, the study showcases the transformation of 
the stranger from something external into a figure far more liminal, which is forced to 
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My study reads the transformation of the figure of the stranger in the literature of 
the modern age in terms of liminality. I argue that in modernity, the sacred and the 
profane are no longer understood as binaries but are liminal and constituted in a playful, 
nuanced, and increasingly non-dialectical relationship with each other. In my readings, I 
show the explanatory potential of focusing on the resacralizing  in a paradoxical and 
liminal manner  of traditionally sacred concepts such as messianic  time and the 
utopian,  and the conflicts that emerged as a result of secularized modernity s denial of 
its own hybridization. I understand resacralization as the movement, or dance, between 
the secularizing and sacralizing facets of modernity, which ultimately keep it in a liminal 
state.  
This approach to modern literature shows how the modern stranger deals with the 
dangers of failing to be re-assimilated into mainstream society and is caught in a fixed or 
permanent state of liminality, a state that can ultimately lead to boredom, alienation, 
nihilism, and failure. These monstrous  aspects of liminality can also be rewarding in 
that they confront both traditional and contemporary viewpoints, enabling new and fresh 
perspectives suspended between imagination and reality, past and future, difficult and 
paradoxical avenues that makes the uncanny stranger an important figure in secularized 
modernity. 
 As a spectral monster  that has a paradoxical and liminal relationship to both the 
sacred and the secular, the figure of the modern stranger has played a role in both 
adapting and shaping a culturally determined understanding of the self and the other. I 
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argue that with the advent of modernity, the stranger, the monster, and the spectre 
became interconnected. Haunting the edges of reason while also being absorbed into 
normal  society, all three, together with the cyborg, manifest the vulnerability of an age 
that is fearful of the return of the repressed. Yet these figures can also become re-
appropriated as positive symbols, able to navigate between the dangerous and chaotic 
elements that threaten society while serving as precarious and ironic symbols of hope or 
sustainability.  
My study traces the modern stranger back to Mary Shelley s Frankenstein and 
then examines the development of the figure in paradigmatic arenas such as the modern 
metropolis and more contemporary liminal arenas such as cyberspace and social media. 
The stranger is shown to navigate not only the sacred void but also modernization and 
technological change. For Charles Baudelaire as well as for many post-WWI 
expressionists, the fragmented artificiality of the modern city streets was thought to be 
appositely chaotic and even violent surroundings for modern artists cultivating their 
identities. The characters that inhabit the modern city in Baudelaire  poems, or in 
William Gibson s Sprawl novels, are shown to become uncanny allegories of modernity 
as they attain a transcendent connection to the metropolis  uncanny fragmentation, often 
through the many subcultures found on the city s streets, which open up possibilities of 
renewal and re-sacralization. 
This project not only focuses on liminal spaces, between the material and 
immaterial, but also on liminal moods and feelings such as boredom, alienation, sickness 
and failure, and how a liminal and even ironic outlook can transform these such widely 
held negative feelings into revolutionary or resacralized concepts. Although the turn of 
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the nineteenth century was met with technological wonder and amazement, the years 
leading to WWI were also defined by chaos, uncertainty, and conflicting ideologies. 
While warfare was expected to solidify both boundaries and the identities, for the young 
soldiers coming of age during the war, it seemed to reemphasize the ambiguity, liminal, 
and violent nature of the modern world. Robert Musil s novel The Man Without Qualities, 
Max Beckmann s painting The Night, and Fritz Lang s film M examine the violence and 
sickness of war leaking into the postwar era. The murderers depicted in all three works 
become uncanny representations of their sick societies and therefore become difficult to 
judge by citizens equally fascinated, repulsed, and responsible. However, there are 
simultaneously attempts to locate an ironic strength in the very same sicknesses and 
weaknesses. On the eve of WWI, Zeno Cosini in Italo Svevo s seminal novel Zeno s 
Conscience comes to the conclusion that the poisons and diseases of modernity can 
become moments of resacralization. The stranger s use of irony ultimately acts as a 
counterviolence to violence. Through irony, the stranger is able to deal with post-WWI 
society and modernity itself, exposing modernity s violent tendencies through self-
reflectivity, both internal and societal, and thus creating a liminal space of violence and 
nonviolence, of action and inaction.  
The modern stranger as liminal spectre and monster is also a gender transgressing 
symbol. I examine posthuman and feminist works such as Haraway s cyborg thesis and 
Hélène Cixous  The La gh of he Med a , hich look o in e  o  ejec  he ncann  
monstrousness  usually attached to the female gender, either as a way to reimagine the 
female body (Haraway), or go beyond or see through the deception established from the 
uncanny fear men have of women (Cixous). Acker adopts a more liminal and cautious 
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understanding in her vision of both Medusa and the cyborg in regard to gender. Acker 
rejects any representations of beauty, instead opts to retain their original monstrous terror. 
By focusing on a shared monstrousness, Acker blurs gender binaries, opening up a more 
liminal perspective by connecting the modern stranger to God and the sacred, not as 
something perfect and beautiful, but as something monstrous, distorted, and out of place. 
In Acker s work, the stranger presents a more cautious and liminal vision of cities, which 
can be spaces of dreams and possibility but simultaneously places that deny the very 
same utopian elements they seem to cultivate. 
The cyborg is a different sort of liminal, posthuman entity that exists at the 
h e hold of h man and machine. In A Manife o fo  C bo g ,  Donna Ha a a  
famously uses the cyborg as a symbol of a posthuman utopian vision, destroying any 
illusions of the unitary self and blurring the lines of subjective and objective. While the 
figure of the cyborg challenges the Oedipal and Christian narratives of Western society, it 
is also influenced by the very narratives it wishes to dissolve, such as the hybrid nature of 
Jesus as both human and divine in Christian thought.  
If the cyborg is the technological transformation of flesh to metal, cyberspace 
dissolves this relationship altogether, establishing something more abstract and 
immaterial. The cyberpunk novels of William Gibson and Mamoru Oshii s Ghost in the 
Shell films symbolically connect the sacred with cyberspace by allowing for a 
transcending of humanity through the expansion of bodily and societal limitations. While 
the dangers of the Internet are never ignored in these works, it is predominately seen as 
limitless.           
 The more the internet becomes a reality in everyday life, the more dystopian 
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become its depictions. In David Egger s novel The Circle, the omnipresence of the 
Internet is characterized as totalitarian, creating a world where strangers are no longer 
allowed to exist. American author Tao Lin likens the liminal world of the Internet, 
especially social media, to drug use. Lin sees its paradoxical disposition as something 
that can create interaction, excitement and an altering of reality, but can also lead to a 
perpetual state of alienation and boredom. 
Looking at utopia in an ironic manner, however, opens up a discussion of whether 
it is possible for violence to have any positive or even utopian qualities, which ultimately 
gives rise to ambiguous and difficult conversations, such as Ernst Bloch s iconoclastic 
reinterpretation of utopia as a spirit and Walter Benjamin s argument for a revolutionary, 
law-destroying divine violence. Modernity s obsession with radical renewal could 
potentially lead to a predicament that holds humanity in a perpetual state of apocalyptic 
repetition, the topic of Walter M. Miller s A Canticle for Leibowitz.  
In many ways, the modern stranger as a figure of literature and the cultural 
imagination has become more complicated and challenging in the contemporary age, both 
clashing with and encompassing Sara Ahmed s notion of affect aliens,  people who go 
beyond simply the psychological or even spiritual inability to blend in and out of society. 
However, while the stranger may be altering once again, I contend that defining or 
essentializing the figure could result in the creation of other sets of binaries, and thereby 
dissolve the purpose and productiveness of both strangeness and liminality. 
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I: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
An age or society would then be secular or not, in virtue of the conditions of experience of and search for 
the spiritual 
- Charles Taylor, A Secular Age 
 
Unlike an alien or foreigner, the stranger is not simply a newcomer, a person temporarily out of place. He 
is an eternal wanderer, homeless always and everywhere, without hope of ever arriving  
- Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence  
 
We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge-and with good reason. We have never sought 
ourselves-how could it happen that we should ever find ourselves? It has rightly been said: "Where your 
treasure is, there will your heart be also So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not 
comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand ourselves, for us the law "Each is furthest from himself 
applies to all eternity-we are not "men of knowledge" with respect to ourselves   
- Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 
 
The monster ensures in time, and for our theoretical knowledge, a continuity that, for our everyday 
experience, floods, volcanoes, and subsiding continents confuse in space. The other consequence is that the 
signs of continuity throughout such a history can no longer be of any order other than that of 
e emblance Thus, against the background of the continuum, the monster provides an account, as though 
in caricature, of the genesis of differences, and the fossil recalls, in the uncertainty of its resemblances, the 
first buddings of identity. 
  - Michel Foucault, The Order of Things 
 
At almost every point, I have to stand between alternative possibilities of existence, to be completely at 
home in neither and to take no definitive stand against either. Since thinking presupposes receptiveness to 
new possibilities, this position is fruitful for thought; but it is difficult and dangerous in life, which again 
and again demands decisions and thus the exclusion of alternatives. 
  - Paul Tillich, On the Boundary 
 
Prior to his death, Walter Benjamin (1940/2007) penned an essay that presents a 
theory of history as being defined by a continuous series of disruptions that alter the past 
and future through the rapturous present, ha  he claim  a  a model of Me ianic ime  
ha  comp i e  he en i e hi o  of mankind in an eno mo  ab idgmen  (269). Created 
from the ruins of such an event namely the French Revolution, nineteenth-century 
European society was forced to deal with the idea of the modern - the now - in an entirely 
new and secularized fashion. The process or transformation was anything but fluid as the 
ideas of the previous non-modern  world still endured, despite being juxtaposed with the 
influx of new social, political, and personal thought that was sweeping across Europe. As 
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modernity began to rapidly change and influence European culture, many nineteenth and 
twentieth-century writers and intellectuals struggled to identify themselves with this 
modern paradoxical context. As a result, the modern stranger was conjured up out of the 
uncanny depths of secularized modernity.  
Many of the writings during this period focused on the contrasts and paradoxes 
that contributed to the creation and evolution of the modern stranger. Although a subject 
whose makeup is continually shifting, the modern stranger still exists as a strong allegory 
for secularized modernity, particularly because of its unsolidified and liminal 
characteristics. Along with its doppelgänger the monster, the stranger reflects not only 
uncanny otherness but the horrors and anxiety of realizing the potential imperfections and 
weaknesses of the individual, society, and their utopian imaginings. Nonetheless, it must 
be mentioned that the modern stranger is not merely a marginalized figure. In continuing 
with its liminal nature, the modern stranger is nonetheless also a privileged character. Just 
as their alienating experiences vary, so does their privilege, ranging from gender, race, 
class, and geography; the privilege of knowledge, the privilege of having opportunity, the 
privilege to blend in and out of society at will, to wrestle with freedom, secularism, and 
the sacred, or simply the privilege to be bored. Yet, the circumnavigating of these two 
paradoxical perspectives, of privilege and marginalization, once again allows the stranger 
during modernity to be an individual that goes beyond binaural classifications, while 
paradoxically being caught in them, thereby being both inside and outside modernity, 
both remote and included. My project investigates the paradoxical, utopian and negative-
utopian makeup of the modern stranger as an outcome of secularizing and modernizing 
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changes in what is typically regarded as Western, predominately European, Judeo-
Christian culture and history, beginning with the advent of modernity.  
I understand that terms such as the West  and Judeo-Christian culture 1 can be 
problematic and tautological concepts, especially in regard to defining modernity, culture, 
and the socio-political, particularly since both are made up of various and distinct 
societies and interpretations. Cultural theorist and philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah 
point out in hi  fa cina ing a icle The e i  no ch hing a  e e n ci ili a ion  (2016) 
that the term The West  has multiple meanings and connotations throughout history. As 
a result, establishing an essence of western culture or civilization on the bases of a false 
set of collective characteristics and qualities is highly problematic, as accepting such a 
term allocates a certain superiority that can look impl  like a e phemi m fo  hi e . 
While I do agree with Appiah  a g men  ha  he e i  no ch hing a  a p ecio  
golden n gge  ha  link  ancien  ci ili a ion  ch a  G eece and Rome o con empo a  
Europe and North America, I argue that the term the West , as erroneous as it is in 
defining it as a certain homogeneous entity, is still a useful term when discussing 19th-
century imperial and technological knowledge creation, and consequently my project. 
Most notably, Appiah states that the notion of the West  does not emerge until the late 
nineteenth century, expanding during the twentieth under the guidance of imperialism, (I 
would add technological and secular advancements to that), a time frame that ultimately 
coincides with the advent of secularized modernity in the early nineteenth century. It may 
 
1 While the concept of a Judeo-Christian tradition is highly contested and debated (see Is 
there a Judeo-Christian Tradition?: A European Perspective (2016) for both a historical 
acco n  of he e m  o igin and an extensive discussion of relativeness), a strong 
underlining link not often discussed is the effect and complex relationship that secularism 
has had on these two religious traditions. 
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very well be that it was during this time that beginning with Europe, the West first 
established itself as a sort of collective entity, which simply looked to a deceitful 
Hegelian-like lineage in order to establish itself as a historical movement of progress and 
liberalism founded on Christian ethics and a belief in individual rights of agency and 
freedom. And while Appiah is accurate in addressing that it was not just Christianity that 
molded Europe but a combination of multiple cultural and religious societies such as 
paganism and Islam, Christendom has dominated what many regard the west  in recent 
history.  
Thus, a binary essentialism of The West  a  ei he  a fo nde  of e al ed 
in ellec al and a i ic achie emen  o  a di p ai ing e m eflec ing an a enic  n gge  
of racism, imperialism, and subjugation (Appiah), ultimately created the idea of the West 
whether artificial or not. Thus the removal of the concept becomes as problematic as its 
implantation, for as Stefan Kubiak (2017) writes, b  emo ing he e m, [ ]he 
subjugation and colonization of the African, Asian and American peoples and imposing 
foreign control upon them suddenly loses the agent , hile im l aneo l  ignoring that 
E opean and Ame ican ocie ie  ha e e en all  e abli hed certain cultural codes that 
readers educated in a particular culture a e able o deciphe  immedia el  (2017) amongst 
themselves.  
Moreover, concepts such as secular and secularism are also not exclusively 
Western, despite many seeing it as an originary and defining characteristic of Western 
societies. Even Charles Taylor (1998), who is one of the more recent scholars to advocate 
a direct connection between Christianity and secularism, a g e  ha  al ho gh he e i  
h in he claim ha  ec la i m ha  Ch i ian oo i  i  ong o hink ha  hi  limi  
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the application of its formulae to post-Christian societies (31). Secularism has become a 
defining, even if misconstrued, concept that has been used to separate what is largely 
considered as Europe and the Americas from the rest of the world, in order to maintain 
the division of self and other, while many of these others , such as the religious 
challengers of secularism in the Middle East, use the same differentiation to solidify the 
same problematic binary on their own terms (Asad Formations, 2). Secularism, as with 
the notion of the West, has never lost its colonial origins in the Muslim world (Nasr 69). 
Nevertheless, at the same time, it would be unwise to overlook the direct cultural 
significance and influence that both secularism and modernity play in what I have 
described as secularized modernity. In this regard, I am not examining the idea of 
secularism through a political sense as in the separation of church and state, but rather as 
a philosophical or existential mood that is distinctly connected with modernity. As a 
result, the focus of this project will be on what is commonly considered historically 
Christian societies  complex connection with secularism rather than a discussion of the 
concept itself. I do not examine Christianity in a theological lens but rather as a cultural 
category that has had a profound influence on western traditions, norms, and symbols, 
and equally, its effect on paradoxically deconstructing those very same representations.  
 Beginning with nineteenth century Europe, I will explore the conflicts and 
paradoxes of a secular culture created from the liminal spirit of modernity s own empty  
space and its uncanny interrelation with the modern stranger. By arguing that an outsider 
criticizes modernity from within modernity s own liminal space, I should be able to 
show: 1) how the concept of the modern stranger emerged in the late 18th and early 19th 
century, as a result of the liminality created by secularized modernity, where 
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technological possibilities and secular reinterpretations begin to overtake traditionally 
held sacred realms; 2) how the modern stranger moved from being a confined member of 
the social underground to becoming a more prominent figure of alterity that has slowly 
spread into the mainstream; 3) the impact the modern stranger has had on cultural identity 
and the concept of self and other within social environments, from the modern metropolis 
to more liminal contemporary arenas, such as social media and communities where 
identities become further fragmented; 4) the potential of resacralizing sacred and utopian 
elements and the tensions that arise through this paradoxical and secular reinterpretation 
of sacred concepts such as the messianic  and utopian ; and finally, 5) the modern 
stranger and secularized modernity s relationship to the monstrous that is found in both 
its utopian and anti-utopian origins. I examine how these secular/sacred binaries engage 
in a dialectical, yet non-essential, connection with one another by investigating the ways 
in which the modern stranger addresses the process of secularization, and how the 
stranger s situation in liminal space can be seen as a form of resacralization in the 
modern world.  
I contend that, in reference to the modern stranger, defining or essentializing the 
figure could result in the creation of other sets of binaries, dissolving the purpose and 
productiveness of liminality, even the commonly used negative concept of boredom and 
alienation, which itself could be viewed as a constructive element of change. My project 
will attempt to tackle the potential triumphs and difficulties that arise with an idea of 
utopia that is based on ideas of lack, estrangement, boredom, and abjection. Modern 
alienation and disillusionment, which was a main focal point of early and late modernism, 
has not vanished in current society and still creates further fragmentation between the self 
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and other, especially as a result of technological advancements in social interactions. In a 
world that has seen many social movements, subcultures, and what Victor Turner calls 
anti-structures , the question of how the modern stranger inhabits itself within these 
anti-structural communities  becomes increasingly important in the development of 
identity, or non-identity, in the contemporary world. The term anti-structure community 
is derived from the work of Victor Turner (1969/1995), in describing communities that 
challenge the dominant structural order of society. As Turner argues, these communities 
b eak in h o gh he in e tices of structure, in liminality; at the edges of structure, in 
ma ginali ; and f om benea h c e, in infe io i .  Al ho gh ec la  and empo al 
movements, these anti- c e  e ain a ac ed elemen : [i]  i  almo  e e he e held 
to be sacred o  hol ,  po ibl  beca e i  an g e es or dissolves the norms that govern 
structured and institutionalized relationships and is accompanied by experiences of 
unprecedented potency  (128). Ne e hele , once he e comm ni ie  become e abli hed 
in of them el e , he  e n o c e revitalized by their experience of communitas  
(ibid. 129). Both, the structure/anti-structure and secular/resacralized practices are 
relevant in my study of modernity and its paradoxical and liminal quality of going 
beyond yet retaining its limitations.  
My work is located in an interdisciplinary field of Humanities research that could 
be described a  Sec la i ed Mode ni  and is grounded in a combination of modern 
cultural history and literary criticism. It is predominantly situated in a post-humanist 
approach to sociocultural anthropology, sociology, history, critical theory, psychoanalysis, 
theology, and most importantly, literary analysis, which will allow me to critically assess 
traditional beliefs about faith, identity, and truths commonly held in modern Western 
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cultural and social history. More importantly, it allows for a discourse in liminality that is 
able to oscillate between socially constructed binaries, criticisms, and strategies between 
culture and literature more broadly. Under this framework, history and sociocultural 
anthropology provide important methodological approaches for my work, given that 
culture and society have influenced our understanding of human experience and the 
formation of identity. Historical and anthropological approaches are germane to 
understanding the conception of the modern stranger established by secularized 
modernity. A sociological approach will likewise be useful in analyzing social behaviour 
in relation to the order and disorder of society, while critical theory is essential in 
establishing the modern stranger s critique of the social order and customs, and how a 
disruption in society may bring about social change and liberation within this modern 
social structure. In order to understand the unconscious desires, fears, and anxieties of the 
modern stranger, it is important to include a psychoanalytic approach, especially in 
regard to the uncanny. Religious studies is likewise an important facet in my work in that 
it provides methodologies for the difficult relationship between the sacred and the secular, 
locating notions of God, faith, and belief in contemporary contexts of secularized 
modernity. Finally, at its core, my project is structured around literary criticism and 
analysis since the modern stranger first emerged in the world through modernist literature, 
and also because, as François Cusset (2003/2008) indicates in his historical account of the 
rise of the American English department, literature is often regarded as the best medium 
in gaining a perspective of the other and, likewise, the perfect vehicle to integrate 
multiple fields together. Through the exploration of the human condition, literature has 
helped us to make sense of the ambiguities of the modern world and consequently, my 
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project will analyze the effects of the secular and the sacred has on the stranger by means 
of modern literary fiction. Paul Tillich argues that in order to express the complex 
relationship between the sac ed and ec la i ed mode ni , e m  fi  poin  o he 
place  he e he a a ene  of he p edicamen in o  pe iod i  mo  ha pl  e p e ed. 
These places are the great art, literature, and partly at least, the philosophy of our time  
(Essential 5-6). The importance of literature goes beyond an examination of the stranger 
within the art form, seeking to understand how literature helped change or shape 
liminality in modern culture and society.  
BACKGROUND & PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP 
1. The Secular, the Sacred, and Resacralization 
 
In order to understand the socio-cultural climate that the modern stranger finds 
itself in, it is necessary to uncover a process of secularization in modernity, which I will 
be positioning around a Weberian concept of secularization as a result of disillusionment 
or disenchantment. More recently secularization is no longer seen as a straightforward 
process, nor is the secular viewed as necessarily being a binary to the religious. 
Prominent secular or post-secular scholars (Taylor (2007), Asad, (2001, 2003) Connolly 
(2010), Casanova (2010)) argue, in one form or another, that the secular seems to have a 
strong relationship with religion and especially the sacred. Originally, the secular-
religious dichotomy, advocated and popularized by thinkers such as sociologist Emile 
Durkheim (192/1975), conceived of the profane sphere as completely separate from 
religious influence. However, more recently the two are no longer seen as binaries but 
rather as having a peripheral but nonetheless, dialectical relationship. For instance, 
anthropologist Talal Asad (2003) goes beyond the typical dichotomies such as 
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ac ed/p ofane, ea on/imagina ion, and mbol/allego  ha  pe ade mode n ec la  
disco e  (Formations 26). Asad claims that he ec la  i  no  a b i e o  a ma k fo  
eligion  (ibid.), and yet, is also not independent from it; or, in other words, the secular is 
he Siame e in  of eligion ( Mode n Cla ic  221). As he maintains, ince he 
ec la  i  o m ch pa  of o  mode n life, i  i  no  ea  o g a p i  di ec l  and he efo e, 
be  p ed h o gh i  hado  (Formations 16). Even for Mircea Eliade 
(1957/1959), who argues more along the lines of the profane and sacred as opposites, the 
two are not purely caught in their contrasting binaries, at least in terms of lived 
experience, since the behaviour of the religious individual and the non-religious 
individual are similarly based upon myth and symbolism (Sacred 204).  
Although religion as a practice does require ritual and tradition, there is still a 
cognitive, psychological, or existential essence to it that cannot be removed in the 
modern age. Taylor famously argues that in our secular age, God has become 
marginalized, distant, and absent, resulting in a more liminal providential deism  and the 
disenfleshment  of religion. The modern secular, especially in traditionally Judeo-
Christian societies, tends to push the sacred into the internal world of the individual. 
Although resulting in somewhat different conclusions, both Giorgio Agamben (2005) and 
Alain Badiou (2003) talk of a fracture with Jewish history in the writings of Saint Paul, 
creating a path for modern humanism. To some critics, Paul s reading of the Old 
Testament makes him possibly history s first deconstructionist (Hart in Manolopoulos 
75;Weisberg xvi), while the deconstruction of Christianity is simply part of the 
continuation of its own movement (Nancy 2005/2008), resulting from its own self-
distortion. When debating the idea of secularism as an early beginning of disenfleshment, 
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scholars often overlook this separation that St. Paul created in Galatians. The removal of 
historical rituals that stand between God s covenant with humanity, created a rupture in 
what Eliade argues as the passageway or bridge between the profane and sacred, God and 
human (Sacred 182) in Christian societies. Eliade argues that the desacralization of 
modern humanity is a result of Judeo-Christian secularization process, which became 
epitomized by Friedrich Nietzsche s proclamation that God is dead : 
Nietzsche s proclamation was new for the Western, Judeo-Christian world, but 
the death of God is an extremely old phenomenon in the history of religions  of 
course, with this difference: that the disappearance of the High God gives birth to 
a more vivid and more dramatic, though inferior, pantheon  whereas in 
Nietzsche s conception, after the death of the Judeo-Christian God, man has to 
live by himself alone, in a radically desacralized world (Quest 48). 
 
However, there seems to be no final step to this process that Eliade speaks of. Although it 
seems society is desacralizing, historically secularization has led to new forms of 
religious organizations, as with the Protestation Reformation, but more importantly to 
this study, has also allowed for a resacralization of secular space, opening up new 
possibilities of the sacred that are centered more on an individual s personally 
constructed morals and tenets than dogmatic tradition. No longer are traditionally and 
religious established rituals necessary to directly connect with the sacred, but instead, 
faith develops internal, personal, yet at the same time, is still grounded in historical and 
cultural remnants. The secularizing of modernity seems to routinely create a new or 
resacralizing practice within its inherent liminal space, and therefore, the act of 
desacralizing is misleading.  
Asad (2003) suggests that this epistemological turn is a result of post-
Enligh enmen  E opean ho gh  in hich he ac ed and fai h came o be con i ed a  
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a mysterio , m hic hing, he foc  of mo al and admini a i e di cipline  (33) 
resulting in the removal of any kind of habitual character. Therefore, this notion of 
religion established by Enlightenment thought helped to establish a classification of 
religion later asserted by Tillich: [b]eing eligio  mean  a king pa iona el  he 
question of meaning of our existence and being willing to receive answers, even if the 
an e  h it is the state of being concerned about one s own being and being 
ni e all  (Essential1). Taking this explanation into consideration, the idea of being 
religious has shifted in Western modernity to something essential, universal, and beyond 
tradition, which seems to be only a way of expressing one s religious spirit. The notion 
that the religious is something everyone experiences regardless of practice or belief is 
analogous with Julia Kristeva s psychoanalytical thesis in This Incredible Need to Believe 
(2006/2009) in that religion is not an illusionary practice but rather the place where one 
forms one s own identity through a natural and psychological need to believe. By way of 
the secular, the psychoanalytic examination of the inner self for Kristeva, allo  fo  he 
access to the sacred that Christianity made possible  (i ). 
The tension between the sacred as a form of cultural ritual and tradition versus the 
idea of an existential and universal psychological desire for faith has opened up a liminal 
space between traditional ritualistic and cultural aspects of the religious and secularized 
modernity, thus creating more ambiguous cognitive and metaphysical outlook on faith. 
To be clear, what I refer to as resacralization is not exclusively sacred, at least in a 
traditional sense, but rather a simultaneous process or dance between the secularizing and 
sacralizing facets of modernity, which ultimately keep it in a liminal state. Moreover, 
 18 
unlike most understandings of postsecularism,2 resacralization does not operate in 
solidifying binaries of religious and secular but a process of blurring binaries. At least in 
terms popularized by Jürgen Habermas (2005/2008), postsecular societies are ones in 
which religious individuals and non-belie e  engage in a p ac ice of complementary 
lea ning , hile e ac ali a ion i  no  necessarily about religion but the sacred.3  
2. Modernity, Liminality, and the Uncanny  
 
Like the secular, modernity itself is an ambiguous term and defining it can be 
equally as challenging. Generally, it is either thought of as an ongoing project (Habermas 
1985/1990; Giddens 1990; Bauman 1991), or an age that concluded in the mid to late 
twentieth century, defined by ideology, its pursuit of progress, and ultimately its failure to 
deliver (Lyotard 1979/1984; Baudrillard 1976/1993. Nevertheless, in order to consolidate 
my focus in defining modernity, I shall go back to Baudelaire s original and paradoxical 
meaning of modernité, coined in The Pain e  of Mode n Life  (1863/2010), as a fleeting 
and ephemeral experience or strange feeling of modern life that is in flux with he 
eternal and the imm able , and how this sensation has had a profound effect on the 
relationship between past, present, and future (12-13). Michel Foucault (1984) intones, 
Ba delai ean mode ni  i  an e e ci e in hich e eme a en ion o ha  i  eal i  
confronted with the practice of a liberty that simultaneously respects this reality and 
iola e  i  (41). Mode ni  i  m ch mo e han a ime pe iod cha ac e i ed by rational 
discourse, rapid industrialization, and technological advancement. It is an investigational, 
 
2 Many scholars (McLennan 2009; Bader 2012; Beckford 2012) have questioned both the 
meaning and usefulness of the term. 
3 In diffe en ia ing be een he ac ed and eligion I follo  K i e a  nde anding of 
he ac ed being [n]o  religion or its opposite, atheistic negation, but the experience that 
beliefs both shelter and exploit, at the crossroads of sexuality and 
though , bod  and meaning  (Clemen  and K i e a 1). 
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yet tentative attitude that facilitates a certain sense of freedom, only obtained through a 
transformation formed in uncanny or liminal space. Yet, as the postmoderns correctly 
argued, it was likewise a monstrous age of imperialism, systematic violence, racism, 
hubris, patriarchy, and many false utopian promises that had been disguised as 
unfortunate consequences in modernity s unquenching thirst for progress and innovation. 
However, the critique of modernity is not postmodern in essence but was born with 
modernity itself and therefore, cannot be generalized as an age of rationalism and 
contemporization, as a focus on irrationality and absurdity was developed in the same 
e ence. A  Ba man con end , po mode ni m i  mode ni  coming o e m  i h i  
o n impo ibili  (272), a en imen  I ha e and de elopmen  b  a g ing ha  he 
characteristics of postmodernity are in fact fashioned in modernity, especially in regard to 
the perspective of modern stranger. 
For Anthony Giddens, one of the most crucial aspects of modernity is the 
disembedding of ime and pace, meaning he lif ing o  of ocial ela ion  f om local 
contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space  (21). 
Accordingly, modernity s delicate, and liminal character, not only distinguishes it from 
any age which preceded it but allows it to linger perhaps even beyond its own 
culmination. Linda Hutcheon (2003) develops this relationship further than Giddens, 
using a more liminal and uncanny interpretation. For her, postmodernism s connection 
i h mode ni  i  pa ado ical in ha  i  i  nei he  a imple and adical break from it nor a 
aigh fo a d con in i  i h i : i  i  bo h and nei he  (18). Likewise, I do use the term 
postmodern in certain instances. Since modernity is a continuing process, what has been 
labeled as postmodernity does have its own developed characteristics. Similarly, in 
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respect to postmodernism, I essentially agree with Arthur Asa Berger s (2003) claim that 
[p]o mode ni m ha  he e en ial do ble meaning: he con in a ion of mode ni m and 
i  an cendence  (58), though even this view links it to modernity s 
secularization/resacralization practice. Whether modernity has continued, replaced by 
postmodernity, or whether the binary of modern/postmodern itself has been exhausted, 
one of modernity s main enduring contributions is its liminal and uncanny spirit.  
Based on these arguments my central premise of modernity is that its liminal 
makeup and lingering characteristics result in an age where space and time no longer 
coincide or are confined in boundaries, thereby leaving modernity to be defined by an 
uncanny and liminal structure. Turner s notion of communitas and anti-structures is 
directly tied his concept of liminality, as liminal communitas are a collection of liminal 
personae immersed or caught in the same liminal process. While it was Arnold van 
Gennep (1909/1960) who first introduced the concept of liminality, it was Turner 
(1967/2011) who focused and expanded the thought on van Gennep s sacred  middle 
state located between the phases of separation and reaggregation within a ritual passage. 
Turner refers to the liminal as a state of being in be een , o  a threshold  and a point 
of limit. It is a temporal state of marginalization and ambiguity, between profane and 
sacredness in which one s identity dissolves but is also in a a e of becoming  (Forest 
94). For Turner (1978), liminality is a highly important aspect of the ritual process, not 
just for the individual b  all phases of decisive cultural change  (2), for it is during the 
liminal phase that the individual must prepare for an uncertain future. 
 However, there is a possibility that a person fails to be incorporated or 
reassimilated into normal society and may be caught within a fixed or permanent state of 
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liminality (Turner, Dramas 261). Here, Turner focuses on religious vocations such as the 
Christian monastic life or the notion of pilgrimages that are shared by many of the 
world s religions, where the religious or sacred passage is a spiritual or symbolic state 
that continues throughout one s life: 
The Ch i ian i  a ange  o he world, a pilgrim, a traveller, with no place rest 
hi  head.  T an i ion ha  he e become a pe manen  condi ion. No he e ha  hi  
institutionalization of liminality been more clearly marked and defined than in the 
mona ic and mendican  a e  in he g ea  o ld eligion .  (Ritual 107) 
 
This notion of a permanent state of liminality that once seemed to be a condition for the 
strictly religious or sacred realm is now seen as a secular condition, which has become 
consequence of modernity itself (Szakolczai 2000).  
I will examine liminality in a secularized modern context in comparison to the 
classical anthropological understanding found in the works of Turner, in an attempt to 
understand how the concept changes with modernity and if it still contains a sacred 
element in a secularized world as it did in small tribal societies. Most importantly, a 
discussion of liminality s positive and negative elements in modern society and its 
strangers, a liminal figure itself, is germane to my work. In this regard, Agnes Horvath 
(2013), going beyond Turner s definition which strictly focuses on small tribal societies, 
notes that liminali  i  in fac  a ong a pec  of he mode n age and ha  he e m can be 
applied to concrete historical events, and should be applied, as offering a vital means for 
hi o ical and ociological nde anding  (2). Like Szakolczai, Horvath has a 
pessimistic view toward the liminal, arguing that the liminal in modern society is an 
e emel  dange o  and p oblema ic concep  ha  de o  ni , o de , and a e e al 
of the self-e idence of eali  (4). Although the skepticism that both Szakolczai and 
Horvath share of modern society becoming too liminal, and thereby too chaotic and 
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unstable, is understandable, these dangerous  aspects of liminality can also be rewarding 
in that they confront traditional and commonly held viewpoints, enabling new and fresh 
perspectives suspended between imagination and reality.    
 Turner s liminal phase between the seen and unseen, evokes an unsettling eeriness 
of something strange but familiar. It is here that Sigmund Freud s concept of the uncanny 
has a direct link to liminality, since it operates in the same sphere of limits, abnormality, 
and strangeness, often associated with liminal experiences or marginality and thresholds 
(Royle vii). As stated by Turner, in this state the entity is  
betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, 
convention, and ceremonial. As such, their ambiguous and indeterminate 
attributes are expressed by a rich variety of symbols in the many societies that 
ritualize social and cultural transitions. Thus, liminality is frequently likened to 
death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the 
wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon. (Ritual 95) 
 
In his essay Das Unheimliche  ( The Uncann ) (1919/1955) Sigmund Freud expands 
on Ernst Jentsch s use of the term unheimlich, of being a product of intellectual 
uncertainty. Fear and anxiety arise when the person is confronted with something strange 
or alien. Freud, on the other hand, defines the unheimlich as something that is familiar 
and agreeable, yet also unfamiliar and hidden. According to Freud, the reason the 
uncanny terrifying is because it brings to light the fears and anxieties that we have 
previously come into contact with but have repressed. Being both familiar and alien, the 
uncanny leaves an impression of discomfort and anxiety in the subject due to the 
paradoxical feeling of being simultaneously fascinated and repulsed. Since the uncanny is 
ha  o gh  o ha e emained hidden and ec e , and e  come  o ligh  (130), hi  
cognitive dissonance is a result of the other  being contained within the self, thus 
dissolving the subject-object distinction. By referencing Mary Douglas  Purity and 
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Danger (1966), Turner has shown that the liminal persona i  ega ded a  poll ing o 
those who have never been inoculated  again  hem  (Forest, 97). Thus liminal figures 
represent an uncanny fear or danger of polluting normal society.  
Moreover, the uncanny seems to be a by-product of a teleological, secularized 
modern world. Mladen Dolar (1991), Terry Castle (1995), and Anthony Vidler (1992) all 
argue that the invention of the uncanny is directly related to both secularization and 
modernity. According to Dolar, prior to modernity, the premodern uncanny, if we can 
call it that, was something that existed solely for the world of religion and spirituality, 
la gel  co e ed (and eiled) b  he a ea of he ac ed and n o chable  (7); however, it 
is secularized in the modern age, becoming the paradoxical mark of modernity by 
encompassing the ambiguity and uncertainty entrenched in the modern mind. The 
uncanny arose from the Enlightenment and modernity  p chic and c l al 
an fo ma ion , i  agg e i el  a ionali  impe a i e [ hich] also produced, like a 
kind of toxic side effect, a new human experience of strangeness, anxiety, bafflement, 
and in ellec al impa e  (Castle 8). As with liminal space, the uncanny is not unified or 
harmonious but is a continuous alienated and ambiguous state caught in a tension with 
the boundaries of self and other. 
3. The Modern Stranger  
 
By the nineteenth century, many critical observers were left in a bedlam of 
uncertainty, disenchantment, alienation, which led to the rise of the hyper-conscious 
stranger or outsider, an individual who was simultaneously both modern and anti-modern. 
Western modernity had altered the perception of the stranger, as Georg Simmel 
(1908/1964) fi  a g e , a  omeone ho i  able o lea e a  ickl  a  he a i ed, and 
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replaced it wi h omeone ho a  able o e i  and f nc ion among he e  of ocie  
(402). Immersed in the paradoxes of modernity but also critical of its rational limitations, 
the modern outsider challenged the laws of society, nature and the so-called objective 
truths coupled to instrumental reason (ibid. 403-5). With the ascent of the modern 
stranger, the paradoxical role of being both immersed and removed from society allowed 
contemporary individuals to confront the issues that were related to secularism, 
modernity, and urbanization and also critique the normalization of modern city life. The 
modern stranger is a member of society because they lived in and were absorbed by the 
everyday banality of city life, contributing to both the population and even the economic 
aspects of modern life. However, they are removed or felt socially removed from society 
because either their thoughts or ideologies (or lack thereof) were contrary to the majority 
or they were marginalized by their otherness . The modern stranger, therefore, crosses 
borders which are not geographical, but liminal, metaphysical, emotional, and 
psychological.  
In Modernity and Ambivalence (1991) Zygmunt Bauman reasons that modernity, 
which he deems to have originated during seventeenth century Europe but has now 
become globalized, is a social construction that looks to impose intellectual, social, and 
political order through rationality. However, when society becomes fashioned into 
familiar and manageable classes and structures, Bauman claims that there are always 
individuals and sub-cultures that cannot be managed or controlled. The result then is not 
a world of chaos and terror, but instead one of ambivalence and alienation, as the notion 
of strangerhood  becomes a universal condition of modernity and individuality. 
Modernity s attempt to remove all uncertainty and ambivalence in society through 
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rational thought seems to have a reverse effect. Echoing Theodore Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer s thesis in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944/1982) that rationality s attempt 
to overcome nature and mythology only led back into a world of mythology, Bauman 
states that ambivalence and alienation seems to lie inside modernity s core. 
Extending the work of Simmel and Jacques Derrida, Bauman introduces the 
metaphorical subject the stranger . Accordingly, the stranger or society s undecidables , 
borrowing Derrida s term, a e ncann  and e h b id  ha  a e ncla ified  i hin 
society (148). By being someone who is present yet removed, or familiar and at the same 
ime nfamilia , he ange  doe  no  fall in o ocie s social order by living outside of 
social borde  and he efo e become  an objec  of fea  and a h ea  o ocie  (ibid. 
150). Mo eo e , a  a e l , [ ]he stranger undermines the pa ial o de ing of he o ld  
and di b  he e onance be een ph ical and p chical di ance he is physically 
close while remaining spiritually emo e  (ibid.).  
By using Bauman s concept of the stranger in correlation with Simmel s, I plan 
on showing how modernity and the uncanny are the underlining main source of the figure 
of the stranger/outsider. However, although I base much of my work on Bauman s 
analysis, I critically deviate from his thesis in that I argue that the modern stranger is not 
nece a il  spiritually remote  a  Ba man a g e  b  a he , find  a  o ncannil  
resacralize itself within the liminalness of secularized modernity. John D. Caputo argues 
in Ho pi ali  and he T o ble Wi h God  (2011) that there is an explicit connection 
be een he ange  and God in ha  [ ]he ange  i  bo h a ene able fig e and 
dangerous. The ange  i  maddening, like God. Undecidable, like God  (86). I agree 
with Caputo  a e men  of a God ho goe  again  he endenc  of heolog  o hink 
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in e m  of he di ine o de , and of God a  he o ce of o de  (83). The concep  of God 
is rather ome hing o  of o de  o ble, a  a o ce of di p ion and in e p ion  
and hi  hinking of God a  he o ce of i eg la i  and di o de ed and di placed 
o de  (ibid. 83-4). Ho e e , I con ide  hi  concep  of God, a  ome hing o  of 
o de , directly tied to both the unleashing of the uncanny in secularism and secularized 
modernity itself, when humanity must accept its liminal role as both creator/created and 
where God is made out of our image rather than us out of His.  
In Strangers to Ourselves (1988/1991), Julia Kristeva s notion of the stranger 
being con ained i hin he elf, he hidden face of o  iden i  (1), is important in 
linking the stranger and the uncanny. She argues that through the other, we are able to see 
our own otherness since, according to Kristeva, we are all strangers to ourselves. Here, 
Kristeva s applies, what she claims to be, Christianity s greatest legacy of self-
questioning (This Incredible viii-ix) to the idea of the stranger. By recognizing each other 
through our weakness, our own strangerhood , we thereby remove the uncanny fear of 
the foreigner. With Kristeva s argument, we can see the uncanniness of the other 
invading the self, as the way one feels towards a stranger, reflects what we unconsciously 
feel about ourselves. In this sense, Kristeva points out the modern shift of the 
psychoanalytic stranger, which encompasses everyone, as becoming a liminal experience 
of both encountering, and likewise, being a stranger. It is this paradoxical and liminal 
situation that has allowed for a new perspective of strangeness , where the self is not 
solidified or established by the other, or foreigner, but rather by self-estrangement. By 
doing so, Kristeva argues that the ingrained negative attitude toward strangers and 
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foreigners is removed in favour of a more fluid and ambiguous understanding of the 
terms: 
Let us not seek to solidify, to turn the otherness of the foreigner into a thing. Let 
us merely touch it, brush by it, without giving it permanent structure. Simply 
sketching out its perpetual motion through some of its variegated aspects spread 
out before our eyes today, even some of its former, changing representations 
scattered throughout history. Let us also lighten that otherness by constantly 
coming back to it-but more and more swiftly. Let us escape its hatred, its burden, 
fleeing them not through leveling and forgetting, but through the harmonious 
repetition of the differences it implies and spreads. (3) 
 
Through maintaining a fleeing e e ni  o pe pe al an ience  (ibid. 4), the stranger  
resides in a place of liminality that allows for both the linking together and the presenting 
of differences, which subsequently leads to a strange form of freedom or happiness.  
As secularized modernity continues to push us further into liminal space, it runs 
the risk of also leaving the stranger in a fixed or permanent state of liminality (Turner 
Dramas 261). The liminal personae are either involuntary or voluntary, existentially or 
physicall , e  apa  f om he beha io  of a -occupying, role-playing members of 
ha  em  (ibid., 233). Ho e e , hi  fi ed a e i  p oblema ic: if e e hing i  
constantly in flux, then constant change itself remains the same, and the source of 
exci emen  in liminal pace become  a bo ing o ine in of i elf. Indi id al  a e fo ced 
to invent more and more sophisticated and ultimately perverse forms of entertainment in 
a mad search after experience, in the wish to surpass in excitement the boredom of the 
hectic existence in a permanent s a e of liminali  (S akolc ai 229). I will focus on ways 
through which, if possible, the modern stranger can use alienation as a positive force; 
comparable to the way Deleuze and Guattari (1972/1984,1980/1987) have taken a similar 
tactic with Jacques Lacan s (1977) definition of desire as a lack. Alienation, like desire, 
has the possibility to be utopian, productive, and even courageous. The tragic joy  that 
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Nietzsche (1888/1911) discussed is a necessary tool for the stranger. It could be used as a 
weapon to fight the boredom of life, purity, or social structure, albeit paradoxically, since 
one can only experience this beauty by submersing oneself in the mundane horror and 
unclean liminal space in order to experience the beauty of the sacred aspects that are 
found within it.  
  As a danger to social structures, the stranger paradoxically becomes the central 
figure of utopian thought. A major portion of this project, which is tied to the sacred and 
the secular, is the idea of the messianic or messianic time  and its relationship with 
utopia. Based on the work of Ernst Bloch (1918/2000), I show how the undecidablity of 
the stranger can become a form of re-sacralization and itself a utopian element for social 
change, even among anti-structures. In an attempt to remove the negative connotations 
that come with a blueprint understanding of utopia, Bloch s understanding of the term is 
never static. It is not a final ending place but a dialectical process or a spirit  that 
manifests itself out of the darkness of the present world (201). Utopia, according to Bloch, 
is inherent in the unhappiness, despair, and frustration in the present world, in which 
[h]ope i  in he da kne  i elf  (201). Bloch s use of utopia is imperative for our culture 
as the notion of alienation and disillusionment is not absent from our current society, 
especially since the struggle concerning religion and secularization has created its own 
outsiders, not from a Marxist perspective. 
4. Modern Monsters and Haunting Spectres 
 
Notions of liminality, the uncanny, and the modern stranger are directly tied to the 
concept of monstrosity and therefore, a significant and central aspect to my work. An 
etymological study of the word monster exposes a double meaning; one strain deriving 
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from the Latin (to reveal or show), the other monstrum (to warn), which has been 
traditionally viewed as representing a divine omen or portent of an unexpected 
misfortune (Biles 3; Frueh 26). Like the stranger, the uncanny shift of the monster from 
the Middle Ages to modernity is a movement towards liminality. The monster transforms 
from being outside the borders of what is traditionally regarded as human to a presence 
that is located at its threshold, and as a result, it challenges what we consider human, 
along with our notions of what is monstrous, impure, and ugly. As such, it is a 
compelling representation of both the nature/artificial divide of posthuman gender 
blurring and particularly, as symbolic of the abject female body, which like the monster, 
violates boundaries and threatens the social stability (Kristeva 1980/1982). To this effect, 
Rosi Braidotti (2011) appropriately emphasizes the monster s liminality character 
de c ibing i  a  ep e en a ion of he in-between, the mi ed, he ambi alen , loca ed 
between the sacred and the profane. The peculiarity of the organic monster is that she is 
both Same and Other. The monster is neither a total stranger nor completely familiar. He 
exists in an in-be een one  (216). By representing what is both liminal and structural 
to human identity, the monstrous other for Braidotti s help   nde and he pa ado  
of diffe ence  (ibid). Braidotti not only acknowledges a sacred/profane element to the 
liminal monster but likewise a gender transgressive symbol, where the altering of 
pronouns is a result of seeing the monster as a p oce  i ho  a able objec  (ibid. 
243).  
With secularized modernity, the monstrous becomes a symbol of the loss of both 
spirituality and traditional values in the new technological age and likewise a 
representation of our existential displacement in such a morally ambiguous and liminal 
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universe. Although the monster is conjured up in early modernity in order to differentiate 
between a world of progress from a world of superstition, the modern form of the 
monstrous is ultimately found in secularized modernity itself, in its notions of progress: 
The mon e h ea en  mode ni , in ha  i  o igina e  in mode ni , b  eflec  he 
limi  of i  (N. Scott 2). The monster of modernity shows the vulnerability of an age that 
is fearful of the return of the repressed, and as a result, the monstrous has also become a 
reappropriated positive symbol within modernity, one that goes beyond the dangerous 
representation of chaos and peril that threatens society, to a precarious and ironic symbol 
of hope and even sustainability.  
In relation to monstrosity, the notion of the spectre also gains new significance 
during modernity, especially through the hauntological work of Derrida (1993). While 
also haunting us on the edges of reason, the spectre becomes ever closer to the theme of 
monstrosity the more the fragmented self dissipates further away from the physical world 
and body, making the monster and spectre almost interchangeable in modernity s liminal 
space. The liminal metaphor of the spectre is a haunting image of the present that also 
disrupts time. While the spectre foreshadows through haunting repetition, limiting our 
knowable future, it also sideshadows by offering us numerous presents. In writing, 
sideshado ing i  ed o p od ce a en a ion of he ome hing el e . Unlike 
fo e hado ing ha  come  f om he f e, i  ca  a hado  f om he ide f om 
o he  po ibili ie Side hado  conj e he gho l  p e ence of might-have-beens or 
might-bes  (Morson 118). In light of this, as with the monster, the spectre acts as a 




   
The opening chapter of my dissertation argues that Mary Shelley s Frankenstein 
(1818/1999) is the ideal text in outlining secularized modernity and the monstrosity that 
lurks within it, demonstrating the paradoxes and ambivalences of modernity that have 
challenged us ever since its publication. Through this reading, I trace how the novel 
constitutes the emergence and development of the modern uncanny and liminal stranger 
as a response to the dissolving of collective binaries in the secularizing Western world 
and the ever-increasing fragmentation of modern society, from its once strongly held 
morals to the deconstruction of the internal and external self. Frankenstein is witnessing 
the rise of a paradoxical world where, although humanity is given the freedom to create 
with autonomous and enthusiastic purposefulness, in actuality, our existence contains no 
real plan or blueprint. I argue that Frankenstein is the exemplar of the modern stranger 
and the liminal condition that the modern individual has endured, and therefore, acts as a 
foundation to the philosophy and ideas found in the following of the chapters.  
 The second chapter examines two of the most influential philosopher-poets of 
secularized modernity, Charles Baudelaire and Giacomo Leopardi, who helped define 
and influence our views of the modern condition through the expansion of the notion of 
the monstrous that was laid out in Frankenstein. Through the poetry and philosophical 
writings of Baudelaire and Leopardi, I examine the rise of nihilism and boredom in an 
intensifying urban age and the beginning of a resacralization process that created a 
secularized modern form of the sacred from the ashes of the mythos of Christology. 
Leopardi and Baudelaire looked for meaning in the ashes and ruins of the previous age, 
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while simultaneously being cautious of the terrifying new epoch of the secular hell  that 
was forming around them.   
Chapter three focuses on the historical event of the First World War that brought 
the liminality, absurdity, and most importantly, the violence of modern warfare into the 
lives of the everyday individual, resulting in the modern stranger becoming a figure more 
grounded in everyday life. Here the monster of modernity is transformed into an 
incurable sickness that has infested society but also results in an ironic and paradoxical 
form of utopia. By focusing on Italo Svevo s Zeno s Conscience (1923/2001), Robert 
Musil s The Man Without Qualities (1978/1995), Fritz Lang s M (1931/2004), and 
Walter M. Miller s The Canticle of Leibowitz (1959/2007), I show how both the modern 
stranger and the modern monster are thrust back into postwar society. 
The fourth chapter thrusts us into the post-WWII age of the spectacle and the age 
ruled by social media. I link the liminal concept of boredom to the continuing effects of 
secularized modernity. Although a sentiment that is obviously not exclusive to modernity, 
the modern age generates more ambiguity and fragmentation in its comprehension of 
boredom than previous periods. By examining the various forms of boredom in relation 
to the films of Michelangelo Antonioni, the writings of author Tao Lin, and the 
philosophical works of Sara Ahmed, I examine how these different forms of boredom 
tend to blend into one another when outlining the modern experience of the stranger, with 
the concepts of mood and boredom attempting to redefine the modern stranger for 
contemporary modernity.  
In chapter five I look at the tensions of self and other through online communities 
and social media, and how this is creating new forms of fragmentation. The Internet is a 
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new form of liminal or third space4 created in virtual environments and is quickly 
becoming the preferred means of social interaction, yet also has many interesting 
philosophical and existential implications, which can result in certain resacralizing or 
utopian elements. This chapter focuses on early literary and film depictions of cyberspace 
found in the science fiction genre of cyberpunk, most notably in the novels William 
Gibson and Japanese filmmaker Mamoru Oshii s anime series Ghost in the Shell. While 
also examining Dave Egger s novel The Circle (2013), I discuss how the notion of 
cyberspace has changed the more this technology has become entrenched in our lives.  
I explore the changing landscape of identity, as the lines between human and machine 
become more obscure with both therapeutic and threatening consequences that 
accompany an increasing production of, and reliance on online identities in social media.  
The final chapter looks at the modern stranger in regard to gender and post-
humanism. Gender binaries have been used throughout history to establish a male 
dominated and patriarchal society with characteristics as superior and inferior, tackling 
the uncanny fear of self and other. This chapter returns to Shelley s Frankenstein and 
shows its influence on Donna Haraway s cyborgian feminism, and H l ne Cixous  
reimagining of the mythical figure of Medusa in relation to ideas such as gender, 
 
44 The e m Thi d Space  a  fi  in od ced b  c l al and po -colonial theorist 
Homi Bhabha (1990). According to Bhabha, the third space is a liminal space of cultural 
h b idi , hich gi e  i e o omething different, something new and unrecognizable, a 
ne  a ea of nego ia ion of meaning and ep e en a ion  (211). While he e m i  la gel  
used in post-colonial studies, the concept is largely missing from studies on internet and 
cyberculture. According to Masoud Kosari and Abbas Amoori (2018) however, the term 
doe  ha e a place in die  of c be pace ince i  necessitates redefining society and 
social in e ac ion , hile [ ]he increasing expansion of the borderline spaces, better 
called interpenetration, necessitates further complications of the mental and conceptual 
pace  (185). 
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sexuality, the monstrous, and abyssal resacralization. Along these theorists, I examine the 
novels Don Quixote, which was a dream (1986) and Empire of the Senseless (1988) by 
Kathy Acker, in her attempt to deconstruct gender binaries and the language that upholds 
them through the feminist act of writing herself, while simultaneously and paradoxically, 
acknowledging that she is still liminally confined to them.  
The intention of this dissertation is to examine the liminal sphere located between 
the secular and sacred that I argue has characterized modernity itself. This space has 
consequently altered the makeup of the stranger from something external, into a figure far 
more liminal, which is forced to traverse this uncanny space in an attempt to find new 
meanings for an age that is struggling to maintain any. 
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II: FRANKENSTEIN AND THE ‘BIRTH’ OF SECULARIZED 
MODERNITY 
  
The e i  ome hing a  o k in m  o l hich I do no  nde and  (Robert Walton) 
- Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (1831) 
 
The spirit, the specter are not the same thing, and we will have to sharpen this difference; but as for what 
they have in common, one does not know what it is, what it is presently  This Thing is absent  
- Jacques Derrida, Specter of Marx 
 
The sight of the burning tree inspires a vision of the majesty of the day which lights the world without 
setting fire to it at the same time 
- Max Horkheimer & Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment  
 
Just as primitive man believed himself to stand face to face with demons and believed that could he but 
know their names he would become their master, so is contemporary man faced by this incomprehensible, 
which disorders his calculations. "If I can but grasp it, if I can but cognise it", so he thinks, "I can make it 
m  e an .   




The beginning of the nineteenth century was a significant period of transition 
within Europe, as the accruing of contemporary history s revolutionary, secular, and 
modernizing ideals were beginning to be integrated into quotidian life. The signature 
distinction of this time is intrinsically tied to the implementation of the dominant modern 
principles of reason, progress, and social change, which were all grounded in a 
consciousness or soul  of individualism and autonomy. Yet, this amalgam of modern, 
and often opposing, principles produced a problematic and paradoxical condition for 
many modern individuals, who were caught between two existing worlds: the one of the 
traditional past and the modern one that was being implemented. It was this conflicted 
and tumultuous age that was the backdrop to Mary Shelley s Frankenstein, or the 
Modern Prometheus (1818/1831)5, a novel that primarily lays out the psychological and 
 
5 Although originally published in 1818 (1999), Mary Shelley revised the novel in 1831 
(2003). There are several delicate, yet significant differences between these two editions 
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spiritual paradigm, of not only the emerging modern and secular world during the early 
nineteenth century, but also one that lingers and continues to uncannily haunt modernity. 
From the incessant Frankenstein complex , to our tensions between ambiguity and 
knowledge; from our uncanny fear of self and other, to the concept of the stranger 
increasingly alienated from society, Nature, and a silent God, Shelley s novel illuminated 
a shadowy interweaving counterpart to the prevailing ideals of the early modern epoch - a 
monster  of modernity that should not exist, but nonetheless does, throwing a shadow 
and haunting humanity along its journey of progress. Due to Shelley s elucidation of 
these modern struggles and by being one of the first illustrations of modernity s abject 
space, a liminal zone encompassing both fascination and repulsion, I argue that, although 
a process, the rising questions and complications of secularized modernity was 
epitomized within the pages of Shelley s seminal novel.  
It should be noted that this is not just another reading of Frankenstein, a novel 
that has been analyzed in academic circles for countless years, but an analysis that 
contextualizes Frankenstein within the imminent rational and secularizing modern world 
as an indication of the paradoxes and ambivalences of modernity. Through this reading, I 
argue that the novel constitutes the literary emergence and development of the modern, 
uncanny, and liminal stranger caught in the intensifying malaise of secularized modernity. 
Nonetheless, important scholarly work on the subject is highly relevant to my own 
research on the topic and will be used to support this claim. For example, Fred Botting s 
 
in regard to style, structure, and plot, the most prominent being Vic o  appa en  abili  
to exercise freewill and agency in the 1818 edition, while in 1831 edition, he seems to be 
a victim of Fate and Chance. All citations where the text is the same will be from the 
1831 edition. For a detailed and interesting study on the differences between the two 
edi ion , ee Anne K. Mello , Re i ing F anken ein  in Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her 
Fiction, Her Monsters (1988). 
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deconstructive analysis of Shelley s novel in Making Monstrous: Frankenstein, Criticism 
Theory (1991) is essential in showing the novel s multiplicitous spirit, arguing that every 
textual interpretation that tries to centralize or unify the novel s meaning, ultimately fails 
or contradicts itself. Botting s reading of Frankenstein is situated in the extremes 
between Victor Frankenstein and his Creature; the former stands for a fixed identity, 
totalitarianism, and authority, while the Creature represents an unstable difference and 
otherness (139). While I agree with Botting that these two representations of identity 
exist within the novel, I do not feel that a dualistic separation between the characters is 
justified, but rather that both simultaneously represent fixed and fluid identities in their 
own right. The Creature can be as demanding and totalitarian as Victor Frankenstein, 
while Victor s hope of progress places him in an undertaking of discovering unfixed 
po ibili ie , a mi ion ha  Da id Fo e  Wallace (2013) de c ibe  a  elfle  and 
me ianic  (133). Another important aspect of Botting s work is his interpretation of the 
monstrous as a manifestation of the turbulent political climate of the time, commenced 
with the French Revolution. While this is a significant aspect of my own research, I 
expand on this idea by arguing the French Revolution was just as essential to the 
secularization process and the age s religious and spiritual discontent as it was to the 
political spectrum, culminating in the novel s ambiguous and liminal stance on both areas.  
Lee Sterrenburg s work is similarly important in that it also looks at the political 
and psychological fallout that the French Revolution had on Shelley  o k. In Ma  
Shelley s Monster: Politics and Psyche in Frankenstein  (1979), Sterrenburg argues that 
despite her dedication of the novel to her father, Shelley mainly critiques and parodies 
William Godwin s radical utopian politics. Originally influenced by her father and 
 38 
husband Percy Shelley s radical and utopian political ideals, Shelley slowly abandoned 
these in favour of a more anti-revolutionary position, culminating in the political 
ambivalence that exists within the novel. This theory goes fairly against Anne K. 
Mellor s claim that the two editions show a radical change between them. Mellor s Mary 
Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters (1988) is a biographical and feminist 
analysis or Shelley s work. Mellor s analysis explores how the all-male creation myth 
highligh  he hie a chical po e -systems both within the nuclear family and in the 
ocie  a  la ge , he eal mon e  of he o  (217). Although Mellor s analysis 
itemizes the way that Shelley s life influences the majority of her work and presents 
many compelling arguments regarding hierarchical power-systems, her analysis of 
Frankenstein at times undermines the novel s premise regarding the ambiguity 
encompassed within modernity and the fear that comes with contesting that ambiguity, 
particularly when concerning Mellor s study of the edited novel s ending over that of 
Mary Shelley s unpublished original.  
Mellor  main a g men  in he chap e  Re i ing F anken ein  i  ha  Shelle  
altered the meaning and spiritual core of the novel in the 1831 edition to coincide with 
her radically new philosophical and political views at the time; views that had become far 
mo e pe imi ic and melancholic once he had lo  fai h in he po ibili  ha  a 
generous, loving, and nurturant response to both human and physical nature might create 
a world witho  mon e  (176). Ho e e , I a g e ha  he a emp , e en if f ile, o 
suppress the uncanny at the end of the novel and the inevitability of a modern world with 
monsters exist in both editions. The two editions should not be seen as distinctive or 
opposites, but instead, more like shadows of one another. They both ask the question of 
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whether secular knowledge and agency are able to steer human history consciously 
towards scientific and linear progress, or whether freedom has simply left us in a world 
dictated by chaos and chance. If we examine the two editions of Frankenstein together, 
Shelley seems to argue that both Chance and Fate are somewhat paradoxically 
interlocked with one another.  
Frankenstein is by no means is an outdated tale that represented an early modern 
and transitional society that no longer exists. As with modernity, our current age s 
fragmented identity is symbolically tied to the Creature s physical facade of scattered 
limbs assembled together. Society in late modernity continues to be caught within a 
social narrative in, which stems from multiple storytellers, perspectives, and sources of 
knowledge that still resembles a hybrid creature uncannily akin to the one Victor 
Frankenstein created in the darkest corners of his laboratory. As Richard J. Dunn (1974) 
argues, Frankenstein is concerned with a fragmenting society in which communication 
emain  incomple e  (416). Mo e impo an l , eaching a m l i de of heo ie  ch a  
Marxism, (Moretti 1982, Michie, 1990), along with disciplines such as environmental 
studies (Curtin 2005, Hammond 2004), psychoanalysis (J. Berman 1990, Marsh 2009), 
and especially regarding racial (Malchow, 1993, Piper 2007, Young 2008), feminist 
(Yousef 2002, Hoeveler 2003) and gender studies, (Thornburg 1987, Mellor 1988), 
Frankenstein remains not only a prophetic warning, but a modern myth that relentlessly 
renews its influence in our disjointed and continuously becoming  artificial-reality. As 
Jon Turney argues in Frankenstein s Footsteps: Science, Genetics and Popular Culture 
(1998), Shelley  o  abo  finding he ec e  of life became one of he mo  impo an  
m h  of mode ni , adding ha  no  ha  he ec e  of life a e o  fo  he aking e 
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need to ask what role that myth will play in the collective debate about how to make use 
of hem  (2-3). In this regard, Frankenstein seriously encompasses Marshall Berman s 
(1982) pa ado ical di po i ion of mode ni m: o be f ll  mode n i  o be an i-mode n  
(14) in such a highly developed and felicitous manner. Shelley s modern Prometheus6 has 
become the creation story of the modern era, our mythos that captures and illuminates our 
modern experience of struggling to belong in a secular and alienating world where 
responsibility ultimately rests in the individual. Yet, Frankenstein is an uncanny or 
paradoxical creation myth, since the apocalyptical end to the older traditional world is 
entirely intertwined with the birth of the new monstrous one, and as a result, provides us 
with a prototype of the modern stranger that encapsulates a world that creates far more 
questions than answers. 
FRANKENSTEIN AND SECULARIZATION       
 
Mary Shelley s Frankenstein points to a problematic and paradoxical 
characteristic of modernity: with the arrival of the French Revolution, humanity s attempt 
 
6 The symbol of Prometheus as both the modern individual and myth is not only used in  
Frankenstein. Mary Shelley s husband, Percy Shelley, published Prometheus Unbound in 
1820. De pi e he eac iona  fail e  of he F ench Re ol ion, Pe c  Prometheus 
personifies the ideal spirit of rebellion and heroic struggle, contrasting Mary Shelley s 
ambiguous usage of the Greek myth with a more optimistic view of human progress. 
Franz Kafka  pa able P ome he  (1918/1971) uses the myth to address the 
problematic question of existence. After outlining the four different versions of the myth, 
he writes, [ ]he e emain  he ine plicable ma  of ock. The legend ie  o e plain he 
inexplicable. As it comes out of the substratum of truth it has in turn to end in the 
ine plicable  (432). In a similar absurdist vein, Giacamo Leopardi s take on the 
Prometheus m h, The Wage  of P ome he  (1824/1983) in Moral Tales, shows 
Prometheus a  a gamble  and o blemake . In Leopa di  ale, Prometheus takes a 
contest between the gods for the greatest creation too seriously, only to eventually give 
up on humanity after witnessing its destructive Nature. Although both Leopardi and Mary 
Shelley portray Prometheus as a risk taker, the distinctions between the two Prometheus  
highligh  he diffe ence  be een bo h i e  philo ophie , hich hall be f he  
outlined in the next chapter.  
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to free itself from Destiny still leaves it in the hands of Chance, where human control 
outside of the hands of God is no more realistic.7 By 1818, the enthusiasm of the French 
Revolution was slowly subsiding, while its most famous original critique, Edmund s 
Burke s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790/1999), was gaining popularity 
outside of conservative circles with free thinking individuals like Mary Shelly, who 
began to side with Burke s reproach of reason as a universal and objective standard 
(Sterrenburg 1979). Caught within this tension, Shelley s novel takes a liminal stance as 
i  eem  o bo h con c  and undermine the possibility of authority: it operates within 
b  b e  and lea e  open he bina  limi  i  conf on  (Bo ing 1991, 152). 
Frankenstein builds and deconstructs simultaneously the teleological narrative of 
modernity by addressing the ambiguous situation of its age, which was caught between a 
mon e  of a con i ion  (B ke 196) in anarchy and destruction and the utopian spirit 
of humanity s ability to ambitiously change the world for the better. The novel s moral 
and socio-political stance is a liminal hybrid positioned within this void, between two 
contrasting views of utopian and revolutionary change: one of fear, and one of optimism. 
Yet, despite the growing criticism of romanticizing the historic event as utopian, Burke s 
attack on the French Revolution was unable to stop the lasting ideological, social, and 
spiritual effects the French Revolution had upon European society.  
As Albert Camus claims in The Rebel (1951/1991), after the storming of the 
Bastille and the subseque   [ ] G d  Ja a  21, 1793  (39), d  
and p og e  ha e aken o e  he a ea of he ac ed b  ed cing God o he heo e ical 
 
7 Although the outcomes may be similar, fate and destiny are not the same as chance. As 
Saxena and Dixit (2001) poin  o  fa e and [d]e in  implie  ome hing fo eo dained o  
a p ede e mined co e of e en , he ea  [c]hance mean  ome hing ha  happen  
unpredictability without discernable human intention or ob e able ca e  (36). 
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e i ence of a mo al p inciple  (132), he eb  making he ne l  ac i ed al e  of 
Nation, Liberty, and Reason, the new authoritative religious forces on earth. The French 
Revolution and the ensuing destruction of the monarchy, created a gap or void between 
God and humanity with the killing of the King, God s voice or bridge from earth to 
heaven, leaving the Republic on its own without any of God s moral laws (39). The 
iolen  Jacobin chap e  of he F ench Re ol ion a pi ed o e e a  he bea e  of he 
me ianic mi ion of he hope  of he mode n  (C i a do 256), making i  he defining 
moment when Jacob s ladder would be deconstructed and rebuilt, no longer as a passage 
between heaven and earth, but between humanity and its ambitions. Located within this 
unsettled social, political, and spiritual environment, and unable to situate itself amongst 
contrasting ideologies, Frankenstein mold  hem in o a ni e hi d  and a k  ha  i  
i  like o be labeled, defined, and e en ph icall  di o ed b  a poli ical e eo pe  
(Sterrenburg 166).  
 This move towards secularized modernity not only leads to an unnerving political 
and moral malaise, but a spiritual void also begins to accumulate due to a state of fleeting 
impulses and a blurring of traditionally held dualities previously cemented into the social 
and cultural structure. This thrusts certain modern individuals, exemplified in the novel 
by both Frankenstein and the Creature, into a state of liminality and stranger-hood, not 
merely due to the political situation but also because of the spiritual and moral traditions 
that were held up by the strict and hierarchical structure of the great chain of being. 
Shelley s world of Frankenstein lacks a God, at least one that is pure or omnipotent, and 
it is also noteworthy to mention that in a text where creator and created play such a 
significant role, in both editions, God s name is usually uttered in reaction to horrible 
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acts8 (Shelley 26, 58, 74, 195, 199), while Justine s unbreakable faith simply results in 
her tragic, yet forgotten death. The Frankensteins  servant is accused and executed for the 
murder of Victor s younger brother William, the Creature s first victim, and once arrested, 
confesses to a crime she did not commit out of fear of being excommunicated from the 
Church and the possibility of going to Hell. Justine  ffe  f om he mi e  of 
innocence  (ibid. 89) and her sentencing further exemplifies the novel s ambiguity 
concerning corruption, justice, purity, Chance, and Fate. God is nowhere to help an 
innocent person who becomes a victim of a series of events she has no control or even 
knowledge of. 
However, the irreligious stance of the novel does not come from a removal of 
religion or sacredness but instead from the secularizing/resacralizing process that lies in 
modernity. The novel secularizes, yet retains, the mythos of Christianity, though the 
allegorical aspects of the religion are blurred, inverted, or distorted. While in the creation 
o  of Gene i , in hich Adam and E e lo e hei  innocence f om hei  ac i ed 
ability to recognize the difference between good and evil, Shelley, on the other hand, 
reverses this by bestowing the loss of innocence on Frankenstein and the Creature, and 
subsequently the reader, as a result of the removal or blurring of good and evil, where one 
cannot distinguishes between the two, especially since this problematical binary could no 
longer be attributed to the mysterious plan of God. In both stories, neither is unable to go 
 
8 The mo  no able one being hen Vic o  fi  eali e  he gline  of hi  c ea ion; 
Bea if l!  Great God! His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and 
arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly 
whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, 
that seemed almost of the same colour as the dun white sockets in which they were set, 
his shriveled complexion, and straight black lips (Shelley 58). 
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back to their familiar Edens  of innocence and ignorance and must be propelled into the 
future without the parental protection of their creator. Frankenstein takes this even 
further through the shock of animation that supersedes the omnibenevolence and 
omnipotence of a creator with modernity s shadowy secret: bland ugliness and 
powerlessness. With Frankenstein, Shelley secularizes the question of theodicy. The 
responsibilities formally attributed to God now lie on humanity s shoulders, yet she 
reminds us that the question of evil can no longer be circumvented with answers of divine 
mystery, since humanity has taken command of the vitality of history. The future that 
Shelley formed in her imaginary, and foreshadowed in reality, is one in which God has 
abandoned h mani  in he ame a  he C ea e a  abandoned b  hi  na al lo d 
and king  (Shelley 102-3). By abandoning the Creature, Frankenstein simply lives up to 
his role as creator and leaves his creation to its own devices.  
To be fair, Frankenstein borrows considerably from the secularizing literary 
devices of the Romantic and Gothic novels that preceded it, exemplifying the seeds  of 
modernity that both traditions began to cultivate. Not only did it continue the Gothic 
genre s aesthetic of dark and mysterious atmospheric tales of suspense and supernatural  
terror, more notably, concerning its sociocultural and psychological effects, the novel 
renews the Gothic s and Romantic s modern and liminal ritual of secularizing the scared 
into the uncanny, a phenomenon that manifests itself in modernity from the ashes of 
religion. In Unquiet Things: Secularism In The Romantic Age (2015) Colin Jager 
challenge  he no ion ha  a  mode ni  ec la i e , he p e ence o  noi e  of eligion i  
elimina ed. In ead, Jage  claim  ha  he ec la  ilence  i  nable o comple el  
emo e he e id e o  gho  of eligion and he ac ed (4), and ha  i hin he a ic, 
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he ambien  noi e, he al e na i e f e enc e can hea  he pa ic la  kind of 
n ie  (9). The e noi e  and di bance  in ec la  pace ha e of en been 
characterized by moments of the uncanny. In Gothic Riffs: Secularizing the Uncanny in 
the European Imaginary, 1780-1820 (2010), Diane Long Hoeveler, using Charles 
Taylor s secularizing process outlined in A Secular Age (2007),9 focuses on the Gothic as 
a cultural practice designed, no  nece a il  a  a eac ion again  ec la i m, b  a  pa  
of he ambi alen  ec la i ing p oce  i elf  ha  a  in en ed o in an ia e he i e of 
ec la i m  (6). According to Hoeveler, [a]  a majo  componen  of he ec la i ing 
process, the gothic aesthetic anxiously looked both backward and forward at the same 
time, torn between reifying the past and anxiously embracing a future it could not quite 
en i ion  ( ii). D e o hi  liminal position of being caught between the ambiguous 
modernizing attempts of society, although a society where myth and magic still holds 
power over the social imaginary, the uncanny originates with the Gothic tradition (30). 
The Janus-faced genre stands between a feudal and religious past and a contemporary 
world being established on the rational principles brought forth from both the Protestant 
reformation and the subsequent Age of the Enlightenment. Yet, what essentially makes 
the Gothic genre modern, according o Hoe ele , i  i  p eocc pa ion i h he j  no  
or the moment of immediacy, reflected in its fascination with death, the apocalypse, and 
alienation (11). Due to what Hoeveler identifies as gothic riffs , the Gothic represents 
 
9 Although working a o nd Ta lo  f ame o k, Hoe ele  does not agree with his 
argument that during the late eighteenth century there existed two binary subjectivities: 
the porous  elf, ho a  np o ec ed f om he anima  o  pi i al o ld, and he 
skepticism of the buffered  self, who effectively removed any need of the supernatural. 
Hoeveler rejects this binary, arguing in ead of an in e ac ion  o  o cilla ion  be een 
these subjectivities (16-17). 
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he fi  l  modern discourses in which individuals stand in sort of existential 
aliena ion in a ni e e of hei  o n la gel  imagina  making  (15).  
If, from its early inception, the Gothic was itself a modern genre that drew out the 
uncanny through the secularization of the scared, and likewise, emphasized the concept 
of the wandering, alienated, and liminal individual, then why should we begin secularized 
modernity with Shelley s novel, which many critics argue as simply part of the Gothic 
tradition, or at the very least, immensely influenced by Romantic, Gothic literature, and 
even established folklore? (Haggerty 1989, Kilgour 1995, Tichelaar 2012). It must also 
be stated that although the Gothic genre has many similar literary devices and tropes as a 
whole, it cannot be classified in any exclusive way, since the essence  of what ties the 
gen e oge he  i  ag e o  m able  (Godd  266) and i  meaning  o  in e p e a ion  
fluctuate in accordance with the historical, cultural, and ideological environment in which 
they were created and understood (Botting 2001, 1). Still, there are multiple reasons for 
beginning the advent of secularized modernity and the modern stranger with Shelley s 
celebrated novel. First of all, despite its clear influences from and affiliations with Gothic 
literary conventions, it would be deceptive to simply categorize Shelley s masterpiece as 
part of the Gothic tradition. Frankenstein is a difficult novel to classify in any single 
genre, even transformative ones like the Romantic and Gothic, for it stands in a textual 
liminal space in of itself, as it redefines or goes beyond the previous commonly used 
Gothic and horror elements, twisting and blurring common held dichotomies, such as 
myth and reality, good and evil, light and dark, villain and hero, real and artificial, and 
even representations of the double or doppelgänger, far beyond any novel before it.  
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However, what truly distinguishes Frankenstein from previous Gothic novels, and 
what makes it a forbearer of modernism and science fiction (Reichart 1994, Stableford 
1995, Donawerth 1997, Botting 2005, McMahon 2007),10 is that it is not merely 
conce ned i h he pa  o  impl  he j  no , b  in ead i h o  pa ado ical f e 
of what is becoming . The ea on h  Go hic li e a e a  an io sly embracing a 
f e i  co ld no  i e en i ion,  a  Hoe ele  a g e , had o do i h i  adhe ence o 
past traditional dichotomies it was trying to reject, such as in Catholicism, while 
championing a more rationalist view of Christianity that ultimately upheld the same 
binaries.11 On the other hand, by looking toward a prophetic future, Frankenstein is 
curious and troubled with the uncertain society that is forming, perhaps more so than the 
one it is leaving behind. It is first to envision a world where science, technology, and 
secular knowledge look towards and succeed in, replacing ancient beliefs, customs, and 
previously held social constructions. Whereas the supernatural undertaking of the Gothic 
was still reliant on the recognizable characteristics, symbols, and dualities found in 
Christianity, Frankenstein borrows but blurs the lines of these universally recognized 
moral symbols. The supernatural and the uncanny are no longer located in the feudal and 
religious past but instead in the conceptualization of secular knowledge and a scientific 
 
10 Shelley was influenced by the science of her age as much as Gothic and Romantic 
literature. Jasia Reichardt (1994) a g e  ha  he no el i  no  a o  abo  alchem  and 
magic but science, or more precisely, about natural philosophy, chemistry and gal ani m  
(136-137). 
11 As Hoeveler explains, although most Gothic literature was a result of Protestantism s 
attempt to remove the irrational elements found within medieval Catholicism, the 
otherness of Catholicism was still an intrinsic and uncanny component within 
Protestantism, leaving Gothic literature fractured between a thirst for the modern and 
nostalgia for the early Catholic traditions. As a result, the Gothic attempt to secularize the 
ncann  i  a ha  one , ince he e ea lie  belief  hold a  m ch po e  a  he a ional 
ones that looked to eliminate them (30-31). 
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view of progress that gave humanity its hegemonic belief in the future can be molded and 
controlled. Published at the cusp of the Gothic tradition, Frankenstein reconstructs the 
liminal text or bridge between the secular uncanny of the early Gothic tradition and the 
rising modernist one caught in a battle of the artificial and natural, which would endure 
well into the twentieth century. It does not contemplate the past while standing in the 
present as the Gothic genre formally subsisted, but rather, it resides in the modern liminal 
state where past, present, and future collide with one another, leaving the stranger in a 
very ambiguous position of struggling to find meaning or remnants of the sacred in the 
intensifying cold and calculated world.  
The future God in Frankenstein is not an omnipotent being removed from our 
society but instead, the ambitious man, symbolized by Victor Frankenstein, who is 
immersed, though detached from society. Frankenstein s secularized and liminal stance 
of creator and created is even furthered by the act of secrecy. Whether Frankenstein 
should have shared his creation, his secret, with the rest of humanity, and whether his 
silence demonstrates an abuse of power are questions that have lingered throughout the 
history of the novel. His whole experiment is shrouded in mystery and secrecy from 
beginning to end as one secret consequently leads to another; at first to hide his 
controversial research and to maintain his authority and power over unearthing science s 
nkno n po e  and deepe  m e ie  (Shelle , 1831 49), but then continuing in 
order to protect his family and more importantly, modern secular society. If we examine 
the Augustinian understanding of secrecy, it paradoxically shifts from a divine element to 
one of in, di ided b  he ac ed/p ofane bina , in hich God b ing  abo  hi  dden 
conversion away from worldly values by acting on and through the hidden, concealed 
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depths of man  co p ion  (Vance 13). Consequently, the paradox of secrecy goes 
beyond a sacred and profane perspective and encompasses the idea itself, since in order 
for a secret to be recognized, there must also be knowledge of the concealment by 
another person, which simultaneously reveals and conceals the unknown information 
(Bellman 2).  
Nevertheless, secrecy opens up the opportunity of two different worlds. The 
secret world actively affects the ob io  o ld  (Simmel 462). The second world of 
ambiguity that Victor witnesses through the Creature s eyes puts the obvious  world 
based on science and linear progress into serious doubt. Modernity s secret now becomes 
Victor s once he becomes creator: one of a liminal future that cannot be controlled by 
humanity even though it now has gained agency in its own history. The responsibility of 
secrecy falls upon Frankenstein, which forces him into concealing his creation in order to 
protect himself and the people he loves, even though in the end it ironically leads to his 
and his family s downfall. Frankenstein s narrative is structured around what Freud 
(1900/1965) a ed a  he mode n and he ec la  ad ance of ep e ion in he emo ional 
life of mankind  (298), as the more religion wanes in everyday life, the more repressed 
we become.12 To Frankens ein, hi  ec e  i  a b den ha  canno  be e ealed: I a oided 
explanation, and maintained a continual silence concerning the wretch I had created. I 
had a feeling that I should be supposed mad, and this for ever chained my tongue, when I 
would have given he hole o ld o ha e confided he fa al ec e  (Shelle  190). The 
Creature is kept a secret because Victor does not know what he created, opening up 
 
12 To f he  he ela ion hip be een ec la i a ion and ne o i , F e d a g e  [ ]ou 
cannot exaggerate the intensity of man s inner resolution and craving for authority. The 
extraordinary increase in the neuroses since the power of religion has waned may give 
o  ome indica ion of i  ( F e P o pec  290). 
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modernity s Pandora s box. Frankenstein understands that the second liminal world 
hidden within modernity has a detrimental effect on the ideals that are supposedly going 
to take human history towards a utopia here on earth, where the world is no longer 
believed to be mysterious or subjected to Fate but instead controlled by the human 
endeavor towards utopian perfection. In the end, the real secret Frankenstein is trying to 
protect is that human creation is no better than God s, when modern science promised so 
much more.  
THE HISTORICAL SHIFT OF THE MONSTROUS 
 
For most of history, monsters have been represented as symbolic and liminal 
being , of en connec ed o bo h god  and ange , a  he e fig e  of O he ne  [ ha ] 
occ p  he f on ie  one he e ea on fal e  and fan a ie  flo i h  (Kea ne  3). The 
monster has always been a representational being that transcends the borders of 
sacred/profane, and in turn, as a representation of chaos, irrationality, and disorder, acts 
as a warning for both the individual and society at large. However, as liminal creatures, 
monsters simultaneously, and paradoxically, become symbols of a return to order once 
they are defeated at the hands of a heroic figure. The slaying of the monster in most quest 
fiction completes the rite of passage for the hero s journey, moving from the liminal 
phase to the phase of inclusion that ultimately restores order for both hero and society, 
and the realms of the sacred and profane. During the Middle Ages, the monster s 
sacred/profane relationship was strengthened, as was its function of being a 
exemplification of divine admonition, in which their deaths reinforced the glory and 
sacredness of God and the Catholic Church. Outside the oral tradition of fairy tales, 
monster lore during the Middle Ages did not really exist in literary popular culture and 
 51 
was predominantly controlled by the lea ned cla e  (Smi h 16). It was largely the 
saints and clergymen that took up the heroic mantle of monster slayers in medieval 
literature, as much of the literature and folklore of the time looked to reinterpret classic 
monsters symbolically through a biblical and Christian lens (Huet 89; Kearney 29; Bovey 
27). Even the early oral Latin fairy and folk tales of the time were shaped by the themes 
of Christian doctrine, morality, and ethics (Zipes 8-9), while the presence of God was 
usually found in the background of most medieval fables (J. Ziolkowski 196). 
 Beginning with the Renaissance, monsters slowly began to be categorized much 
more scientifically, often seen as abnormalities surviving outside the laws and course of 
nature, although initially, still co-existing with its earlier theological construction 
(Ghadessi 19). It was Fortunio Liceti (1616) who began the long secularization process of 
he mon e  ha  mo ed i  a a  f om i  di ine o igin  a  po en o  hea enl  ign  
(ibid. 21), grounding it in more of a physical and medical teratological classification and 
away from the religious, supernatural, and metaphysical realms of the Middle Ages. As 
European history shifted to the early modern period and the Enlightenment, the fear of 
the monster had transformed into curiosity, creating a far more relaxed outlook towards 
them as the Age of Reason began to take hold over society (Hagner 175). However, the 
monster and supernatural as a whole, seems to return to popular culture during the 
eighteenth century with the rise of the Romantic and Gothic literary movements. 
Although it kept the monster as a secularized figure, the Romantic and Gothic 
movements challenged reason not through religious means but rather through an 
examination of an excess of emotions and desires. The monsters in Gothic fiction 
frequently became a symbol of the inability to control or suppress these desires, while 
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also continuing its usage as a critique against the monstrous superstition that many 
Protestants argued Catholicism had attached to Christianity, and in doing so, retain the 
monster s symbolic nature as a warning. A significant change, nonetheless, is that the 
borders that the monster traversed on, no longer exist in far away lands that the hero must 
travel to, but instead are located in the shadows of the modern city and the human psyche. 
As with the stranger, as society approached the modern age, the topographical location of 
the monster is far closer than previously in history. 
 Despite this, the monster still retains its liminal character of being both a symbol 
of chaos and also a return to order. Originally, Gothic literature was generally expressed 
through two subgenres.13 In Gothic terror , which was popularized by Ann Radcliff in 
novels such as The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794/1987) and The Italian (1797/1968), the 
monster, and all supernatural occurrences for that matter, are not slain by the hero but 
nonetheless retain a return to order through its elimination. Instead of the hero defeating 
the monster with strength and courage, the tools of reason and rationality are now used to 
dispel the monster as an element of superstition, and thereby, continue the symbolic 
representation that the monster s demise leads to a return or restoring of order. Gothic 
horror , originally materializing in Matthew Gregory Lewis  The Monk (1796/2004), 
broke away from Radcliff s dispelling of the supernatural through reason. Although 
 
13 In her e a  On he S pe na al in Poe  (1826), Ann Radcliffe first distinguishes 
between horror  and terror . Horror is the fear of something tangible, exhibited through, 
repulsion, shock, and violence, while terror is channeled through anxiety, a fear of the 
unknown, and is characterized, according to Radcliff, as nce ain  and ob c i  
(150). Radcliff saw horror as inferior as it was unable to conjure up a sense of the 
blime: Te o  and ho o  a e o fa  oppo i e, ha  he fi  e pand  he o l, and 
awakens the faculties to a high degree of life; the other contracts, freezes, and nearly 
annihila e  hem  (ibid.) 
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retaining the trope of monstrosity as a characteristic of Catholicism and the human 
psyche, the supernatural instances in Lewis  work go unexplained and unexamined. The 
supernatural for Lewis was an extension of reality, and although he himself was a skeptic, 
the monsters and the supernatural as a whole in his stories, reflected the hysteria, 
irrationality, and superstition of the many people who did believe in them (Lewis, 
Po c ip  o The Castle Spec e  198). Lewis  horror  novels went beyond the stories 
of terror , as they were not only a critique of Catholic mania but likened the same 
hysteria towards the French Revolution, social change, and the ensuing chaos it would 
bring. Although containing a much more tragic ending than novels in the terror  genre, 
Lewis  The Monk still restores a sense of order and normalcy at the novel s conclusion 
(Haggerty, The Fail e  131).  
 The recognition of the Creature as something real, an emphasis on violence, and 
its apparent anti-Jacobin stance, may seem to link Shelley s Frankenstein firmly with the 
horror classification of Gothic fiction; however, as with its treatment of the uncanny and 
Gothic genre in general, Frankenstein transcends these binaries by borrowing but also 
subverting these classifications, residing in between both definitions of horror and terror. 
Shelley displays both by exercising many common horror tropes but still applying an 
overarching sense of an uncertainty and terror through the anxiety of an unknown future, 
which dictates of the story s use of fear. More importantly, unlike previous Gothic fiction, 
Frankenstein is reluctant in restoring order with the novel s conclusion. Frankenstein 
may very well be the first hero  who is unable to restore order since he fails to tame or 
slay the monster he created nor can he dispel it as illusionary through reason since it was 
created through scientific reason itself, leaving us to contemplate a liminal and unknown 
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future. While these reasons do separate Shelley s handling of the monster from previous 
Gothic fiction, her most significant act is making the Creature have its own conscience, 
desires, emotions, and most importantly, a voice. It is the first monster that is allowed to 
speak, to tell its own story, and as a result, the first monster that readers truly sympathize 
with. With the birth of Frankenstein s creature, Shelley begins to distance monstrosity 
away from an interpretation that simply sees it as an extension of evil and instead 
produces a reading that is far more ambiguous. With Frankenstein, the monstrosity 
contained in humans is not restricted to specific evil people or demons, but instead is 
something ubiquitous that lives within human, or rather male, excess and hubris. 
MODERNITY’S MONSTROUS SECRET 
 
In he  In od c ion  o he 1831 edi ion, Shelle  decla e  a fea  of an  h man 
endea o  o mock he pendo  mechani m of he C ea o  of he o ld  (9), 
solidifying the novel s discernible warning against an unrelenting thirst for knowledge 
and human progress in divergence of God s perfect creation. However, her anxiety 
continues with the terrifying thought of the mocker s  cce  in achie ing God s 
work (ibid), which seems to build a sense of dread more from an uncanny fear in the 
monstrous achievement than any attempt, or failure , at playing God. The uncanny fear 
of the novel comes from Victor s triumph, for it brings to light the anxieties surfacing as 
a result of humanity s progress in the modern world. The imagination, agency, and thirst 
for knowledge that surges through Frankenstein during the process of creation and 
discovery, dissipates once he is triumphant in creating life from nothing. The originally 
beautiful physical image of the Creature alters only when it is finally animated, resulting 
in an uncanny terror that illuminates itself afterwards through reflection and not during 
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he p oce ; no  ha  I had fini hed, he bea  of he d eam ani hed, and b eathless 
ho o  and di g  filled m  hea  (Shelle  58). The perspective of the Creature s 
ph ical appea ance change  hen Vic o  ga e  in o i  ho ible watery, clouded eyes  
(186), and since the eyes are traditionally known as a gateway to soul,14 the soul of 
humanity is no longer masked by its physical beauty but rather through eyes that reveal a 
horrific truth. It is through the action of reanimated life that the internal horror has 
projected and manifested itself onto the physical appearance of the Creature.15  
Here again, Shelley reverses the typical dichotomy of dark (evil) and light (good). 
In Frankenstein, light symbolizes knowledge, birth, and the Enlightenment ideals, yet it 
becomes a threatening aspect to our existence. The Creature s eyes blend into the 
whiteness of the sockets, giving a lack of contrast and a terrifying sense of ambiguity. As 
Sla oj i ek (1993) i e  of hi  cene; [ ]he non an pa en , depthless  eye blocks out 
our access to the soul,  to the infinite abyss of the person,  thus turning it into a soulless 
monster: not simply a nonsubjective machine, but rather an uncanny subject that has not 
yet been submitted to the process of subjectivization  which confers upon it the depth of 
personality  (240, no e 2). In this instance, the eyes are rendered malevolent not 
because of the a typically dark and light juxtaposition that would historically define evil 
with good but due to a liminal and abject character that subsequently reveals an uncertain 
truth of the contemporary secularized world controlled by modern man. It is through the 
 
14 The eye is the lamp of the body. So if your eye is healthy, your whole body will be 
full of light. But if your eye is evil, your whole body will be full of darkness. Therefore, 
if he ligh  i hin o  ha  ned in o da kne , ho  g ea  i  ha  da kne !  (Ma he  6: 
22-23). 
15 The 1831 edition contained the first image of the Creature, depicting the Creature after 
animation. As Turnley acknowledges, the image does not really portray the Creature as 
having any monstrous features outside of its large stature (Image I). 
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eyes of the modern creation that the manifestation of the uncanny unveils the absurdity of 
modernity s belief in linear progress: they reveal nothing except an ambiguous future in 
which human agency does not translate into control. The abject Creature or monster 
therefore becomes the symbolic representation of this lack of control. 
Shelley unearthed or brought to light the anxious modern feeling of being 
simultaneously fascinated and repulsed by the world forming before her eyes. Once light 
is cast upon secular knowledge and human potential, how can it ever remain hidden from 
humanity again, regardless how horrifying it may be? The modern terror witnessed 
during the artificial creation of life comes from a success  that cannot be prevented nor 
actively controlled, making Shelley s warning against the act of playing God to be a 
futile one. The conception of her story emphasizes both her fear and fascination of 
science and progress, as she was simultaneous attracted and disgusted with the world that 
was forming,16 a sentiment that appears in both the rebellious  1818 edition and the 
conservative  1831 edition.17 Shelley herself alludes to this when addressing the many 
al e a ion  in he  In od c ion  o he 1831 edi ion, a ing ha  he ha  changed no 
po ion of he o , no  in od ced an  ne  idea  o  ci c m ance lea ing he co e 
and b ance of i  n o ched  (10). However, according to Mellor, Shelley s 
 
16 As Julia Kristeva explains in Powers of Horror (1982), [o]ne h  nde and  h  o 
many victims of the abject are its fascinated victims - if not its submissive and willing 
ones. We may call it a border; abjection is above all ambiguity. Because, while releasing 
a hold, it does not radically cut off the subject from what threatens it on the contrary, 
abjec ion ackno ledge  i  o be in pe pe al dange  (9). F he mo e, in e m  of abjec  
li e a e; a  he en e of abjec ion i  bo h he abjec s judge and accomplice, this is also 
true of he li e a e ha  conf on  i  (16). 
17 Anne Mellor attributes this pessimistic transformation to the turmoil that Shelley 
experienced in her personal life between both publications (1988, 170-76). 
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announcement is simply a lie that, as with Victor, disclaims any responsibility to her 
creation, itself a victim of Fate (1988, 176).  
Although Mellor is correct in arguing that the sense of agency and moral choice 
does essentially evaporate in 1831, I do agree with Shelley s statement that the essence of 
the novel, especially regarding its uncertain moral stance and problem of agency, does 
not necessarily change; the ambiguity of agency simply becomes more transparent in the 
1831 edition than in 1818. The freewill Victor evidently nurses in the first edition is 
virtually illusionary, not necessarily in terms of his ability to make individual actions or 
choices, but rather in that the consequences of these choices are purely left to Chance. 
Later in the twentieth century, Jacques Monod (1970/1972) famously argued that the 
scientific pursuit of knowledge disengaged the connection between humans and Nature, 
subsequently leaving us all in the hands of Chance and a world without intrinsic meaning. 
P io  o mode n ho gh , o  ance o pe ceived the strangeness of their condition 
only very dimly. They did not have the reasons we have today for feeling themselves 
ange  in a ni e e pon hich he  opened hei  e e  (Monod 29). De pi e ha  he 
group he refers to as the animists believed, such as religions to theorists such as Hegel 
and Marx, for Monod the world does not contain a teleonomic principle, plan, or a 
ha monio  con c ion b  a he  ha  [p] e chance, ab ol el  f ee b  blind, i  
today the sole concei able h po he i  (112-3). The novel Frankenstein seems to predict 
this same existential theory for modern individuals as a result of the ascent of the 
scientific pursuit, which creates and propels the modern stranger into the chaos of liminal 
uncertainty.  
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Despite Frankenstein s experiment coming to fruition, he is nonetheless subjected 
to a world of Chance, as the modern world is still doomed to proceed towards a world 
governed by the principles of scientific rationalism. Victor, as a representation of modern 
humanity,18 essentially has no choice but to proceed forward, as if it is his and 
humanity s Fate to accelerate civilization to its fullest potential. Frankenstein may regret 
certain actions he has committed but he does not regret his vigor and passion for 
scientific discovery. When addressing Walton s men at the end of the novel, who wish to 
abandon their Captain as his expedition has become extremely dangerous, Frankenstein 
eem  o once again loca e he e e ie  hile he o k a  incomple e  (214), hich he 
was unable to recall after his experiment was completed, and once again defends a 
scientific pursuit of knowledge and discovery despite being conscious of the 
consequences of his own experiments:  
Are you then so easily turned from your design? Did you not call this a glorious 
expedition? and wherefore was it glorious? Not because the way was smooth and 
placid as a southern sea, but because it was full of dangers and terror; because, at 
every new incident, your fortitude was to be called forth, and your courage 
exhibited; because danger and death surrounded, and these dangers you were to 
brave and overcome. For this was it a glorious, for this was it an honourable 
undertaking. You were hereafter to be hailed as the benefactors of your species; 
your name adored, as belonging to brave men who encountered death for honour 
and he benefi  of mankind . e need no  ha e come h  fa , and d agged o  
captain to the shame of a defeat, merely to prove yourselves cowards. Be steady 
to your purposes, and firm as a rock (217). 
 
Frankenstein, like the modern world, is unable to go or look back towards the past, 
regardless of the consequences and mistakes he has made. For Frankenstein, and many 
other moderns, the idea of progress is dependent on a severing of a past founded on 
 
18 To be clear, by humanity, Shelley is certainly addressing a patriarchal society 
dominated by male ambitions. This topic will be examined further in Chapter 6.  
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myths, while focusing on the truths of the objective world, regardless of how ugly it may 
turn out to be.  
Nonetheless, once Frankenstein s eyes lock upon modernity s monstrosity, no 
matter how hard he tries to ignore it, it haunts him until his death, like an unconscious 
fear he is unable to repress. Similar to what Shelly said of her inability to get rid of her 
hideo  phan om  (9) ha  ha n ed he  af e  he fi  inclining of he  o  came o he  in 
a dream, the novel s ending ultimately leads to the lingering of modern liminality. 
Frankenstein has become the modern socio-cultural spectre that has haunted us ever since. 
In Specters of Marx (1993), Jac e  De ida de c ibe  he pec e a  a kind of gho  ho 
comes back or who still risks coming back post mortem  (59). Derrida s description of 
the spectre is extremely reminiscent of Frankenstein  C ea e, a liminal fig e ha  i  a 
paradoxical incorporation, the becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and carnal form of 
he pi i . I  become , a he , ome hing  ha  emain  diffic l  to name: neither soul nor 
bod , and bo h one and he o he  (ibid. 5).  
If we examine Mary Shelley s original ending,19 in which the Creature is 
p hing him elf off , a he  han he pa i e bo ne a a , hich i  fo nd in he final 
version, the Creature  en e of agenc  ill lead  him o be ca ied a a  b  he a e  
 
19 The final lines of the novel are some of the many revisions Percy Shelley contributed 
to the novel before its initial publication. The original being:  
He sprung from the cabin window as he said this upon an ice raft that lay close to 
the vessel & pushing himself off he was carried away by the waves and I soon lost 
sight of him in the darkness and distance (qtd. in Mellor 1988, 68) 
Pe c  Shelle  evision: 
 He sprang from the cabin window as he said this, upon the ice raft which lay 






and ultimately leads to the same outcome. Mellor argues that Percy Shelley s revision of 
Cap ain Wal on lo ing igh  of he C ea e in he o iginal o being lo  in da kne  and 
distance,  i  bo h a defen i e mane e  o a d off an ie  and a e  final a ho ial 
control over his wife  b e i e c ea ion , in an a emp  o po la e a comfo ing 
ea ance  (1988, 68). However, the revised ending reflects the liminal and existential 
condition of modernity in a much greater degree and also emphasizes and links both 
Walton and the Creature s sense of alienated perspective in one sentence. What also 
make  he C ea e an ncann  pec e i  ha  i  i  ill becoming, nnamed and lo  in 
da kne  and di ance,  encompa ing a hado  ec e  i hin ho e dep hle  and 
watery eyes. 
More importantly, the ending s apparent comforting reassurance , leads us to an 
uncanny false sense of security. As Freud writes, the author of the uncanny is betraying 
us to the superstitiousness which we have ostensibly surmounted; he deceives by 
promising to give us the sober truth, and then after all overstepping it  ( Uncann  250). 
The novel s ending lulls the reader into a false sense of security when the Creature states 
that it will take its own life and thereby removing itself from society, repressing the 
uncanny beyond the border of darkness, however the novel has already established what 
o gh  o ha e been kep  concealed b  hich ha  ne e hele  come o ligh  (ibid 14). 
Therefore, placing the Creature back into the security of darkness is ineffective as a 
palliative outcome, especially since the story lives on to haunt us, underlining one of the 
main premises of the novel: the impossibility to repress the uncanny into darkness once it 
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has come into light. Examining the ending of Freud s essay20, Nicholas Royle (2003) 
argues that the uncanny has a paradoxical role where it not only manifests itself in light 
but also remains uncanny within darkness, a  ome hing con an l  de ined o e n  
(109), and similar to the ending of Frankenstein, i  i  da kne  hich finall  ha n  hi  
p ojec  (110). If the Creature is uncanny because it initially represents the return of the 
repressed  in creation, it is equally uncanny in its dissolving back into darkness, in the 
miscarried attempt to once again repress the repressed and return us back to a dissipated 
past.  
THE END OF THE NATURAL AND THE BEGINNING OF ARTIFICAL REALITY 
 
The spectre in Frankenstein is not a supernatural entity from the past but a hybrid 
being representing an ambiguous future, one that moves away from Nature towards a new 
and artificial reality. In Frankenstein, the uncanny spectre materializes into a cyborg-like 
entity, a physical and tangible specimen signifying the transition of the spiritual and 
supernatural to the material, scientific, and disenchanted world. This evolution away from 
the supernatural does not necessarily lead to the arrival of the purely natural, nor does it 
remove itself from myth. It essentially means that a movement towards disenchantment 
or secularization paradoxically leaves us on an oscillating liminal path towards re-
enchantment or re- ac ali a ion. A  Da id Ke e e  (1997) e plain , al ho gh 
Frankenstein supposedly eschews the supernatural, magic, or alchemy in favor of modern 
science as a means of instilling life into dead tissue, the distinction between natural magic 
and alchemy on the one hand and natural philosophy and chemistry on the other, and that 
 
20 Conce ning he fac o  of ilence, oli de and da kne , e can onl  a  ha  he  a e 
actually elements in the production of that infantile anxiety from which the majority of 
h man being  ha e ne e  become i e f ee  (F e d, Uncann  252). 
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be een eligion and cience, i  bl ed a  e e  i ing age of he e  (61). P io  o 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno writing of the mythological reverberation of the 
Age of Enlightenment in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Shelley explored the same themes 
in Frankenstein, where the ideals that looked to dispel myth simply produced their own. 
Here myth is no longer allocated or represented by a feudal or even the natural world but 
rather falls into the space of science and rationality.  
The Ne onian La  of Na e e e een a  e empla  of Rea on  (Smi h 41) 
and although they were permanent and represented God s perfection, at the same time, 
he  al o e emplified a con a ing Ch i ian accep ance of h man impe fec ion, 
manifested in sin and suffering, disease and death, with a presumptuous conviction that 
nature  impe fec ion  co ld be made pe fec  b  h man geni  (ibid. 53). Victor, by 
ways of modern science, looks to reverse Nature s fixed state and advance the refining of 
man through the perfecting of Nature. Shelley explicates this premise through Professor 
Waldman  peech, hich allo  F anken ein o app ehend hi  chime a  of bo ndle  
g ande  (48) i hin a mode n eali , ome hing he eali ed, al ho gh el c antly, that 
he was unable to do through the ancient proto-science of alchemy:  
The ancient teachers of this science,  said he, promised impossibilities, and 
performed nothing. The modern masters promise very little; they know that 
metals cannot be transmuted, and that the elixir of life is a chimera. But these 
philosophers, whose hands seem only made to dabble in dirt, and their eyes to 
pour over the microscope or crucible, have indeed performed miracles. They 
penetrate into the recesses of nature, and show how she works in her hiding places. 
They ascend into the heavens; they have discovered how the blood circulates, and 
the nature of the air we breathe. They have acquired new and almost unlimited 
powers; they can command the thunders of heaven, mimic the earthquake, and 
even mock the invisible world with its own shadows  (Shelley 49). 
 
Here, the power of controlling or commanding Nature lies in replicating or mimicking it. 
The nlimi ed po e  ha  he mode n cien i  po e e , come  no  f om o iginal 
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creation, but through artificial reproduction. Frankenstein examines the equivocal 
boundaries between natural and artificial, machine and human in such a way that its 
b illiance i  no  o m ch o poin  o  ha  a ificial life and in elligence a e po ible, 
but that human life already is this artificial intelligence  (Morton 47). It is through our 
imaginative potential to dream and realize the unknown or the not-yet that distinguishes 
us as human beings from animals.  
By presenting us with a negation or a lack, what currently does not exist, our 
imagination tens to lead us to a utilitarian belief in changing the world for the better by 
giving us alternative worlds that we can strive for (Dahlbom 89). Frankenstein unearths 
and examines the artificial nature of human beings, both through Frankenstein s drive of 
progress and also doubled through the hybrid Creature. However, our artificial potential 
is threatened by the natural process of life and death, and by creating life through 
scientific means, Frankenstein attempts to overcome the natural course of existence by 
chea ing dea h; b  ha  glo  o ld a end he di co e , if I co ld bani h di ea e 
f om he h man f ame, and ende  man in lne able o an  b  a iolen  dea h!  (Shelle  
42). Losing his mother at an early age, Frankenstein is overwhelmed with the anxiety of 
mortality and attempts to conquer his existential unease in order to create a new path 
towards a better future for humanity. Unwilling to be confined to Nature s course, or the 
decaying prison of the human body, Frankenstein tries to replace and take on her function 
of giving birth, while at the same time, commences a process that still lives with us  
today21: the possibility of cheating death.  
 
21 With companies such as Alcor Life Extension Foundation and The Cryonics Institute, 
people have started to seriously believe in the idea of immortality  through the scientific 
methods of cryonic suspension.  
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Life and death appeared to me ideal bounds, which I should first break through, 
and pour a torrent of light into our dark world. A new species would bless me as 
its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to 
me. No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should 
deserve their s. Pursuing these reflections, I thought, that if I could bestow 
anima ion pon lifele  ma e , I migh  in p oce  of ime  ene  life he e 
death had apparently devoted the body to corruption (ibid. 55). 
 
Frankenstein s de i e o b eak h o gh  he ideal bo nd  of he h man bod  and 
Nature itself is driven by his struggle of cheating or denying death, which ultimately 
becomes his downfall. Wi h he emo al of God, he bi h of a ne  being, and a o en  
of ligh  c a hing through the traditional ignorance, Frankenstein must come to terms 
with the resulting amputation of an afterlife from the new modern human consciousness. 
Death, now being final in the modern world, leaves us with an existential void or 
emptiness that Frankenstein looks to refute through a complete denial of death itself 
(McMahon 2007). However, Frankenstein s attempt to end the uncertainty that comes 
with death, ironically leads to more, once again exhibiting a lack of control that human 
agency is unable to subvert.  
Victor Frankenstein, however, is not a one-dimensional individual, and does not 
fully abandon nature for scientific pursuit. Principally a paradoxical character, he is as 
much of a Romantic, as he is a mad  scientist. In fact, his fascination and complete 
reliance on science and nature mirror one another. Victor connection s to both science 
and nature become an obsession, which he uses to abjure from humanity and his family. 
Whe ea  hi  ie  of hi  fa he  i  di hea ening; I ee him no , e cellen  and ene able 
old man! Hi  e e  ande ed in acanc , fo  he  had lo  hei  cha m and hei  deligh  





more than the eyes of his father, which simply speak of death. Even after the death of 
Elizabeth, Victor only attempts to find a sanctuary in Nature, which identical to his 
scientific pursuits, ultimately fails him: 
What then became of me? I know not; I lost sensation, and chains and darkness 
were the only objects that pressed upon me. Sometimes, indeed, I dreamt that I 
wandered in flowery meadows and pleasant vales with the friends of my youth, 
but I awoke and found myself in a dungeon. Melancholy followed, but by degrees 
I gained a clear conception of my miseries and situation and was then released 
from my prison. For they had called me mad, and during many months, as I 
understood, a solitary cell had been my habitation (ibid. 202). 
 
Nature, which in many respects replaced God for many Romantics of the time, is 
extremely indifferent toward Victor. In a similar way to how the Creature searches for its 
identity and meaning in relation to its creator, Victor positions his sense of meaning and 
sacredness in something that is completely detached from him. In Frankenstein, God, 
Nature, and Victor are all interrelated by being silent creators, and while we know that 
out of those three, Victor is definitely not indifferent, he is still rendered helpless since he 
stands or oscillates within a liminal position of creator/created, Satan/God, or rebel/lord. 
It is also no coincidence that the Romantic elements, especially in regard to 
Frankenstein s experiences with nature and love, become much more problematic as the 
novel progresses, juxtaposing the scientific warning with one of Romantic excess. Victor 
represents the nightmare of both scientific and Romantic intemperate idealism.  
Through the birth of Frankenstein s Creature, this idealism is potentially 
superseded in the modern world with a liminal permutation between the two. The 
artificial  Creature is depicted as more passionate and human-like than Frankenstein, 
making the formally distinguishable binary of artificial and natural much more 
complicated, giving way to an uncanny world where artificiality  has become the new 
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natural . While modernity attempts to categorize everything into binaries such as natural 
and artificial, Shelley shows us that modernity paradoxically subverted these very same 
binaries. Following Jentsch, Freud argues he ncann  i  c ea ed hen he e i  
intellectual uncertainty whether an object is alive or not, and when an inanimate object 
become  oo m ch like an anima e one  ( The Uncann  233). By the early nineteenth 
century, Shelley was able to prophesize what Donna Haraway (1985/2004) argued in the 
la e en ie h cen : ha  machine  ha e made ho o ghl  ambig o  he diffe ence 
between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed, 
and many other distinctions that used to apply o o gani m  and machine  (11).22 Monod 
suggests that the differences between the natural and artificial were always misleading to 
begin with and that the two can no longer be regarded as opposites, as it is impossible to 
differentiate between natural or artificial characteristics, even in human beings. What 
distinguishes the natural from the artificial is that the natural contains in-of-itself what it 
needs to develop, while the artificial depends on external influences and is designed for a 
purpose (Monod 3-4). However, what blurs this distinction for Monod, is that the 
teleonomy, or the apparent internal purposefulness, recognizes no difference between 
living and non-living organisms, therefore, the natural is dependent on external forces as 
m ch a  he a ificial and endo ed with a purpose or project, which at the same time 
he  e hibi  in hei  c e and ca  o  h o gh hei  pe fo mance  (9). Taking hi  
into account, what Frankenstein argues is not that modern society leaves us dislocated 
from Nature, which itself is alienating, but rather that what is in fact alienating is our 
inabili  o accep  bo h o  i ola ion, nna alne , and angene : man m  a  la  
 
22 The relationship between Frankenstein and Ha a a  o k ill be f he  e amined 
in Chapter 6. 
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wake out of his millenary dream; and in doing so wake to his total solitude, his 
fundamental isolation. Now does he at last realize that, like a gypsy, he lives at the 
boundary of an alien world. A world that is deaf to his music, just as indifferent to his 
hopes as o hi  ffe ing o  hi  c ime  (ibid 172-3). However, although Mary Shelley 
seems to acknowledge the connection between Nature and the artificial, the novel still 
seems to try to, not necessarily to deny, but nonetheless internalize this knowledge, 
putting it back into the uncanny darkness from which it came. 
THE UNCANNY STRANGER IN A SECULAR VOID 
 
As I have argued, Frankenstein is not a novel that contemplates the past while 
standing in the present as the Gothic genre formally subsisted, but rather, it resides in the 
modern liminal state where past, present, and future become something far more 
uncertain, leaving the stranger in a very lonely and unclear position of trying to find 
importance in life. The freedom given or forced onto the Creature, emulates the new 
found independence that humanity must face that renders the Creature to contemplate its 
e i ence: I a  dependen  on none, and ela ed o none. The pa h of m  depa e a  
free;  and there was none to lament my annihilation. My person was hideous, and my 
stature gigantic: what did this mean? Who was I? What was I? Whence did I come? What 
a  m  de ina ion? The e e ion  con in all  ec ed, b  I a  nable o ol e hem  
(131). As Northrop Frye (1983) notably argues, Shelley  no el i  a p ec o of he 
existential thriller, as such a book as Camus s L Étranger. The whole point about the 
monster is not a machine, but an ordinary human being isolated from mankind by 
e eme gline  (122). Looking back, it is possible to see the Creature as simply 
ordinary  as our society becomes much more oriented around the liminal, but at the time 
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it was something entirely new; it was the birth of the modern stranger that continues to 
preoccupy our existence. Unlike Victor, whose existential crisis revolves around the 
ominous cloud of death, the Creature s existential malaise is situated within the menacing 
idea of modern life, existence, and problematic notion of freedom. The Creature is an 
uncanny representation of the modern individual born with the burden of freedom, 
lacking any form of an established identity and tradition to tie oneself to. With no nation 
or family to belong to, the Creature is forced into a series of newfound questions that it 
struggles to find answers for. Marginalized from society, the Creature as stranger, must 
become a voyeur; a fly on the wall that observes without being seen but is still 
nonetheless there. Being a modern liminal figure, Victor s doppelgänger cannot be fully 
absent and must exist. As he explains to Franken ein, I admi ed i e and good 
feelings and loved the gentle manners and amiable qualities of my cottagers, but I was 
shut out from intercourse with them, except through means which I obtained by stealth, 
when I was unseen and unknown, and which rather increased than satisfied the desire I 
had of becoming one among m  fello  (Shelle  124). The C ea e s melancholic 
alienation sweeps in like a plague to the people around him. At the moment right before 
Frankenstein confronts the Creature on the mountain for the first time since it was created 
in the laboratory, the path up the mountain instantly becomes lonely and desolate as 
Shelley s links the Creature and Frankenstein by painting the estranged spirit of the 
modern condition: 
The ascent is precipitous, but the path is cut into continual and short windings, 
which enable you to surmount the perpendicularity of the mountain. It is a scene 
terrifically desolate. In a thousand spots the traces of the winter avalanche may be 
perceived, where trees lie broken and strewed on the ground, some entirely 
destroyed, others bent, leaning upon the jutting rocks of the mountain or 
transversely upon other trees. The path, as you ascend higher, is intersected by 
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ravines of snow, down which stones continually roll from above; one of them is 
particularly dangerous, as the slightest sound, such as even speaking in a loud 
voice, produces a concussion of air sufficient to draw destruction upon the head of 
the speaker. The pines are not tall or luxuriant, but they are sombre and add an air 
of severity to the scene. I looked on the valley beneath; vast mists were rising 
from the rivers which ran through it and curling in thick wreaths around the 
opposite mountains, whose summits were hid in the uniform clouds, while rain 
poured from the dark sky and added to the melancholy impression I received from 
the objects around me. Alas! Why does man boast of sensibilities superior to 
those apparent in the brute; it only renders them more necessary beings. If our 
impulses were confined to hunger, thirst, and desire, we might be nearly free; but 
now we are moved by every wind that blows and a chance word or scene that that 
word may convey to us (100). 
 
Although both Frankenstein and the Creature are stuck in between the realms of 
Chance and Fate, the main difference between their liminal positions is that Frankenstein 
oscillates between the extremes of science and Nature, compliance and rebellion, while 
the Creature is a product of them and subsequently, is trapped in between them, unable to 
move. While Frankenstein oscillates between the either/or, the Creature does not live by 
the either/or binary but the hyphenation between it where even a correlation with John 
Milton  ebellio  Sa an i  lo : Sa an ha  hi  companion , fello -devils, to admire and 
enco age him; b  I am oli a  and abho ed  (ibid. 133).23 Even the allusions of Christ 
ultimately fail, as the Creature, God s favourite son , is neither redeemed nor saves 
anyone at the end of the novel. For Jerrold E. Hogle (1998), the Creature represents the 
absolutely Other , the other s other or the more specifically, a more liminal other, 
repositioning the Creature from the uncanny towards the abject: 
The creature is a monster  in that it/he embodies and distances all that a society 
refuses to name  all the betwixt-and-between, even ambisexual, cross-class, and 
cross-c l al condi ion  of life ha  We e n c l e abjec , a  K i e a o ld 
put it  . . . I /he i  the absolutely O he  . . . poin ing immedia el , a  e ha e 
just seen, to intermixed and repressed states of being, the divisibility of the body, 
 
23 1818 edition: Yet even that enemy of God and man had friends and associates in his 
de ola ion; I am i e alone  (242). 
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thrown-down  social groups, class struggles, gender-confusions, birth-moments, 
and death-drives . . . as well as to a cacophony of ideological and intertextual 
differences. All the while, though, he/it both re-presents each of these alterities 
and keeps them at a great remove by being quasi-human yet strictly artificial 
(Hogle 185-7). 
 
Interrelated with the uncanny, as both concepts revolve around the paradoxical, the 
liminal, and he conf on a ion i h he o he , he abjec  i  di inc  in ha  i  i  mo e 
iolen  han he ncann  and i  elabo a ed h o gh a fail e o ecogni e i  kin; 
nothing is familiar, not even the shadow of a memor  (K i e a 5).24 According to 
Hogle, abjection becomes a more significant characteristic after the publication of 
Frankenstein due to the fact that the eighteenth-cen  Go hic p o ide  he mbolic 
means for that very construction of elf  e  a chaic o he  (179), hile 
Frankenstein offers the Gothic ghost of the counterfeit in its most achieved, complex, 
and influential form up to 1818, using what is most fundamental in the Gothic to alter and 
deepen ( a he  han impl  e e e) i  (203). Frankenstein s Creature is uncanny because 
 
24 Al ho gh, J lia K i e a a g e  ha  abjec ion i  [e]ssentially different from 
ncannine ,  (5), there is a strong correlation in terms of their connection to 
modernity and the secular. Wi h Ch i iani , he abjec ion of he elf, he ecogni ion of 
he an  (ibid), a  ab o bed b  eligio  ca ed i e and he l ima e p oof of h mili  
befo e God  (ibid). While religious abjection solidifies o  p ifie  (ibid. 7) the subject 
at one point, boarder, or limit, the secular abject places the subject in a place of ambiguity 
or liminality, further breaking down the binary distinctions between self and other. 
Similarly, the uncanny seems to be a by-product of a teleological and secularized modern 
world. Mladen Dolar, 1991; Terry Castle, 1995: Anthony Vidler, (1992) all argue that the 
invention of the uncanny is directly related to secularization and modernity. Prior to 
modernity, the supernatural was something that existed solely to the world of religion and 
spirituality; however, this spectrality becomes secularized in the modern age and 
transforms into the uncanny, becoming the paradoxical mark of modernity by 
encompassing the ambiguity and uncertainty entrench in the modern mind. The uncanny 
arose from out of the Enlightenment and modernity  p chic and c l al 
an fo ma ion , i  agg e i el  a ionali  impe a i e ( hich) al o p od ced, like a 
kind of toxic side effect, a new human experience of strangeness, anxiety, bafflement, 
and in ellec al impa e  (Ca le, 8). A  i h liminal o  abjec  pace, he ncann  al o i  
not unified or harmonious but is a continuous alienated and ambiguous state caught in a 
tension with the boundaries of self and other.  
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it is a foreign other but nonetheless indicates a monstrous familiarity with the human 
subject: God, in pity, made man beautiful and alluring, after his own image; but my 
fo m i  a fil h  pe of o , mo e ho id e en f om he e  e emblance  (Shelle  
133); however, it paradoxically also embodies the abject since it is inauthentic, 
genderless,25 and leads to disgust and horror. Like the abject, the C ea e di b  
iden i , em, o de  and doe  no  e pec  bo de , po i ion , le  (K i e a 4). I  i  
a mbol of a o ld he e meaning collap e  (ibid 2) and e l  in he c ea ion of he 
modern secularized stranger, a liminal character that unlike the rebel who is at odds with 
society, is an individual that was born displaced from both rebellion and submission. 
Another aspect Frankenstein inimitably separates itself from previous literature, 
especially the Gothic genre, is by creating far more existential and moral ambiguity 
between the protagonist and its doppelgänger, to the point where binaries such as good 
and evil blur and no longer serve any purpose. Although Frankenstein s doppelgänger 
represents the monstrosity within him and human nature, he does not necessarily 
represent the naturally evil, dark aspect of the self, but rather a secularized and 
ambiguous un-evil monstrosity, one that lies between the binaries of good and bad, which 
is found in humanity, modernity, and the quest for secular knowledge. This in turn raises 
more questions than answers, such as the infamous and unresolvable question that has 
resonated with the tale until today: who is in fact the real monster?  Yet, to choose one 
entirely misses the point of the novel. As Reicha d  main ain , onl  a h man being o  
h manoid can be a e mon e he e en ial condi ion fo  a mon e  i  ha  he h man 
cha ac e i ic  i  po e e  m  no  be changed oo fa  (139). Thi  goe  a  m ch fo  he 
 
25 The concept of abjection in relation to Frankenstein and gender will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
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monstrous attributes as it does for the benevolent ones, making Victor as much as the 
Creature s double as it is Frankenstein s. The humanism displayed by the Creature, as 
much as its monstrosity, shows that the dialectical essence of humanity vacillates 
between our experiences and actions. Therefore, the projection of blame cannot solely 
fall on the shoulders of Frankenstein, for the Creature is rejected by everyone in the novel, 
not just Victor, making the responsibility not just of its creator but everyone s, including 
the De Lacey family and even the Creature itself.  
With the insertion of the character of Captain Walton, Frankenstein even goes 
beyond the simple blurring of the doppelgänger as merely being a double of the 
protagonist. By creating a third double  or doppelgänger, Shelley creates a universality 
of the double or shadow motif, which further encompasses the other into the self. In 
addition to all three characters being explorers, wanderers, and isolated individuals in 
their own right, both the Creature and Frankenstein can only reveal their stories and 
secrets to Walton and it is he who is able to channel this modern feeling to others through 
his writings. Through Captain Walton s letters, the modern and liminal spectre lives on 
haunting society in a frightening manner, resulting in the inevitability of truth turning into 
myth and vice versa. As Lee Sterrenburg argues, beginning with Frankenstein, 
e a e p e en ed i h he confe ional of i ola ed p o agoni  ho a e, a  lea  
symbolically, reenacting heroic and messianic quests from a previous 
revolutionary age. Political themes are translated into private and psychological 
terms. The messianic struggles of the hero are presented subjectively, in an 
autobiographical confession we cannot fully trust, and surrounded by equally 
subjective editors, interlocutors, and interpreters, whose presence further 
complicates our hope of finding a simple ideological meaning. The identity of the 
demonic forces is no longer clear. The specter haunting Europe is no longer the 
monster Jacobin. The messianic impulse remains, but its political content has 
been called into question (145-6). 
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Despite the progressive uncertainty of the messianic spectre, we still can learn from it; we 
can learn from what is haunting us. Walton abandons his quest because he was able to see 
the uncanny and abject horror of his pursuit through Victor s story and through the 
manifestation of the Creature itself. Although Walton s abandonment of his exploration 
of the North Pole does not end modern history s relentless pursuit of secular knowledge 
and discovery, it still advances an optimistic perspective because it allows us, if not to 
correct our mistakes, at the very least to realize them. Yet, even in in this regard, the 
liminal essence of Frankenstein holds power, for Shelley is unwilling to lay all the cards 
on the table, as the story once again ends ambiguously. Regardless of the fact that Walton 
saves himself and his crew from the unknown, will his sister Margaret, and subsequently 
the reader, believe his story or will it be simply dismissed as nonsensical science fiction? 
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III: LEOPARDI AND BAUDELAIRE: KINDRED SPIRITS OF THE 
MODERN STRANGER 
 
The ancient covenant is in pieces; man knows at last that he is alone in the universe s unfeeling immensity, 
out of which he emerged only by chance. His destiny is nowhere spelled out, nor is his duty. The kingdom 
above or the darkness below: it is for him to choose 
 -Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity  
 
Ah! qu aimes-tu donc, extraordinaire étranger? 
J aime le  n age  le  n age  q i pa en  l -ba  l -ba  le  me eille  n age ! 
Well then! What do you love, extraordinary stranger? 
I lo e he clo d   he pa ing clo d   o e  he e  o e  he e  he ma elo  clo d !] 
- Cha le  Ba delai e, L ange  ( The S ange ) 
 
Che fai tu, luna, in ciel? dimmi, che fai, 
Silenziosa luna? 
Sorgi la sera, e vai, 
Contemplando i deserti; indi ti posi. 
Ancor non sei tu paga 
Di riandare i sempiterni calli? 
(What are you doing, moon, up in the sky; 
What are you doing, tell me, silent moon? 
You rise at night and go,  
observing the deserts. Then you set. 
Aren t you tired 
Of plying eternal byways?) 
- Giacomo Leopa di, Canto notturno di un pastore errante dell Asia  ( Nigh  Song of A 
 Wande ing Sheppa d in A ia ) 
 
I m a pessimist because of intelligence, but an optimist because of will 




While Frankenstein was being published in 1818, in the small provincial Italian 
town of Recanati located in the central province of Macerata, the Italian poet, philologist, 
and literary critic, Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837), was developing his own related, 
although unique, opinions regarding the monster of modernity. Although they never met, 
Shelley herself resided in various parts of Italy during this time (1818-1823), continuing 
to focus on the premise of the dark and problematic side to imagination and desire 
explored in Frankenstein with her second novel, the historical romance Valperga: or, The 
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Life and Adventures of Castruccio, Prince of Lucca (1923)26. Unlike in Frankenstein, the 
monster  of Valperga is no longer ambiguous in nature but is clearly destructive with no 
utopian character (Blumberg 76), and in a sense, Shelley s second novel restores morality 
back to its dualistic beginnings of good and evil that her first novel infamously 
challenged. What Leopardi and shortly after, French poet Charles Baudelaire (1821-
1867) brought to the prevailing modern conundrum is a further plunging into the uncanny 
nature of modernity, in an effort to truly understand its paradoxes and alienating factors 
in its most complex and contradictory aspects, thereby advancing the liminalizing of the 
dialectical binaries that were thought to structure and unify morality, time, and the 
character of modernity itself. 
 There is no longer an attempt to repress the uncanny monster; the poets believed 
that one must now heroically stare directly into its ambiguous eyes and not run away in 
horror, as Victor Frankenstein had, who struggled to suppress the idea of cosmicism27 
back into the void he had let it escape from. By confronting this cosmic horror directly, 
Leopardi and Baudelaire believe that it was the only genuine, although paradoxical, way 
to locate any remnants of Beauty or meaning contained within a calculating and 
unsympathetic modern world. They sought meaning in the modern void rather than resent 
any real or imaginary creators for humanity s predicament. This chapter, which centres 
on the poet-philosophers Leopardi and his kindred spirit Baudelaire, examines the 
 
26 As Daniel E. White (1997) poin  o , hile there is neither evidence nor likelihood 
that Shelley read Leopardi while she was in Italy, in many respects Valperga was a  
production of the same cultural climate in hich a ho  ch a  Leopa di  voiced 
opposition to past and present histories of foreign domination in I al  (8). 
27 Cosmicism is the literary philosophy established by the American author H P Lovecraft, 
which argues that in the face of no identifiable divine presence in the world, humanity 
has become fleeting and insignificant in regard to the cosmos. 
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advancing secularization of modern life, in which the mystery and myth of modernity 
founded on a reliance of reason that was assessed in Frankenstein, dissipates further into 
the hellish realm of monstrosity, illusion, and artificiality.  
In Frankenstein, Mary Shelley had presented to the world a difficult problem or 
question regarding the idea of progress, whereas Baudelaire and Leopardi try to provide 
us with a difficult answer. What we see in Leopardi and Baudelaire is that the battle 
between Nature and the spirit and the effects of this struggle, led them to step beyond the 
scientific aspect of secularized modernity. Instead, their emphasis is not on a menacing 
though preventable future based on science, but on the repetitive and cyclical past and 
present that have already become our future. The modern situation forces them to explore 
the pains of unhappiness that come with existential boredom, the problem of desire as a 
secular form of hell, a complete renunciation of the myth of progress, and moreover, the 
poet or artist s role within secularized modernity, consequently making them two of the 
most truly original thinkers of the modern era. There is also a shift in regard to the 
alienating factors of modernity: the Creature s existential anguish came from being 
removed from society, whereas anguish for Leopardi and Baudelaire no longer originates 
from being detached from society but, from being immersed in it. While Leopardi is 
slightly detached from the advent of modernity since he was living in rural Italy for much 
of his life, acting essentially as a pansophical modern stranger, Baudelaire pushes these 
ideas into the modern urban streets of Paris, the location the modern stranger must escape 
to in order to live and breathe. With Baudelaire, the stranger no longer removes themself 
from society but instead plummets into it, bringing us closer to Simmel s definition of the 
ange  a  omeone ho come  oda  and a  omo o  (402).  
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I will continue to address the concept of the monster or spectre of modernity that 
lives within a messianic or utopian notion of time, which becomes more liminal in regard 
to Leopardi and Baudelaire. In Leopardi s writings, the idea of the monster or the 
monstrous became a recurring theme that according to Fabio Frosini (2016), represented 
a pa ado  of e i ence  (113) ha  had a ofold meaning. Fi , he mon o  a  een 
by Leopardi as an aberration from Nature and secondly, as something that reflects foreign 
values and principles that belong to a different era or place (ibid. 107). Leopardi s liminal 
view of the monstrous therefore encompasses both the rising modern world that deviates 
from Nature but likewise, the ideals that no longer have a place in the contemporary age 
yet still exist (ibid.). Originally, Leopardi became famous or infamous, for his pessimism 
(Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Croce,)28, a label obtained through the anti-philosophical 
ideas found in his Operette Morali (Moral Tales) (1824/1983) and in the various 
aphorisms found in the Pensieri (Thoughts) (1845/1981). The neo-Marxist theorist 
Antonio Gramsci argued that Leopardi was in a continuous state of uncertainty because 
of his inability to transcend his pessimism (Prison Letters 236). Nevertheless, in spite or 
even due to Leopardi s nihilism, Gramsci recognizes the liminal and modern character of 
 
28 Schopenhauer wrote that Leopardi presented he mocke  and e chedne  of hi  
e i ence  yet with such a multiplicity of forms and applications, with such a wealth of 
imagery, that he never wearies us, but, on the contrary, has a diverting and simulating 
effect  (588). 
Nietzsche was influenced by Leopardi and shared many ideas, such as an interest in the 
Copernican revolution and an admiration with ancient Greek civilization, along with 
ambivalent feelings towards reason and abhorrence for religion (Rosengarten 162-63). 
Nonetheless, Nietzsche criticized Leopardi as a suprahistorical  hinke , ho acco ding 
to him only saw the nausea and decline in humanity (Untimely Mediations 66). Nietzsche 
would regard this type of pessimism a  eak pe imi m  and his own as pessimism of 
strength  (Birth of Tragedy 3-4). 
Although Benedetto Croce (1923/1935) praises Leopardi as a great poet, he completely 
rejects Leopardi as a thinker and philosopher due to Leopa di  pessimism and 
outsiderness (98-99). 
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Leopardi  o k, a g ing ha  [i]n Leopa di one find , in an extremely dramatic form, 
the crisis of transition towards modern man; the critical abandonment of the old 
transcendental conception but not as yet the finding of the new moral and intellectual ubi 
consistam which would give the same certainty as the jet i oned fai h  (236). To be 
certain, Leopardi s writings are crowded with cynical and melancholic opinions and 
observations. However, more recently, scholars have been reluctant to continue to label 
Leopardi as an outright pessimist and are beginning to see a certain optimism in the 
Italian s work, even in regard to his later, more negative writings. Cesare Luporini 
(1947/1993), who did categorize Leopardi as a nihilist, was nevertheless one of the first 
to argue strongly in favour of a progressive reading of Leopardi s work that saw the 
Italian poet as a moralist thinker whose ideas were closer to the socio-political ideals of 
the French Revolution than originally perceived (48-9).  
Luporini s progressive and rationalist reading of Leopardi induced a more 
positive view of Leopardi, including the analyses of Walter Binni (1947/1978) and 
Antonio Negri (1985/2010, 1987/2015). Nonetheless, although Negri follows Luporini 
and Binni in not identifying him as a pessimist, he does go against their notion of 
Leopa di a  a p og e i e hinke . Acco ding o Neg i, Leopa di i  no  eall  a 
progressive but a libertarian in flight. Leopardi builds on disenchantment with progress 
and on the joy of liberation  (Diary, 26). Negri restrains himself from the progressive 
label because it advocates a dialectical movement that is in contrast with both Leopardi s 
anti-dialectical and anti-idealist arguments and likewise, his notion of time. Negri s book 
on the Italian poet, Lenta Ginestra (Flower of the Desert) (1987/2015), focuses on 
Leopardi s materialist ontology and largely goes against much of the previous Leopardi 
 79 
scholarship. He argues that with Leopardi there is a radical break from the mechanistic 
and physicalism of the Enlightenment, whereas Leopardi s materialism is critical or post-
c i ical, li ing , and a e  a nega i e ol ion o he p oblem of he dialec ic, i h 
e ao dina  fo ce  (Desert 94). As Timothy S. Murphy (2015) states in the 
T an la o  In od c ion , Neg i ee  Leopa di a  a fa cina ing p ec o  o Nie che  
d e o hi  n imeline  (xiv). Living within the untimely or crisis of modernity, Negri s 
Leopardi provides a new path or alternative response to it, thereby giving the Italian poet 
an atemporal and paradoxical messianic character in his writings that make them still 
significant in our own contemporary modernity.  
Leopardi was also a great influence on the work of Walter Benjamin, who acts as 
a post-historical link between the two poets. Benjamin s life-long project, Passagen-Werk 
(Arcades Project) (1999), is an assortment of strategically scattered quotes collected from 
various authors, further emphasized with Benjamin s own evaluations. Leopardi s 
Zibaldone (1898/1981), meaning miscellany, shows many similarities with Benjamin s 
work and in a way even acted as an inspiration for the German philosopher s own 
project.29 Even before Luporini and Negri, Benjamin was one of the first to refute the 
pessimistic label carried by Leopardi s legacy and asserts that there is a revolutionary and 
heroic aspect to the Italian poet  o k, efe ing o him a  a pa ado ical p agma i  
and i onic angel  (Rennie 140 n46).  
The influence of Baudelaire is more transparent in Benjamin s writing, as it is an 
easy assertion to say that Baudelaire is the centre piece that the Passagen-Werk formed 
 
29 Benjamin never read the Zibaldone but did read translations of Leopardi s Pensieri 
(Rennie, 140 n46), which was a posthumously published book of aphorisms that were 
drawn from the pages of Zibaldone (Negri, Flower 190). 
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itself around. Benjamin continued his deep fascination of Baudelaire by writing various 
essays that confirms the French poet as a truly modern writer completely submersed in a 
struggle against modernity and commodification that was emerging in mid-nineteenth 
century Paris. Benjamin s use of Baudelaire in his materialist assessment of nineteenth 
century Paris has been extremely important in progressing Baudelairean studies by 
altering many previous perceptions of Baudelaire as a tasteless decadent and a scandalous 
or immoral poet. Benjamin also does not view Baudelaire through a Freudian lens as Leo 
Bersani (1977) does, whose poetic reading of Baudelaire s work argues that the 
jouissance of narcissism leads to self shattering. Nor does he partake in a psychoanalytic 
approach that renders Baudelaire as a poetic or late-Romantic idle dreamer, an argument 
later advocated by Jean-Paul Sartre in his book Baudelaire (1947/1950).  
With Benjamin, Baudelaire becomes more situated in the realm of modernity and 
i  een a  an i ional hinke  ho a  no  inac i e b  in ead a  omeone ho ba led 
the crowd  with the impotent rage of someone fighting the ain o  ind  (Writer 176, 
210), the shock experience of urban living at the centre of his work. According to Susan 
Blood (1997), post-Benjamin scholarship of Baudelaire has broadly been divided into 
two spheres: the historicist criticism that focuses on Baudelaire s work in context to the 
socio-political changes and thought that occurred in the mid-19th century, exemplified by 
the work of Richard Burton (1991) and Marshall Berman (1988); and the allegorical 
strain of Baudelairean scholarship associated with Hans Robert Jauß (1982), Paul de Man 
(1969/1971), and Blood herself, which takes, albeit in different directions30, a more 
 
30 Blood argues that Jauß  allego ei i  i  a eade  e pon e ha  me ge  he ae he ic and 
poe ic; ho e e , de Man  e of allegory splits these two elements favours a more 
language-oriented conception of allegory (17). Blood, on the other hand, supports a more 
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aesthetic approach to socio-hi o ical e ion, ince allego  in ol e  a di bance of 
hi o ical ca ego ie  (ibid. 14). However, as Joseph Acquisto (2015) points out, an 
e cl i e eading of Ba delai e ha  foc e  on mode ni  la gel  mi e  he heologico-
e he ic o ld ie  (57) of he F ench poe . Like i e, cla if ing Benjamin s analysis of 
Baudelaire as purely materialist misses the theological aspect of Benjamin s own work.  
Despite the slight pigeonholing of Baudelaire into an either/or classification by 
some academics, Baudelaire is nevertheless widely known as the poet who encompasses 
all the complexities of modernity, regardless whether through an allegorical, historical, or 
psychoanalytic reading of his work. As argued by Michel Foucault (1984), Ba delai ean 
modernity is an exercise in which extreme attention to what is real is confronted with the 
practice of a libe  ha  im l aneo l  e pec  hi  eali  and iola e  i  (41). He 
con in e , [m]ode n man, fo  Ba delai e, i  no  he man ho goe  off o di co e  
himself, his secrets, and his hidden truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself. This 
moderni compel  him o face he a k of p od cing him elf  (42). Thi  p e ha  
has occurred in history forces the individual not to find an historical self within past 
ill ion  b  in ead o c ea e o  c l i a e one elf, ha  Fo ca l  call  he oi a ion  (ibid), 
which becomes the prevailing new form of re-sacralization for the modern world. For 
instance, German critic Benjamin Fondane (1947), champions a secularized theological 
experience as the main component of Baudelaire s work. Fondane structures the 
viewpoint of Baudelaire on the metaphysical anxieties that manifest in the urban 
 
complex and composite model of Baudelairean allegory than Jauß  o  de Man , in 
hich he epe i ion of he allegory makes it both less readable and more aesthetically 
powerful. All this boils down to saying that a radical mode of allegory may be cut off 
from the symbolic synthesis of meaning and representation and still involve the aesthetic 
and the phenomenal in ome a  (20).  
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nightmare of modernity, especially in regard to the French poet s concept of boredom, 
rather than a materialist perspective.  
In the work of Ulrich Baer (2000), we see that much of Baudelaire s work 
contains a synthesis of the metaphysical and materialist assessment of modernity. Baer 
argues that Baudelaire is the first modern poet due to his synching of the disparity 
between immaturity and sophistication that captured the shock-like trauma and 
experiences of modernity (4). Moreover, his discussion of the stranger in Baudelaire s 
prose poem of the same name is very important in linking the concepts of the modern 
poet and the modern stranger within a liminal space outside of meaning, yet as someone 
who is also dependent on locating it. A  Bae  con end , L ange  ( The S ange ) is 
a poem abo  ea ching fo  ne  beginning , f eedom and di in e e edne  (57). It is a 
poem con aining nei he  a o  no  an a g men  (ibid 58) but does comprise of a 
ange  ha  i  he p o o pical mode n poe  ho e i  he logic of e change and p ofi  
i ho  p e ending ha  a  emain  holl  o ide ha  logic  (ibid 59). Here we see with 
Baudelaire, as with Leopardi, the approach to poetry and philosophy is also grounded on 
a liminal space that encompasses both an existential and spiritual platform as much as a 
materialist one, which epitomizes the character of both the modern stranger and 
modernity itself.  
In he e a  Vacan  Holida : The Theological Remainder in Leopardi, 
Ba delai e, and Benjamin  (2006), J. M. Bake , J . e plo e  he comple  ec la  and 
theological relationship between the three thinkers through a study of holiday and leisure 
time in their works. Baker describes the holida  in liminal e m , a  a pace on he 
calendar once reversed for ritual recollection, but a space that has since lost its 
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ce emonial f nc ion and declined in o lei e ime  (1190). The acanc  o  oid of 
holida  and lei e ime admi  a po en ially new meaning: it is the remembrance of not 
only of what once was but what of what lost its chance to be in the great deluge of 
p og e  (ibid. 1214). More importantly, Baker describes the theological spirit in their 
works with a passage from one of Benjamin s letters, he e he e plain  he ela ion of 
his work to theology as like that of a blotter to ink: from the point of view of the blotter 
he would gladly forget what was written there, and nevertheless it was saturated with it. 
Theology in this sense is the remainder that involuntarily returns even when one wishes it 
a a  (ibid. 1190).  
My work wrestles this complex relationship of the secular and the sacred by 
grounding my study on the spirit of secularized modernity as a whole, while engaging 
deeper in the subjects of the modern stranger, liminality, and the resacralization of the 
modern age through the paradoxical means of Kierkegaardian repetition , and 
subsequently the concepts of noia and ennui. I argue that Leopardi and Baudelaire do not 
try to recede from imagination and illusion; nor do they simply accept them as ultimately 
fatal. They plunge into both the internal and external voids in an attempt to define 
individuals, and to remarkably find a new paradoxical form of imagining and even the 
resacralizing of modern society, through its own fragmentation.  
 
THE MONSTROSITY OF THE LIMINALIZING SPACE OF SECUALR MODERNITY 
 
Leopardi s unceasing shift in his philosophy began with his correspondences with 
the liberal intellectual Pietro Giordani, resulting in a political and religious break from his 
family s conservative ideals that in turn led to Leopardi s unsuccessful attempt to flee 
Recanati and his father s domineering character in 1818. The following year, Leopardi 
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contracted a severe eye disease from extensive reading that would alter the way he 
viewed the world (Rosengarten 121) and together with a development of scoliosis, these 
physical ailments seemed to push him towards seeing the hidden dark shadow of 
instrumental Reason. Many of his contemporary critics, including Alessandro Manzoni 
and Niccolò Tommaseo, believed his pessimistic thoughts simply were a reaction to his 
diseases, famously epitomized as I am hunchbacked, therefore there is no God  (Origo 
222), which Leopardi considered highly offensive to his philosophical work.31 What 
these critics neglected to understand was that, like Frankenstein s Creature, Leopardi s 
monstrosity  and his strangeness allowed him to see past the utopian images of progress 
that modernity and its adherents promised. He acknowledged the monstrosity found 
within modernity. In fact, Leopardi actually regards the monster as a liminal essence that 
balances the pe fec ion  of he h man pi i . Fabio F o ini con end  ha  
he no ion of mon e /mon o  i  he chain ha  link  real  and imaginary  
because on the one hand it is the image  of a eal e o   mankind s abandonment 
of na e  and, on he o he , he e l  of a mi calc la ion ha  make  a me e 
partial viewpoint absolute. If the second moment is applied to the comprehension 
of the first, the result is that every monster must be considered as something 
perfect, including the monstrous  separation of human race from nature. The 
institution of what is relative  thus corresponds with the origin of history, and 
mon o i  appea  a  (and he efo e i ) he iden ifica ion ma k of h mani  (1). 
 
Therefore, we see how for Leopardi, the monstrous is contained within modernity since it 
abhors Nature, but also for maintaining certain habits and ideas that contradict any 
modern or progressive thinking and governing.   
 
31 In response to a German critic who panned him in a similar vein, Leopardi laments: 
[b]efore dying, I wish to protest against this invention of weakness and vulgarity, and 
beg my readers to try to controvert my remarks and my arguments, rather than accuse my 
ill-heal h  (ci ed in O igo 265 (Epistolario, VI, 24 May 1832)). 
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Leopardi sees monstrosity as an essential product of human nature and evolution: 
L esistenza, per sua natura ed essenza propria e generale,  un imperfezione, 
un irregolarit , una mostruosit  (Zib1095) ( [e] i ence, b  i  na e and e ence and 
generally, is an imperfection, an i eg la i , a mon o i ) (Z 1822). While humans are 
naturally perfect specimens in nature, it is because of this perfection that humanity is 
allo ed o become impe fec  and mon o  come elle macchine o ei la o ii 
compitissimi e perfettissimi, che per esser tali, sono minutamente lavorati, e quindi 
delicatissimi, e per la somma delicatezza pi  facilmente degli altri si guastano, e perdono 
l essere e l o lo o  (Zib 829) ( like those most refined and perfect machines or devices 
which, in order for them to be such, are intricately tooled, and hence most delicate, and 
on account of their supreme delicacy more easily break down than others, and lose their 
e ence and e ) (Z 1201). As Victor Frankenstein realizes after creating his Creature, 
outside of Nature, our quest for perfection, our messianic insistence that the future is 
utopian, paradoxically makes us imperfect and monstrous. Moreover, our desire to cheat 
death and to remove human suffering, to go beyond nature, is what ultimately makes or 
allows humans to acknowledge our monstrosity.  
As with Leopardi, in Baudelaire s poetry there is no spiritual journey upwards to a 
better place, just as there is no discernable progress of modernity. Instead his poetry 
contains images portrayed as a fragmented journey of repetition, memories, boredom, 
wonders, fleeting dreams, and endless nightmares. His hell is not a future place only seen 
when one dies but a present one; a hell where death becomes more of an escape than the 
beginning of a horrific afterlife. In his introductory poem in The Flowers of Evil entitled 
A  Lec e  ( To he Reade ), Baudelaire criticizes his audience as hypocrites (6), 
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accepting false illusions of progress and perfection, and unwilling to accept that we are 
impl  p ppe , a  [c] est le Diable qui tient les fils qui nous remuent!/ Aux objets 
répugnants nous trouvons des appas;/Chaque jour vers l Enfer nous descendons d un 
pas,/ Sans horreur, à t a e  de  n b e  i p en  ( he De il p ll  on all o  ing !/ 
In most repugnant objects we find charms; Each day we re one step further into 
Hell,/Content to move acro  he inking pi ) (4;5). However, as Jonathan Culler (2008) 
argues, in he poem L I m diable  ( The I emediable ), Baudelaire casts doubt on 
the notion of Satan being an external entity that con ol  o  ac ion : Embl me  ne , 
tableau parfait/D une fortune irremediable/Qui donne à penser que le Diable/Fait toujours 
bien tout ce qu il fai !  ( Pure emblems, a perfect tableau/ Of an irremediable evil,/ 
Which makes us think that the Devil/Does what he chooses to do!) (ibid. 160;161). Culler 
a g e  ha  he ph a e make   hink  c ea e  ambig i  of ha  i  l  e pon ible fo  
this evil (xxxiv). In both the Christian tradition and in Flowers of Evil, he De il i  an 
agent or personification ho e abili  o ac  i  e en ial  ( i), ho gh fo  Ba delai e, 
acting out our evil  temptations, is a manifestation of our psychological and uncanny 
desires (xxxvii). In the Flowers of Evil, evil and the devil are symbolic representations of 
the human ability to act and to choose, which is at the same time continuous and 
irremediable, and human action can only guide us closer and closer to hell. 
 Despite its secular underpinning, modernity is a spiritual journey and undertaking 
in Baudelaire s eyes, beca e i  gi e   he abili  o e plo e he fo bidden ealm of evil  
and allo  he a i  o an fo m banal eali  h o gh he imagina  he e 
epheme ali  and e e ni  a e one  (Caline c  54). Al ho gh Ba delai e epa a e  he 
poems in his famous work into two sections, Spleen and Ideal, the poems do not 
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necessarily separate these two concepts, but instead blend them into one another, they 
become essentially the same, as one could not exist without the other: je ne con oi  
guère (mon cerveau serait- il un miroir ensorcelé?) un type de Beauté où il ny ait pas du 
Malheur  (Journaux 22) ( I can ca cel  concei e (i  m  b ain become a i ch s 
mirror?) a type of Beauty which ha  no hing o do i h So o ) (Intimate Journals 43-
4). For Baudelaire, this Sorrow is an uncanny strangeness that allows one to acknowledge 
something as beautiful:  
Le beau est toujours bizarre. Je ne veux pas dire qu il soit volontairement, 
froidement bizarre, car dans ce cas il serait un monstre sorti des rails de la vie. e 
dis qu il contient toujours un peu de bizarrerie, de bizarrerie naïve, non voulue, 
inconsciente, et que c est cette bizarrerie qui le fait être particulièrement le Beau. 
C est son immatriculation, sa caractéristique. (Curiosités 216) 
 
Beauty always has an element of strangeness. I do not mean a deliberate cold 
form of strangeness, for in that case it would be a monstrous thing that had 
jumped the rails of life. But I do mean that it always contains a certain degree of 
strangeness, of simple, unintended, unconscious strangeness, and that this form of 
strangeness is what gives it the right to be called beauty. It is its hallmark, its 
special characteristic. (Selected Writings 119) 
 
Here, Baudelaire points to a paradoxical sense of beauty: it can only exist when a form a 
strangeness shades it, becomes one with it. What is interesting is that Baudelaire 
peculiarly claims this relationship is not a monstrous  and disjointed experience, even 
though for Baudelaire, the monstrous is an uncanny result of joining together two 
oppo i e  o  he f ing of di e gen  pe pec i e  (M. Scott 71). As with his concept of 
evil, monstrosity seems to have a double connotation for Baudelaire; as an undesirable 
experience in regard to ennui, but also as a creative practice belonging to the liminal 
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realm of art and imagination32. He directly connects monstrous to beauty and sacredness 
in he poem H mn o Bea  ( H mne  la Bea ) ,33 even suggesting a correlation 
be een mon o i  and God in Mademoi elle Bi o i .34 It is why many of the 
women in his poems are often regarded as monstrous, not necessarily as a criticism but 
almost as a sign of admiration and accomplishment (Stephens 146). Therefore, despite 
what Baudelaire claims in the previous passage, monstrosity, strangeness, beauty, and the 
divine all seem to be interconnected for him.      
 This paradoxical relationship must be why Baudelaire struggled with these 
uncanny feeling  h o gho  hi  life, fo e e  p lled be een he de  po la ion  
im l an e  (Journaux 62) ( o im l aneo  allegiance ), between the God and 
Satan that exist within everyone (Intimate Journals 73). He does not try to answer a 
mystery but sees this as a fact or detail, an entanglement due to the consequences of 
modernity and disenchantment. It is not that those are opposites in the sense that one 
needs the other to exist; rather, they both are virtually the same thing. The positions of 
both good and evil are presented allegorically through his depictions of urban life while 
exploring the newly paved boulevards of nineteenth century Paris. It becomes a place 
where the lines between Heaven and Hell, dream and nightmare begin to blur, where 
 
32 La na e e  laide, e  je p f e le  mon e  de ma fan ai ie  la i iali  po i i e  
(Curiosités 263) [ Na e i  gl , and I p efe  he mon e  of m  imagina ion to the 
i ene  of ac ali ] (BLC 180). 
33 Q e  ienne  d  ciel o  de l enfer, qu importe, Ô Beauté! monstre énorme, 
eff a an , ing n !  [ Wha  diffe ence, hen, f om hea en o  f om hell, O Bea , 
mon o  in implici ? ] (Flowers 44; 45). 
34  C a e  ! pe -il exister des monstres aux yeux de Celui-là seul qui sait pourquoi 
il  e i en , commen  il  e on  fai  e  commen  il  a aien  p  ne pa  e fai e?  (Spleen 
204) [ O C ea o , can he e be mon e  in he e e  of Him ho alone kno  hy they 
exist, how they came into being, how they might not have come into being? ] (Paris 93) 
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demons and angels soar to such an intensity that the poet and reader cannot tell them 
apart, making the distinction between these realms no longer substantial. 
For both Leopardi and Baudelaire, the removal of humanity from the natural 
definitely revolves around the artificial. Leopardi eventually comes to the conclusion that 
all life is artificial, even Nature, which gifted us illusions that give life meaning. The 
illusions of modernity are not able to hold up to the ancient illusions that connected both 
human and Nature. In Leopardi s poetry, the moon is often seen as a final representation 
of enchan men  and ac edne , anding alone a  nigh , p ojec ing he hado  of i  
ab ence  (Cal ino 24) ha  allo  fo  a ce ain in e de e minac  and openne  o ill ion  
(Galassi xx). In this instance, Baudelaire s philosophy is slightly different. He sees 
Nature in humanity as something disgusting and evil and the artificial that separates us 
from it as something good and beautiful. The absence of stars in Baudelaire s poetry 
ac   c a   L  C c  d   ( D ) (Buck-Morss 193), as they 
fail to equal the artificial light brought on by the city s illumination, which gives power to 
  a  b a     (Flowers 193). The beauty of modern life must 
be found within artificial reality for Baudelaire, and that is why the majority of his work 
focuses on the modern city. What Baudelaire and Leopardi acknowledge, in a greater 
degree than we saw with Shelley, is that the artificiality of humanity and even Nature 
itself furthers the destruction of the dialectical synthesis between nature and unnatural: 
reality and illusion. This monstrous artificiality, unnaturalness, or being out of place is far 
more entertaining and adventurous for Baudelaire than the modern monster that is ennui, 
once again expressing monstrosity s paradox: Q elle  bi a e ie  ne o e-t-on pas 
dans une grande ville, quand on sait se promener et regarder? La vie fourmille de 
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mon e  innocen  (Spleen 204) ( The ange hing  one enco n e  in a ci  hen no 
one knows how to move around it and look! Life is eeming i h innocen  mon e ) 
(Paris 93).  
A  Benjamin poin  o  of he Ba delai e poem  T  me ai  l ni e  en ie  
( Yo d en e ain he ni e e ) and L A e i e  ( The Ca ione ), Baudelaire 
ha  lo  him elf o he pell of he e e  hich do not return his glance, and submits to 
hei  a  i ho  ill ion  ( Mo if  190). The ambig o  e e  ha  e emble a 
mirror-like blankne  (ibid) do not cause terror for Baudelaire as they did for 
Frankenstein when he first gazed into the watery eyes of the Creature. Instead, it is 
a ing in o he e e  ha  e e ill min  ain i e de  bo i e  (Flowers 52) 
( ill mina ed like bo i e ) (ibid. 53), which plunge him further into an enchanted 
state. For Baudelaire, a secularized modern hell is the only possible place for the re-
sacralization of the modern world. What matters to Baudelaire is our engagement in our 
own heavens or hells that exist within both the depths of modernity and our psyche. In 
he poem Le Vo age  ( Vo age ), Beauty is found in both moral binaries but only 
when diving into the new and unknown: [ ]e e-nous ton poison pour qu il nous 
réconforte!/Nous voulons, tant ce feu nous brûle le cerveau,/Plonger au fond du gouffre, 
Enfer ou Ciel, qu importe?/Au fond de l Inconnu po  o e  d  no ea !  ( [ ]e e  
your poison, sir, to treat us well!/ Minds burning, we know what we have to do,/ And 
plunge to depths of Heaven or of Hell,/ To fathom the Unknown, and find the new! ) 
(ibid. 292; 293). The new  does not only relate to the contemporary, novel, and fleeting 




THE MODERN DANTES: WANDERERS OF A MODERN AND LIMINALIZING HELL 
 
Another notable connection between the two poet-philosophers conceivably stems 
from their relationship with the works of the celebrated Italian poet Dante Alighieri. 
What both Leopardi and Baudelaire took from Dante was an acknowledgement of the 
limits of reason, something that was far more substantial to them after the Enlightenment 
and French Revolution, alongside a blending of mythic and religious themes with present 
and historical reality (Barricelli 74). More importantly, both sought to describe a 
secularized allegorical interpretation of Dante s La Divina Commedia (The Divine 
Comedy) (1320/1998), or to be more specific, his Inferno. While the thought of bringing 
heaven to earth was being championed by the materialists and modern utopians, 
Baudelaire and Leopardi saw fit to look for the hell, or monstrosity, that came with it. 
This tradition, starting with Leopardi and Baudelaire, continued well into twentieth 
century modernism with the works of Samuel Beckett, Eliot, Joyce, and Virgina Woolf, 
a  man  mode n  a  Dan e o be eminen l  mode n in en ibili  and in manne  
(Hiddleston 78).35 Leopardi, Baudelaire, as well as Frankenstein s Creature, share an 
affinity of being modern Dantes, and their alienation from travelling in an unknown 
world is all encompassing. Throughout their journeys within secular hell as flâneurs or 
voyeurs, they are left ultimately alone with neither a Virgil to guide them, nor having a 
concept of absolute and lasting Beauty in Beatrice as a goal to reach.36 In La T omon o 
 
35 Moreover, Erich Auerbach claims in his famous book Dante: Poet of the Secular 
World (1929/1961) that this extremely religious poet, paved the way for imagination for 
the secular world through Mimesis.  
36 In Le Pein e de la ie mode n  [ The Pain e  of Mode n Life ] (1863), Baudelaire 
explains that modern beauty is something that is unstable and always in flux. Beauty 
itself is made up of dual components; n l men  e nel, in a iable  e  d un élément 
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Della L na  ( he Se ing of he Moon ), Leopardi describes the wanderer within secular 
modernity:  
Van l ombre e le sembianze/Dei dilettosi inganni; e vengon meno/Le lontane 
speranze,/Ove s appoggia la mortal natura./Abbandonata, oscura/Resta la vita. In 
lei porgendo il guardo,/Cerca il confuso viatore invano/Del cammin lungo che 
avanzar si sente/Meta o ragione; e vede/Che a se l umana sede,/Esso a lei 
veramente è fatto estrano 
 
(The shadows/And the shapes of glad illusions/Flee, and distant hopes,/That prop 
up our moral/nature up, give way./Life is forlorn, lightless./Looking ahead, the 
wayward traveler/Searches unavailing/for goal or reason on the long/road he 
senses lies ahead,/and sees that man s home truly has become/alien to him, and he 
to it.) (Canti 282; 283) 
 
This poem was written while Leopardi was caught in the threshold of his forming 
secular thoughts and his religious upbringing (Canti 480), where his soon to be 
annihilated Christian beliefs were juxtaposed with an idea of death as oblivion and 
nothingness (Rosengarten 150). Dante at least had a Hell that served justice and provided 
order but modern hell was a place of nothingness and boredom, to such a point that 
Leopa di ell  he pec e of Dan e in A Angelo Mai  ( To Angelo Mai ) (1820) Bea o 
te che il fato/A viver non dannò f a an o o o e  ( Yo  e e l ck  fa e did no  condemn 
you to live among these ho o ) (Canti 18; 19). Leopardi describes traditional Hell as a 
anc a  f om o  o ld, f om o  mode n no ion of hell: Eran calde le tue ceneri 
sante,/Non domito nemico/Della fortuna, al cui sdegno e dolore/ 
 
ela if, ci con anciel  (L art 54) [ an e e nal, in a iable elemen  and a ela i e, 
ci c m an ial elemen , ] ( Painter  3) and although it does contain an element that is 
constant and universal, it is only through the second element that humans are able to 
recognize beauty, for the first eternal and infinite constituent of beauty would be 
indige ible, inapp eciable  (L art 54)) [ be ond o  po e  of dige ion o  app ecia ion  
without the second ( Painter  3). Furthermore, Leopardi s poem A Sylvia  [ To S l ia ] 
and Baudelaire s À une passante  [ To a omen pa e  b ], arguably the poets  most 
famous poems, are about the inevitability of unobtainable or unrequited love. 
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Fu più l averno che la terra amico./L averno: e qual non è parte migliore/Di questa 
nostra?  ( Yo  hol  a he  ill e e a m,/ ndefea ed enem  of fo ne,/ o ho e ho e 
disdain and pain/ hell was friendlier than earth./ Yes, even hell: for what place isn t 
p efe able o o ? ) (ibid. 32; 33). The o ld i  fo e e  condemned and omiglia a n 
e o infe no  (Zib 115) ( e emble  hell i elf ) due to the implementation of reason over 
imagination (Z 113). 
The influence of Dante on Baudelaire s own work has been well documented, 
especially by the twentieth century moderns and equally by Walter Benjamin throughout 
his Passagen-Werk (233-4,247, 251, 267, 271, 275, 289, 295, 305, 324, 363), even 
though the degree of Dante s direct influence on the French poet is debatable.37 Barbey 
d Aurevilly labeled Ba delai e a  a defo med Dan e  (Raine  157), ega ding him a  a 
mode n and a hei  e ion of he I alian poe , bo n a  a e l  of a fallen age  (Raine  
157, n. 4), while, later, T.S. Eliot emphasized Baudelaire s modern qualities by referring 
o Ba delai e a  he f agmen a  Dan e  (Selected Essays 336) and as a Christian and a 
Cla i  bo n o  of hi  d e ime  (Essays Ancient and Modern 72). Although 
Baudelaire focused on sin, morality, and spiritual death, as did Dante, the structures of 
the worlds in which they exist differed prominently. Whereas Dante s spiritual universe 
was divided clearly and separately into Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven, in Baudelaire s 
world, the division between each realm is far more ambiguous. Morality has become 
uncannily unhinged and displaced in the modern world, becoming a place where good 
and evil have, copulated, giving birth to a new liminal form of thought that existed 
between ancient moral boundaries. Modernity and secularism culminate in a hellish 
 
37 See Ba delai e  Kno ledge and U e of Dan e  b  Jame  S. Pa . 
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existential boredom for the stranger, resulting from the limitlessness of desire and the 
inability to cure it. Replacing a religious or mythological place where sins are punished, 
hell has become a psychological response to the ascending secularized world that forces 
individuals to place their dependence of abstract concepts such as happiness and joy onto 
material and physical pleasures and desires that ultimately leave one in a state of 
perpetual weariness. Modernity is characterized by its boredom, which itself is connected 
to a negation of lived experience and action, two fundamental attributes needed for the 
pursuit of linear progress.  
Although, not exactly the same thing, both Baudelaire s usage of ennui and 
Leopardi s treatment of noia can be roughly translated as a mixture of both melancholia 
and boredom. Moreover, both are ailments that cannot be alleviated as a result of a 
forever present and reoccurring sense of consciousness that comes from a desire of living 
a happy or joyous life in a secular world based on pleasure. Each individual, according to 
Leopardi, is given the two-edged gift of self-love from Nature. This is the reason why 
every person seeks out good, which is nothing more than the search for pleasure, and 
since desire is superior to pleasure, pleasure can only satisfy desire in fleeting moments 
(Z 333). Our desire for the infinite happiness, keeps desire in the realm of impossibility 
beca e infini e de i e canno  be a i fied b  plea e, h  i i piace i debbono e e  
misti di dispiacere  (Zib135) ( all plea e  m  be mingled i h di plea e ) (Z 130). 
We can see that the relationship between pleasure and desire for Leopardi, which is 
comparable to Jacques Lacan s (1977) psychoanalytic relationship between being, desire, 
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and lack38, does not actually lead to happiness because it lacks any positive qualities. 
F ndamen all , i  i  onl  p i a ione  (Zib 818) ( p i a ion ) (Z 1136). While 
Leopardi s conception of pleasure and desire is temporal and therefore an indication of 
consciousness, it likewise implies a succession or chain of signifiers that both Lacan and 
Freud argue that make up the unconscious (Rennie 199-200). Both Lacan and Lepoardi 
see desire and lack fundamentally bound together in an endless series of unfulfilled 
plea e eeking. Fo  Lacan, de i e i  ca gh  in he ail  of metonymy, eternally 
e ending o a d he de i e fo  ome hing el e  ( crits 431). The metonymic desire is 
never satisfied but always deferred, flowing from one to another (ibid. 379). Therefore, 
desire is a liminal process with no beginning or end. In the case of Leopardi, the modern 
ci i en i  becoming pi i all  emp  and  tormentato da un desiderio infinito del 
piace e  (Zib 247) ( i  o men ed b  an infini e de i e fo  plea e ) (Z 229). Similar to 
Lacan s psychoanalytic description, Leopardi philosophical understanding of pleasure, 
which for him is everything that we desire, is never existing in the present moment, but 
me el  cce i e hin  o  an idea del f o  (Zib 306) ( idea of he f e ) (Z 290). 
Although desire for pleasure is innate in human beings, for the modern individual that is 
alienated from nature, happine  i  no  po ible af e  ha ing ac i ed kno ledge of le 
ill ioni e il nien e di piace i na ali (Zib 57) ( he emp ine  of hing  and he 
ill o ine  and no hingne of na al plea e ) (Z 63). As a result, noia 
psychologically envelops the self once the individual acknowledges the futility of trying 
to satisfy infinite desire.  
 
38 In The Ego in F e d  Theo  Lacan argues that [d]esire is a relation to being to 
lack. The lack is the lack of being properly speaking. It i n  the lack of this or that, but 
lack of being he eb  he being e i  (223). 
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Noia is an existential pain brought on by reason and uniformity, even from a 
uniformity of pleasure, and essentially engrained within homogeneity itself (ibid. 1085), 
making i  la pa ione la pi  con a ia e lon ana alla na a  (Zib 732) ( he pa ion mo  
contra  o and fa he  f om na e ) (Z 952). Conversely, it is Leopardi s concept of 
noia, which continuously emerges throughout the Zibaldone that led to his shift in seeing 
Nature as evil. Noia is what allows reason to destroy the illusions created by Nature, and 
therefore, is essential in what removes humans from Nature. Since human nature is finite, 
it is unable to satisfy our pleasure and desire, which is ultimately infinite, thus giving us 
eternal sorrow in exchange for fleeting happiness. As Leopardi maintains, 
La noia  manifestamente un male, e l annoiarsi una infelicit . Or che cosa  la 
noia? Niun male n  dolore particolare, (anzi l idea e la natura della noia esclude la 
presenza di qualsivoglia particolar male o dolore), ma la semplice vita pienamente 
sentita, provata, conosciuta, pienamente presente all individuo, ed occupantelo. 
Dunque la vita  semplicemente un male: e il non vivere, o il viver meno, s  per 
estensione che per intensione  semplicemente un bene, o un minor male, ovvero 
preferibile per se ed assolutamente alla vita ec. (Zib 1061) 
 
(Boredom is clearly an ill, and the experience of boredom brings unhappiness. 
Now what is boredom? No particular ill or suffering (in fact the idea and nature of 
boredom excludes the presence of any particular ill or suffering) but simply life 
itself fully felt, experienced, recognized, life fully present to the individual and 
taking him over it s everywhere, it saturates an individual. Life therefore is simply 
an ill: and not to live, or to live less; whether in duration or in intensity, is simply 
a good, or lesser ill, rather absolutely and in itself preferable to life, etc.) (Z 1719) 
 
Noia is virus-like, a self-creating and self-feeding emotion based on nothingness that 
p ead  and con amina e  he e e  i  goe : La noia  la pi  sterile delle passioni umane. 
Com ella  figlia della nullit , cos   madre del nulla: giacch  non solo  sterile per se, 
ma rende tale tutto ci  a c i i me ce o a icina ec.  (Zib 656) ( [b]o edom i  he mo  
sterile of human passions. Born of nothingness, it gives life to nothing. Not only is it 
sterile in itself, it also makes whatever it mingles with, whatever it draws close to, sterile, 
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e c. ) (Z 818). Since noia is a never-ending feeling even worse than despair, Leopardi 
acknowledges a heroic quality in being able to inhibit its liminality on daily basis (ibid. 
186), thereby making it the most tragic, yet inspiring emotion since it places the human 
spirit, although fragile and uncertain due to modernity, as more important than the rest of 
the universe (Svendsen 58). While many things may have led to Leopardi s theory of 
pleasure and noia, such as his ailments and strict upbringing, the existential 
disillusionment and moral indifference that was encircling modernity induced an creative 
outlook on the world that would linger within the modern age.  
Ennui too was a result of a spiritual malaise in the modern world; however, 
Baudelaire emphasizes its development as a by-product of over-stimulation even more 
than Leopardi. Baudelaire saw ennui, which he also refers to as Spleen, as the greatest 
fla  of he mode n age if no  ili ed p ope l . In To he Reade , boredom is seen as 
humanity  g ea e  eakne ; [c] est l Ennui! L oeil chargé d un pleur involontaire,/II 
rêve d échafauds en fumant son houka./Tu le connais, lecteur, ce monstre délicat,/- 
Hypocrite lecteur, - mon semblable, - mon f e!  ( He i  Enn i! - with tear-filled eye he 
drams/Of scaffolds, as he puffs his water-pipe./Reader, you know this dainty monster 
too;/-Hypocrite reader,-fellowman,-m  in! ) (Flowers 6; 7). Fondane argues that the 
heological malai e Ba delai e i  apped in i  he bo edom of he co mo  (63), the 
boredom that represents all modern civilization, stimulating us to blindly proceed through 
the void. Although the abyss and ennui are existentially bound and should be a concern 
for all individuals, it is the stranger that forces herself to gaze into it and not to turn away, 
something Baudelaire accuses his readers of being incapable of at the beginning of his 
most famous work. Baudelaire s introduction  to The Flowers of Evil brings all of 
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humanity into the same modern world where boredom has made urban society take on a 
state of insomnia. Elund Summers-Bremner argues in her intriguing book Insomnia: A 
Cultural History (2008) ha  mode ni  like in omnia  i  akin o ha ing a men al i ch 
one cannot reach, a state of conscious enjoyment one can imagine but cannot get to. And 
insomnia, while frequently companioned by anxiety and conflict, is reliably an 
e pe ience of bo edom  (75). No  onl  doe  S mme -Bremner relate boredom to 
insomnia, she argues that modernity and insomnia are uncannily interrelated because they 
ho  ho  nkno n e can be o o el e , and nkno able hing  of en eem o come 
f om o ide  (ibid. 31-32). However, this liminal and almost unnatural state is where the 
Stranger feels natural and thrives in. Navigating in the realm of boredom, in the unknown, 
is where the Stranger begins to finally know itself. 
Baudelaire s p o e poem Chac n a chime e  ( o each hi  o n Chime a ) 
shows how each individual has a monster that imprisons and guides them without 
knowing, po  pa  n in incible be oin de ma che  (Spleen 46) ( impelled b  an 
impe io  need o ad ance ) (Paris 112); ho e e , enfonça dans l atmosphère de 
l ho i on  ( lo  in he ai  of he ho i on ) (ibid.) the poet is weighed down by 
Indiff ence  (ibid.) ( Indiffe ence ), and finding the mystery of each person s monster 
becomes a pointless endeavor for him. Baudelaire  capi al I  indiffe ence e l  in hi  
alienation from a world that solely believes in an aimless sort of progress, where the 
purpose of the movement is simply movement itself. The idea of alienation from 
indifference later became an important theme for modernists such as T.S. Eliot and 
Robert Frost who were influenced by their predecessors of the fin de siècle (Gray 2005, 
11), where alienation is derived from the paradoxical notion of being detached from a 
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world with entrenched meaning and yet still having a direct, albeit a self-protective 
relation to that world (Jaeggi 150). Addressing Benjamin s Passagen-Werk, Susan Buck-
Morss (1991) claims, 
 
na al hi o  a  p ehi o ic and mode ni  a  Hell  the nineteenth-century 
origins of the most recent historical phenomena, when named as reincarnations of 
the most archaic, open themselves up to critical understanding. Both images 
contain the same conceptual elements  history and nature, myth and 
transitoriness  but in configurations so different that their meanings pull in 
opposite directions. If after a century the original arcades appear prehistoric, it is 
because of the extremely rapid changes which industrial technology has wrought 
upon the urban landscape. But the experience of time brought about by this rapid 
change has been precisely the opposite: hellish repetition (184). 
 
Nonetheless, ennui is still a feeling that the modern artist or stranger must 
embrace to understand the world and ourselves within it. Like the uncanny, ennui and 
noia have manifested themselves to us through secularized modernity, revealing to us a 
monstrous aspect of society that is no longer subjugated. In showing us the hellish truth 
of the boredom and repetition of modern capitalist life, ennui becomes almost a 
revolutionary aspect of modernity. Benjamin wanted to use the Passagen-Werk to show 
how the contemporaries of nineteenth century Paris, which he felt mirrored his own age, 
experienced their age as exhausting, disillusioning, and boring, where in spite of the 
massive movement towards technology, secularism, and the reshaping of the city that 
usually defines the characteristics of progress, nothing new seemed to be emerging. In 
The Communist Manifesto (1848/2005), Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels state that the 
[c]on an  e ol ioni ing of p od c ion  fo nd in capi ali m and mode ni , leads to the 
disenchan men  of e e da  life and co o ion of ac ali , in hich all ha  i  olid 
mel  in o ai , all ha  i  hol  i  p ofaned  (7). Both modernity and capitalism do an 
effective job of exploiting our ability to both live in repetition, yet simultaneously give us 
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illusionary-like instances of new. With every product bought or every new boulevard 
created, the same repetitive joy is once again experienced as new. However, as the 
illusion begins to fade for some or the repetition becomes one of emptiness, the 
receptiveness of modern life slowly leads the individual into a state of existential 
boredom and malaise. Marx (1844/2007) characterized the alienation of the worker from 
he p od c  of hi  labo  as an alien God , where the more one puts into it, the less it 
belongs to them (Manuscripts 70). Conjuring an image akin to Frankenstein s Creature, 
capital for Marx, is the prevailing and alienating power over labour that assumes the form 
of an i ola ed and anima ed mechanical mon e , demonicall  po e ed o work  
through this alterity (Capital 302, 503). 
In this regard, we can see that this vision of history is in many ways akin to Søren 
Kierkegaard s concept of Gjentagelsen (repetition), hich mean  o ake again  (A. 
Lewis 79). Conceptually, recollection (Erindringen) and repetition are paradoxically the 
same movement, merely in opposite directions; one moves backwards where the latter 
moves forwards; one might be seen as inauthentic, while the other can be regarded as 
authentic movement. If modernity becomes an existence of simply recollecting, the 
indi id al ma  fall in o a m ndane, meaningle  noi e  (Kie kegaa d 149). Unlike Marx, 
Kierkegaard however does not only see a negative stance in recurring alienation, but also 
recognizes it as something that can be positive and spiritual. Whereas recollection looks 
backwards, repetition is an action, to take back again ; therefore the action becomes 
something new and always moving forward. Repetition can become a spiritual or sacred 
ggle a  in being bo n again, he e in he momen  of de pai  a change ake  
place and f eedom ake  on a eligio  e p e ion, b  hich epe i ion appea  a  
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a onemen  (ibid. 320). Engaging i h hi  pa ado , epe i ion become  an indication of 
spiritual intelligence and strength for Kierkegaard: 
The person who has not circumnavigated life before beginning life will never live; 
the person who circumnavigated it but became satiated had a poor constitution; 
the person who chose repetition - he li e Indeed, ha  o ld life be if he e 
were no repetition? Who could want to be a tablet on which time writes 
something new every instant or to be a memorial volume of the past?...If God 
Himself had not willed repetition, the world would not have come into 
e i ence The efo e, o ld con in e , and i  con in e  beca e i  i  a epe i ion. 
Repetition - that is actuality and the earnestness of existence (132-3). 
 
Kierkegaard places both a liminal and religious element to repetition39 in a similar way to 
Baudelaire s use of the new, in that it is a type of restoration or cultivation of the self. In 
a p choanal ic en e, [ ] e epe i ion i  a de i e fo  a ge ing back of he O he , 
restoration of the God relationship. It is desire for the transcendent Other but, 
paradoxically, desire for restoration of a relationship that one cannot recollect from  
ac ali  (McCarthy 91). True repetition is a movement forward, where one is the same 
yet also becomes another.40         
 
39 it is: transcendent, a religious movement by virtue of the absurd  when the 
bo de line of he onde o  i  eached, e e ni  i  he e epe i ion  (Kierkegaard 305). 
40 Kierkegaard s repetition shares some affinity with Nietzsche concept of the eternal 
recurrence/return: 
Yo  hole life, like a andgla , ill al a  be e e ed and ill e e  n o  again, - a 
long minute of time will elapse until all those conditions out of which you were evolved 
return in the wheel of the cosmic process. And then you will find every pain and every 
pleasure, every friend and every enemy, every hope and every error, every blade of grass 
and every ray of sunshine once more, and the whole fabric of things which make up your 
life. This ring in which you are but a grain will glitter afresh forever. And in every one of 
these cycles of human life there will be one hour where, for the first time one man, and 
then many, will perceive the mighty thought of the eternal recurrence of all things:- and 
for mankind this is always the ho  of Noon  ( Eternal  250). 
Although both concepts share a paradoxical movement forward out of nihilism, one of 
the main differences between the two concepts, as Anna Strelis Soderquist (2016) points 
out, is that while Nietzsche s idea is more of a though  e pe imen  o  an e e ci e of he 
imagination, Kierkegaard  epe i ion m  be an e e ci e in p ac ice  (39). 
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It is with this perspective that makes such pessimistic and paradoxical thinkers 
such as Baudelaire and Leopardi important to modern thought, secularization, and even 
the paradoxical notion of the resacralization. For one, they dived deep into the 
monstrosity of modern life, in order to pull out the paradoxical fragments of beauty and 
sacredness that are intertwined with it. Their plight living in liminal modernity could be 
summed up by a famous quote often attributed to Gramsci: [t]he challenge of modernity 
is to live without illusions and without becoming disillusioned . Although perhaps 
discouraging, while others were attempting to secularize the notion of heaven on earth, 
they felt it necessary to acknowledge and examine the secularized hell that is so closely 
tied to heaven, by questioning not only the rational, technological, and capitalist aspects 
of modernity, but also the false historical, spiritual, and religious ones that came with it. 
Nevertheless, Baudelaire and Leopardi exhibited an uncanny positivity, akin to 
Nietzsche s sense of affirmation or tragic joy 41, where tragedy is the experiencing of 
modern life. This paradoxical joy at the heart of their melancholic views is their 
challenge to appreciate liminal and secularized modernity for what it was. Through an 
acceptance of the paradoxical beauty found in ordinary and harsh modern experience, the 
poets look to dissuade any illusionary optimism of progress that refuses to stare in the 
eyes of its own monstrosity or fails to embrace the modern condition of estrangement and 
alienation. Failing to do so would ironically result in an age of spiritual bankruptcy. 
 
41 The saying of Yea to life, including even its most strange and most terrible problems, 
the will to life rejoicing over its own inexhaustibleness in the sacrifice of its highest 
types this is what I called Dionysian, this is what I divined as the bridge leading to the 
psychology of the tragic poet. Not in order to escape from terror and pity, not to purify 
one s self of a dangerous passion by discharging it with vehemence  but to be far 
beyond terror and pity and to be the eternal lust of Becoming itself that lust which also 
involves the lust of destruction  ( Twilight  120). 
 103 
Consequently, long before Camus  Le Mythe de Sisyphe (Myth of Sisyphus) (1942), 
Baudelaire and Leopardi strove to envision a smile on the individual that is faced with the 
uncanny absurdity of the modern age, even if it was only an ironic one, merely for the 
reason that freedom needs to be free of illusions, if not completely, then at least of the un-
nurturing ones. 
A RUPTURE IN HISTORY AND THE ILLUSION OF PROGRESS 
 
Modernity lives and breathes in a paradox of time. Born from a rupture in history 
and fostered on past ruins, it not only gazes towards the future, it continuously is being 
haunted by its ahistorical spectres. 42 Whereas the future can be considered to be utopian 
in that it contains a wealth of unknown possibilities, the disenchantment and 
demystification of modernity, paradoxically developed from a fear of the unknown,43 can 
itself become a problematic roadblock built into progress itself. While most of their 
contemporaries continued to insist on a myth of constant societal growth, Leopardi and 
Baudelaire were beginning to see through the dream of modernity and the veil of progress 
that was cast over the eyes of society, realizing that what many considered to be reality, 
was essentially artificial in nature. And yet, although the two acknowledge that there is a 
definite rupture in history with the advent of modernity, neither necessarily sees this 
disruption in history correlating to any real sort of progress.  
 
42 F anken ein  C ea e can be een a  epi omi ing hi  no ion of a modern ahistorical 
spectre. 
43Adorno and Horkheimer a g e, Man imagine  him elf f ee f om fea  hen he e i  no 
longer anything unknown. That determines the course or demythologization, of 
enlightenment, which compounds the animate with the inanimate just as myth 
compounds the inanimate with the animate. Enlightenment is mythic fear turned radical. 
The pure immanence of positivism, its ultimate product, is no more than a so to speak 
universal taboo. Nothing at all may remain outside, because the mere idea of outsiderness 
is the very source of fear  (16). 
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Leopardi saw this distinct rupture between what he deemed ancient and modern 
civilization as an irreversible separation. According to him, we must not consider 
mode ni  come na emplice con in a ione dell antica, come un progresso della 
mede ima  ( as a continuation of ancient ci ili a ion, a  i  p og e ion ), but rather, 
e e d e ci il , avendo essenziali differenze tra loro, sono, e debbono essere 
considerate come due civilt  diverse, o vogliamo dire due diverse e distinte specie di 
civilt , ambed e ealmen e comple e in e e e  (Zib 1094) ( [ ]he e o ci ili a ion , 
which are essentially different, are and must be considered as two separate civilizations, 
or rather two different and distinct species of civilization, each actually complete in 
i elf ) (Z 1820-1). This contrast between the ancients and the moderns, spurred on by the 
Copernican and French revolutions, was a prevailing theme in Leopardi s work, and 
although it seems he tends to assign a superiority to the ancients and the classics, 
especially in his early, more nostalgic poems, the melancholic, yet necessary demise of 
the classical age is always prominent in his writings and would further continue and 
expand throughout his life s work. Furthermore, Leopardi believed that an admiration of 
classical poetry should result in the love of one s contemporary age, since classical poets 
were themselves writing about their own present time and not partaking in some 
anachronistic practice (Rennie 135). One of the very first canti written by Leopardi, the 
Dantesque poem L app e amen o della mo e  ( The App oach of Dea h ) (1816), 
echoed the tyranny and horrors of the Inferno, yet one that reflected his own modern age 
rather than Dante s Italy of the fourteenth century (Rosengarten 142). As Leopardi 
laments in another poem dedicated to Dante, he sees historic ruins as spectres that should 
spur us on in the future: “Mira queste ruine/E le carte e le tele e i marmi e I templi;/Pensa 
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qual terra premi; e se destarti/Non può la luce di cotanti esempli,/Che ai? l a i e pa i  
( Look a  he e in ,/ he e page , can a e , he e one  and emple ./Think ha  ea h 
you walk on. And if the light/of these examples fails to inspire you,/what are you waiting 
for? Arise and go ) (Canti 26, 27).       
 Leopardi s Italy seems to embody the turmoil and alienation of secularized 
modernity, completely caught in an illusion of progress and an undefined future.44 In 
Dialogo di n Vendi o e D almanacchi e di n Pa egge e  ( A Dialog e of an 
Almanac-seller and passer-b ) (1832), the setting of Leopardi s narrative takes place in 
a modern European city and tells us of a fleeting conversation between an almanac seller 
on the street and a modern flâneur-like character. The passer-by questions the seller s 
belief that the future should always be better than the past simply for the fact that the 
future has yet to come and thereby contains many possibilities. But as the passer-by and 
Leopardi himself contend, this optimism in the future is based on an illusion of the 
unknown and that deeming the future better because it relies on an outlook that the past is 
simply not good enough, leads to a paradoxical position that if the past is never good 
enough how could the future ever be? The seller admits he is only willing to re-live his 
life as a different person, which Leopardi shows as modern existence s greatest flaw: 
reducing existence from repetition to pure novelty. By trying to evade the past, humanity 
has paradoxically continued on a cyclical path of reoccurring desire. For Leopardi, 
nothing is novel; everything is old; everything repeats.  
 
44 Interestingly, Mary Shelley saw the liminality of Italy as a result of being a fragmented 
e  of na ion a e  a  i  g ea e  hope, ince i  had no  e  fo med a na ion  and 
therefore still contained in itself a possibility of creating something new. As Tilottama 
Rajan (1998) e plain , Shelle  a  ha  he ickne  of con empo a  I al  a  al o i  
po en ial  (30-1). 
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Despite history being cyclical for Leopardi, he was never a supporter of a 
restoration of the past, especially a civilization dominated by a Christian God. Leopardi 
endeavored to search out modern and secular knowledge at all costs, believing that any 
nostalgic sentiment towards the past kept modernity rooted in its current existential 
predicament. This development of thought leaves Leopardi with an extremely 
paradoxical view of mode ni , e  hi  di ill ionmen  e l ing f om he o mani 
ilen i, e p ofondi ima e e  ( pe h man ilence , and dep hle  clam ) (Canti 106; 
107) found within modernity directed him to an anti-Platonic and relativist stance 
concerning life that eventually led him to proclaim God s death45, even before Nietzsche 
 
45  chiaro che la distruzione delle idee innate distrugge il principio della bont , 
belle a, pe fe ione a ol a, e de  lo o con a ii. Vale a dire di una perfezione ec. la 
quale abbia un fondamento, una ragione, una forma anteriore alla esistenza dei soggetti 
che la contengono, e quindi eterna, immutabile, necessaria, primordiale ed esistente 
prima dei detti soggetti, e indipendente da lo o. O  do e i e e a agione, e a 
fo ma? e in che con i e? e come la po iamo noi cono ce e o ape e, e ogn idea ci 
deriva dalle sensazioni relative ai soli oggetti esistenti? Supporre il bello e il buono 
assoluto,  tornare alle idee di Platone, e risuscitare le idee innate dopo averle distrutte, 
giacch  ol e e e, non  altra possibile ragione per cui le cose debbano 
assolutamente e astrattamente e necessariamente essere cos  o cos , buone queste e cattive 
quelle, indipendentemente da ogni volont , da ogni accidente, da ogni cosa di fatto, che 
in realt   la sola ragione del tutto, e quindi sempre e solamente relativa, e quindi tutto 
non  buono, bello, vero, cattivo, brutto, falso, se non relativamente; e quindi la 
convenienza delle cose fra loro  ela i e In omma il p incipio delle co e, e di Dio 
stesso,  il n lla Ce o  che distrutte le forme Platoniche preesistenti alle cose,  
distrutto Iddio  (Zib 483-4). 
[  i  i  clea  ha  he de c ion of inna e idea  de o  the principle of absolute 
goodness, beauty, perfection, and of their contraries. That is to say, the principle of a 
perfection, etc., that has a foundation, a logic, a form prior to the existence of the objects 
which contain it, and hence is eternal, immutable, necessary, primordial and existing 
before the said objects, and independent of them. But where does this logic, this form 
exist? And what does it consist of? And how can we recognize or know it, if we derive 
every idea from sensations relating only to existing objects? To assume absolute good 
and absolute beauty is to return to ideas of Plato, and to revive innate ideas after having 
destroyed them, since once they are removed, there is no other possible reason why 
things should absolutely and abstractly and necessarily be thus or thus, with these good 
and those bad, independently of every will, of every accident, of every concrete 
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famously did.46 In many of his poems, Leopardi places himself in a liminal position 
within time, space, and society, unable to find complete solace in past wisdom, the 
present reality, or the promising  f e ahead of him; Non io d Olimpo o di Cocito i 
sordi/regi, o la terra indegna,/e non la notte moribondo appello;/non te, dell atra morte 
ultimo aggio,/con cia f a e  ( I call no  on he heedle  king  of Ol mp  o  
Cocytus,/ nor on unworthy earth, nor the night before I die;/ and not you, conscious 
future generation,/ la  hope of ligh e  dea h ) (Canti 64; 65). As Fabio A. Camilletti 
(2017) claim , Leopa di s style confirms this impression of immediacy, as if it aimed to 
cap e a fading and indefinable en a ion in hich no ch onological p og e ion can 
be de ec ed, no  an  f he  anal i  po ible  (Camille i 23).  
What the ancients had over the moderns, according to Leopardi, and the essential 
difference that defines this historical rupture that is modernity, was the ancients  ability to 
nurture strong and life-giving illusions, while in the modern age, these illusions have 
become ultimately empty and baseless due to the absolute implementation of both reason 
and truth over Nature. By stressing the idea of illusion, Leopardi rejects the 
mythologizing of human history and develops an animosity towards the notion of 
Christian perfection that, has been secularized, and in turn resacralized, into modern 
 
circumstance, which in reality is the sole reason for everything, and is therefore always 
and only relative. Hence everything is not good, beautiful, true, bad, ugly, false except 
ela i el , and hence he p op ie  of hing  i h e pec  o one ano he  i  ela i e   
In ho  he p inciple of hing , and indeed of God i  no hingne Wha  i  ce ain i  ha  
once the Platonic fo m  p ee i ing hing  a e de o ed, God, oo, i  de o ed  (Z 368-
369) 
46 Al ho gh Nie che a  an admi e  of Leopa di, calling him one of he fo  ma e  
of prose  (Gay Science 146), he could not have known of the reference to God s 
destruction, since Zibaldone was not published until after Nietzsche s death. However, 
Nietzsche s ridiculed madman, whom Nietzsche gives his famous quote to (Zarathursta 
59; Gay Science 181), ended up being an apt voice to paraphrase Leopardi. 
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society s concept of progress. As a result, Nature/God turns into something imperfect at 
the expense of the illusion of humanity s perfection (Z 235). In developing an attitude of 
secularization that is inadvertently similar to Charles Taylor s, Leopardi argues that 
Christianity helped destroy these classical illusions through a championing of Reason 
over Nature, the same conception the Age of Enlightenment had ironically used to 
destroy the illusions that had been shaped by Christianity. As it was later for Nietzsche, 
Christianity is a primary cause of nihilism in the modern world. The problematic 
combination that came with Christianity s influence of searching for happiness from a 
world outside of our own and scientific reason s emphasis on demystifying the natural 
world that surrounds us, has led humanity into a liminal state in which our world has 
become remarkably unhomely for us: Non  egli n pa ado o  ( I  i  no  a pa ado , ) 
Leopa di a g e , che la Religion C i iana in g an pa e ia a a la fon e dell ateismo, o 
generalmente, della incredulit  religiosa? Eppure io cos  la penso. L uomo naturalmente 
non  incredulo, perch  non agiona mol o, e non c a g an fa o delle cagioni delle co e  
(Zib 432) ( ha  he Ch i ian Religion ha  in la ge pa  been he ource of atheism or 
more generally of religious unbelief? Yet I think this is the case. Man is not naturally 
incredulous because he does not reason much and does not care a great deal about the 
ca e  of hing ) (Z 502). This historical process leaves modern Europe in a continuous 
liminal position in which the re-enchantment brought on by the Enlightenment, which 
paradoxically co-exists with its rationalizing and disenchanting element, puts society in a 
problematic situation where it is in a constantly oscillating between enchantment and 
disenchantment: past, present, and future. 
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For Leopardi, the modern world, in comparison to the traditional, is akin to adults 
growing up from their childish past; however, he laments our inability to fear the 
supernatural as we did previously as children:  
Lascio stare il timore e lo spavento proprio di quell et  (per mancanza di 
esperienza e sapere, e per forza d immaginazione ancor vergine e fresca): timor di 
pericoli di ogni sorta, timore di vanit  e chime e imo  delle la e, ogni, 
cada e i, epi i no ni . L idea degli spettri, quel timore spirituale, 
soprannaturale, sacro, e di un altro mondo, che ci agitava frequentemente in 
quell et , aveva un non so che di s  formidabile e smanioso, che non pu  esser 
paragonato con verun altro sentimento dispiacevole dell uomo. Nemmeno il timor 
dell inferno in un moribondo, credo che possa essere cos  intimamente terribile. 
Perch  la ragione e l esperienza rendono inaccessibili a qualunque sorta di 
sentimento, quell ultima e profondissima parte e radice dell animo e del cuor 
nostro, alla quale penetrano e arrivano, e la quale scuotono e invadono le 
sensazioni fanciullesche o primitive, e in ispecie il detto timore. (Zib 305-6) 
 
(To say nothing of the fear and terror typical of that age (due to a lack of 
experience or knowledge, and to the power of our imagination, still fresh and 
i gin): fea  of dange  of e e  kind; fea  of figmen  and chime a fea  of 
gho , d eam , dead bodie , noi e  in he nigh The idea of pec e , ha  
spiritual, supernatural, sacred, otherworldly fear, which frequently gripped us at 
the age, had something so dreadful and frenzied about it that it cannot be 
compared to any other pleasurable feeling felt by human beings. For childhood or 
primitive sensations, and this fear in particular, reach, assail, penetrate, and 
overwhelm the ultimate and deepest part and root of our mind and heart, which 
reason and experience render inaccessible to any kind of feeling.) (Z 289-90) 
 
Although the modern world has predominately extinguished its sense of supernatural fear, 
it has to deal with a new and subtle kind of terror. Terrore  for Leopardi, takes on an 
ncann  a pec  in he mode n o ld ha  de e mine  an ambig o  feeling of p i e 
and hock  (Camille i 126), ince i  e mol o pi  avvilitiva dell animo e sospensiva 
dell uso della agione  (Zib 822) ( i  fa  mo e likel  o ca e he use of reason to be 
pended ) (Z 1160). This uncanny and monstrous terror is a form of fear that results 
from the post-Enlightenment. Reason thrusts us towards a terror brought on by an 
acceptance of a greater insignificance, a fear that even goes beyond the boundaries of the 
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courageous individual or trailblazer. Leopardi contends that, while the courageous or 
i e man non eme mai emp e e e e a e i o  (Zib 822) ( i  ne e  af aid he can 
always be terror- ck ) (Z 1160.). With fear, one can still be led by imagination and 
spirited action, whereas with terror, the individual becomes paralyzed. We see this 
distinction of fear and terror also in Frankenstein: Victor s fear of death propels him to 
create life but the terror witnessed afterwards paralyzes him from action for a large 
portion of the remainder the novel.  
Leopardi similarly rejects the utopian enthusiasm of modernity s rational 
ideologies, arguing those are inauthentic forms of life. In he poem La Gine a O, Il 
Fio e Del De e o  ( The B oom, o  he Flo e  of he Wilde ne ) Leopardi disparages 
he idea of p og e  eeing i  a  eg e i e: Q i mi a e i i pecchia,/ ecol pe bo e 
sciocco,/che il calle insino allora/dal risorto pensier segnato innanti/abbandonasti, e vòlti 
addie o i pa i,/del i o na  i an i,/e p ocede e il chiami  ( Look he e and ee o elf 
reflected, proud and foolish century,/ who gave up the way forward/ indicated by 
resurgent thought,/ and having changed course,/ boast of turning back/ and call it 
p og e ) (Canti 290, 291). In regard to spiritual evolution, Leopardi argues it stems 
f om ha  e do no  kno ; nel di impa a e  (Zib 1104) ( in nlea ning ) (Z 1832). 
What the scientific method has shown us is that in actuality, we do not understand the 
la  of Na e. The mo e e di co e , he mo e e eali e ha  e ape  emp e meno  
(Zib 1104) ( kno  le  and le ) (Z 1823), and l apice del sapere umano e della 
filosofia consiste a conoscere la di lei propria inutilit  (Zib 211) ( he peak of h man 
knowledge or philosophy is to ecogni e i  o n ele ne ) (Z 195). Leopardi argues 
that the need to discover brought on by scientific process, the rational ideals of the 
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Enlightenment, and the French Revolution, although reliable, had nonetheless weakened 
and challenged our profound notions of faith and meaning, leaving us with an 
insurmountable void to battle due to the deterministic and materialistic features of 
modernity, while still trying to satisfy the need for spiritual fulfillment. Leopardi does not 
completely refute the idea of progress, advocating the notions of the social constructs 
designed by humans such as civilization that ultimately led to the constructions of cities. 
It is only when it is recognized as linear progress or historical optimism that progress, as 
an all-encompassing project, begins to fail. 
BATTLING THE STORM THAT IS MODERNITY IN THE STREETS OF PARIS 
 
A similar anti-utopian shift can be seen in the writings of Charles Baudelaire. The 
optimism of revolution and progress  c ea i e pi i  fo nd in A  Bo geoi  ( To he 
Bourgeois)  (1846) slowly dissipates in his writings after the 1850 s (M. Berman 138). In 
e a  ch a  De l idée modern du progrès appliquée aux beaux-a  ( On he Mode n 
Idea of Progre  a  Applied o he Fine A ) (1855) and throughout his later journal 
entries, Baudelaire moves towards the notion of the absurdity of infinite human progress: 
[l]a c o ance a  p og  e  ne doc ine de pa e e  ( [ ]he belief in P ogress is a 
doc ine fo  idle ) fo  Il ne pe   a oi  de p og  ( ai, c est-à-dire moral) que dans 
l individu et par l individu lui-m me  (Journaux 60) ( [ ]he e canno  be an  p og e  
(true progress, that is to say, moral) except within the individual and by the individual 
him elf ) (Intimate Journals 71-2). Here, Baudelaire s concern is with an internal and 
spiritual rather than an external or socio-political perspective of advancement, rejecting 
any illusionary ideas of progress based on modernity s teleological, scientific, materialist, 
and technological innovations that have become for him, dazzling spectacles used to 
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cover up the dark void existing within modernity s attractive façade. Baudelaire s 
writings begin to question humanity s messianic belief in unending progress and 
seriously consider whether this belief is humanity s greatest downfall: 
Je laisse de côté la question de savoir si, délicatisant l humanité en proportion des 
jouissances nouvelles qu il lui apporte, le progrès indéfini ne serait pas sa plus 
ingénieuse et sa plus cruelle torture ; si, procédant par une opiniâtre négation de 
lui-même, il ne serait pas un mode de suicide incessamment renouvelé, et si, 
enfermé dans le cercle de feu de la logique divine, il ne ressemblerait pas au 
scorpion qui se perce lui-même avec sa terrible queue, cet éternel desideratum qui 
fait son éternel désespoir? (L art 220)  
 
(I am leaving out of the account the question whether, in making humanity more 
sensitive in proportion as it adds to the sum of possible enjoyment, unending 
progress would not be humanity s most ingenious and cruel form of torture; 
whether by this process, which is a stubborn negation of itself, progress would be 
a constantly renewed form of suicide, and whether, imprisoned within the flaming 
circle of divine logic, progress this eternal desideratum, which is humanity s 
eternal despair, would not be like the scorpion that stings itself with its own tail.) 
(Selected Writings 122) 
 
Instead of containing any substantial growth, the historical process outlined by 
Baudelaire is self-defeating and a representation of the decline in human history, 
especially in regard to the moral and spiritual being. According to Jean-Paul Sartre, 
progress for Baudelaire was a con in o  decline hich a  ch ha  e e  momen  
a  infe io  o he one ha  p eceded i  (168). Fo  Sa e, Ba delai e s pessimistic 
experience of modernity and his abhorrence of the idea of positive and effective progress 
was a circumstance of hi  age ha  na ched him a a  f om he con empla ion of he 
past and compelled him to turn his eyes towards the future. In this way he was made to 
live his age backwards; and in such a situation he felt as clumsy and embarrassed as a 
man who was being made o alk back a d  (ibid.). Sartre seems to depict Baudelaire 
in a similar vein as Benjamin s analytic account of Paul Klee  d a ing Angel  No  
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(1920),47 as someone swept backwards against the wind of progress. Yet, this description 
goes against the poet s emblematic liminal stance on life that juxtaposes binaries in order 
to fully experience the present-day. Baudelaire was unable to gaze in one direction for 
too long and was far more Janus-faced than Sartre wants to admit. Progress and 
modernity were simply constant change for Baudelaire and although change signifies 
something new, he understood that it also encompasses something that has been lost or 
has decayed. In Baudelaire  famo  poem Le C gne  (The S an), faced i h he ban 
restitution of Paris, the poet gazes into the face of progress, ripping away its utopian 
fa ade: Pa i  change! mai  ien dan  ma m lancolie/N a bougé! palais neufs, 
échafaudages, blocs,/Vieux faubourgs, tout pour moi devient allégorie/Et mes chers 
souvenirs sont plus lo d  e de  oc  ( Pa i  ma  change, b  in m  melanchol  
mood/ Nothing has budged! New places, blocks, scaffoldings,/Old neighbourhoods, are 
allego ical fo  me,/And m  dea  memo ie  a e hea ie  han one ) (Flowers 174; 175), 
onl  o concl de ha   uiconque a perdu ce qui ne e e o e/Jamai , jamai !  ( [o]f 
all those who have lost something they ma  no  find/ E e , e e  again! ) (ibid. 176;177). 
While Baudelaire is confronted with a physical and structural change of Paris, his 
thoughts flow towards the people, liminal figures that are captives but also historical 
 
47 Benjamin i e  of Klee  pain ing:  
A Klee painting named Angelus Novus shows an angel looking as though he is 
about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are 
staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the 
angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of 
events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon 
wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the 
dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from 
Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no 
longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his 
back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is 
what we call progress ( The e  257-8). 
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e ile  and o ca . F om O id, o And omache, o an Af ican neg e  (ibid), and he 
poem s allegorical swan, Baudelaire s historical journey of change is paradoxically 
caught in its static motion. According to Richa d Te diman (1993) [ ]he p oce  of 
memory carries an uncanny danger, which emerges in the paradigm of dispossession that 
organizes Baudelaire  poem. Fo  he e ile  of Le C gne,  fo  he di po e ed, 
memory stages not recovery but deficiency memo  fig e  he ina hen ici  of 
p e en ne , he a ma ic pe i ence of an i e e ible e pe ience of lo  (108). While 
all progress  signifies loss to Baudelaire, being a captive of memory and nostalgia is 
equally as damaging to the internal self, since both a total belief in progress and a 
clutching of the past imprisons the individual into a false sense of reality.   
The poems in Les Fleurs du Mal (The Flowers of Evil) (1857/2008) depict much 
more than historical outsiders. They are littered with uncanny characters of his present 
time. For Baudelaire, the strange characters that inhabitant the modern city, such as 
gamblers, prostitutes, alcoholics, and drug addicts, his true heroes of modern life, become 
the uncanny allegories of modernity. Although the uncanny is best elucidated in literature, 
it was the metropolis that allowed it to surface into the public realm of everyday 
experience, looming through the void in urban space; a space ideal for the stranger who is 
alienated, estranged, and experiences homesickness due to the modern condition, which 
allows the uncanny to surface within the self and most notably in modern and avant-garde 
art (Vidler, 5-13).48 Baudelaire s allegorical use of his heroes of modern life was a violent 
 
48 In The Architectural Uncanny (1992), Anthony Vidler claims that space is inheritably 
inherently uncanny since  
[s]pace, in the contemporary discourse, as in lived experience, has taken on an 
almost palpable existence. Its contours, boundaries, and geographies are called 
pon o and in fo  all he con e ed ealm  of iden i . pace i  a med o hide, 
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a   d   d   a  ca d , a  [ ]  a  d c d b d 
 a ad  b ca  b       (Buck Morss 182). Along with using 
allegory as a subtle weapon against his capitalist age, Baudelaire uses it as a means of 
reading the world in order to understand the emotional and psychological aspects of the 
inner person through plunging oneself into the physical world. The reason why 
Baudelaire s heroes of modern life are uncanny is because they should not exist in a 
utilitarian and Bourgeois-utopian world built upon the idea of progress. The backdrop of 
many of his poems, are the newly constructed long and wide boulevards that were being 
developed in Paris during the time Baudelaire was writing. Commissioned by Napoleon 
III, Georges-Eugène Haussmann, also known as Baron Haussmann, set out to reconstruct 
and modernize Paris between 1853 and 1870, in an attempt to clear out slums, create 
b ea hing pace , and facili a e he affic flo  o a d  he cen e of he ci  (M. 
Berman 150). In the process of leveling and destroying the old medieval city, 
Haussmann s renovation of Paris destroyed many arcades, the favourite home of the 
Baudelairian flâneur, which consisted of shopping malls made of glass and steel that had 
been created before the Second Empire while Baudelaire was growing up as a child. The 
arcades represented to Baudelaire the dream of modernity and the possibilities and 
wonders that it could provide. With the destruction of these arcades and his childhood 
fantasies, along with the failed revolution of 1848, Baudelaire quickly learned that 
 
in its darkest recesses and forgotten margins, all the objects of fear and phobia 
that have returned with such insistence to haunt the imaginations of those who 
ha e ied o ake o  pace  o p o ec  hei  heal h and happine  In e e  ca e 
light space  is invaded by the figure of dark space , on the level of the body in 
the form of epidemic and uncontrollable disease, and on the level of the city in the 
person of the homeless (167-8). 
 
 116 
modernity was a fleeting dream of destruction, failure, repetition, and boredom. The 
metropolis was a modern image of the chaotic flux of sensation into which the bourgeois 
rational dream world was beginning to be dissolved (Ferguson 19, 31). However, thanks 
to the new modern reconstruction of Paris witnessed by Baudelaire, society was able see 
these marginalized figures now more than ever, as the boulevards created more social 
contact between people of different classes.  
Baudelaire  p o e poem Le  e  de  pa e  ( E e  of he Poo ) perfectly 
captures this confrontation and we are able to see how these new boulevards forced 
people to confront and deal with the image of the poor because they were no longer 
segregated in the underprivileged quarters of Paris, a monster that modernity could not 
cover up. The E e  of he Poo  ho ca e  Ba delai e s social consciousness and 
critique of what Benjamin calls high capitalism.  It is one of the poems that asserts 
Ba delai e a  one of he g ea  ban i e  (M. Berman 147). The narrator of the 
poem takes us back to a memory, which we discover is the cause of the hatred he feels 
towards the woman he once loved. The memory takes place in a café at the corner of the 
new boulevard. The narrator describes the scene in the café with dream-like quality, 
con aining nappe  blo i an e  de  mi oi  ( da ling mi o  pool ) and le  
n mphe  e  le  d e e  (Spleen 122) n mph  and godde  (Paris 52). A poor family 
walks up to the window, spell-bound by the beauty they witness inside. At this moment, 
the narrator feels both guilt and shame and looks at his lover expecting her to feel the 
same thing. When he eplie , Ce  gen -là me sont insupportables avec leurs yeux 
ouverts comme des portes cochères ! Ne pourriez-vous pas prier le maître du café de les 
éloigner d ici?  (Spleen 123) ( I canno  bea  ho e people i h hei  e e  o  on alk ! 
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Tell he ai e  o ge  id of hem ), (Paris 53) the narrator realizes that his dream of 
de  me  d o mai  n en feraient plus qu ne  (Spleen 121) o o l  o ld be a  
one  (Paris 52), died along with that dream. The new boulevard not only creates an 
en i onmen  of plende  inache e  (Spleen 121) nfini hed plendo  (Paris 52) in 
the modern city but also has brought the poor family to the window of the café, and 
consequently face to face with the young bourgeois couple. As a result, both the dream of 
progress and the feeling of guilt and shame begin to crack through the recently paved 
boulevards of Paris (M. Berman 152). While the woman continues to repress these 
feelings or rather is unable to see them with her own prejudice eyes, the narrator is no 
longer able to ignore them, which leads to both his bitterness towards her and his 
questioning of himself. Whereas he originally saw her eyes as beautiful, in the end, they 
become a symbol of the inability to communicate, and ep e en  a hif  f om lo e o ha e, 
f om fan a  o eali , f om clo ene  o aliena ion  (Rice 35). The movement or 
breakdown in their relationship pushes the narrator to acknowledge that it is the woman 
he loves whose eyes are truly poor. 
Although this poem does show the class division and inequalities that occur in the 
capitalist hub, it also shows Baudelaire s tendency to blur the lines between reality and 
dream. The tale is told through the memory of a couple inside the modern café, where the 
modern bourgeois reality is described by Baudelaire in dream-like fashion. The line 
between dream and reality becomes instantly blurred. When the narrator looks outside of 
his dream and into the harsh reality of the eyes of the poor , he realizes that this utopian  
experience is just a bourgeois modern dream but also that this dream, and the dream of 
eternal love, are illusions and do not truly exist. On the other hand, the poor family on the 
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other side of the glass window is standing within the harsh reality of modernity yet 
looking into the modernist dream living inside the café, believing in all its wonders. 
Baudelaire therefore, creates a liminal world where both parties are caught within reality 
and dream simultaneously, encompassing the fragility of both. The narrator is first 
recalling a memory, in the same the way one recalls a dream. However in this dream, he 
sees the failure of the modern one and recognizes that we repress what makes us feel 
uncomfortable in our own skin. The narrator acknowledges his strangeness, locating the 
dark aspects that exist within both his dreams and his reality. Although he has seen the 
death of the modern dream and likewise, modern love, he nonetheless furthers his 
understanding of both his internal and external worlds as being interconnected, albeit 
fractured.  
While Baudelaire is often seen as a precursor for the decadence of the nineteenth 
century fin de siècle, he, as with Leopardi, also foreshadow the fragmented, opposing, 
and chaotic beginning of the next century that will plunge the world into its greatest  war 
yet, and bring the modern stranger into a whole new realm of liminality and violence.  
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Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a 
sword. 
 - Matthew 10:44 
 
La salute non analizza se stessa e neppur si guar- da nello specchio. Solo noi malati sappiamo 
qualche cosa di noi stessi. 
 (Health doesn t analyze itself, nor does it look at itself in the mirror. Only we sick people know 
something about ourselves) 
 - Italo Svevo (Zeno s Conscience) 
 
Le   emain oldie  e en af e  he a fo  his is not war against an eternal enemy, as the 
newspapers and our honorable politicians say, nor of one race against another; it is a European 
civil war, a war against the inner invisible enemy of the European spirit. 
- Franz Marc 
 
When he o ld a  in darkness and wretchedness, it could believe in perfection and yearn for it. 
But when the world became bright with reason and riches, it began to sense the narrowness of the 
needle  e e, and ha  ankled fo  a o ld no longe  illing o belie e o  ea n   




Three men, resembling military soldiers and officers, are torturing a man, raping 
his wife, and holding their small child captive in a small attic. The executioners look 
calm and unemotional, as if mad scientists of pain and torture performing a sensible 
experiment. A dog is seen howling away for help but is ultimately unheard, as a 
phonograph plays hiding the screams of the helpless victims. The noise of technological 
modernity, of the city, is drowning out the violence that is taking place. This violent and 
grotesque scene is an illustration of Max Beckmann s post-WWI Expressionist painting 
The Night (1919). The work, which was not only influenced by the terrors of WWI but 
also by the outbreak of the November Revolution of 1918 in Germany, exemplifies a life 
ruled by violence, chaos, and murder. There is no purpose to the suffering shown in this 
painting, only senseless and meaningless violence, executed from a source of perpetual 
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boredom if anything else. In the painting s background lie another man and woman: the 
next victims or curious voyeurs? The answer is uncertain, but nonetheless, the painting 
implicates the viewer s scopophiliac attraction to violence with the horrific scene. Even 
the face on the child being carried away seems to have conflicted emotions. Clutching 
onto one of the murders, the child s eyes seem to express a dejected state but the smirk on 
its face gives away a hint of pleasure. In the background is a window, which seems to be 
the victims  only way of escape. However, one of the killers is about to close the blinds, 
signifying that modern society has little time left before it is able to detect, or even more 
frightening, finally consents to the horror that has entered it. The moonlight shinning in 
bears a resemblance to a detached eye looking in on this ghastly scene, and despite the 
fact that the blinds are closing, it has already witnessed and observed enough; the viewer 
has not just but rather was a part of the scene, and therefore, lives in its memory. The 
painting is not a genuine account of a specific attack, but instead represents all of 
humanity caught in a vicious maelstrom of monstrosity and violence.  
After the First World War, the modern stranger begins to become a more 
prominent figure in the literary and visual art world, but more importantly, starts to move 
from its individualistic and outsider beginnings and more into the collective sphere. Prior 
to WWI, modern strangers only manifested themselves in a handful of works by novelists, 
poets, and philosophers, and therefore, was still a peripheral and uncanny character in 
secularized modernity. After the war, the philosophical and intellectual landscape of 
modernity changed, ushering in innovative or transformed avant-garde and literary 
movements such as Expressionism or the Lost Generation  of the 1920s. These literary 
and art movements epitomized the returning soldier of the trenches that embodied this 
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new chaotic and ambiguous mindset, alongside the monster of modernity. These themes 
would once again manifest after WWII with the existentialism of Camus, Celine, de 
Beauvoir and others, and further into late modernity, when the concept of the modern 
stranger would be more properly defined in works of philosophy and critical theory by 
thinkers such as Zygmund Bauman (1991), and Julia Kristeva (1991). The relationship 
between war and the modern stranger put greater emphasis on violence as an essential 
characteristic of secularized and liminal modernity, and can be seen as an examination of 
why in contemporary film and literature, the modern stranger is usually represented as the 
violent anti-hero. World War I created an upheaval like no other and along with its 
postwar peace settlement, resulting in a global revolution (Sondhaus 2011), not just 
geographically and politically but also psychologically and artistically.  
 This chapter will predominantly focus on the time period in and around WWI, 
emphasizing the development and rise of the modern stranger during the early twentieth 
century culture and its continued foregrounding of the relationship between monstrosity 
and violence. In exploring these theories, I center my study on the modernism of the early 
twentieth century; through avant-garde art movements such as Expressionism and 
Futurism, primarily focusing on the significant painter Max Beckmann and filmmaker 
Fritz Lang. Moreover, the literature of Erich Maria Remarque, Robert Musil, , and Italo 
Svevo will also be addressed to examine the indirect influence of the modern stranger on 
these themes of violence, irony, utopia, and the paradoxical connection between them. 
Elizabeth Ziolkowski s S e o s Uomo Senza Qualità: Musil and Modernism in Italy  
compares and contrasts two of Svevo s and Musil s most celebrated characters, Ulrich 
and Zeno, who have been historical linked as being men without qualities . Both Ulrich 
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and Zeno a e bo h a ac i e, i onic, in elligen  men, ho a e open o a ange of 
pe pec i e , ne e  commi ing o j  one  (89), even morally ambiguous ones (94). 
While the men do contain qualities, just indistinct ones, they are contrasted against the 
men with qualities  that falsely believe that they possess control over their lives, a trait 
that ultimately leads to their hubris and failure.  
As Ziolkowski proclaims, [b]oth narratives suggest that the only genuine choice 
in the modern world is to be a man without qualities, a reflection of the crisis experienced 
during modernity in general and also of the crisis during the dissolution of Austria-
H nga , he e iden i  a  e peciall  in fl  (95). No i h anding he compa i on , 
Ziolkowski argues that the continuous and strong link between Zeno and Ulrich has a lot 
to do with the strong Austro-Italian literary relations of the time, especially since the term 
inetti (inept, passive, weak) that typically emphasizes Svevo s characters, is not 
necessarily the best to describe Urlich (84). Nonetheless, I will build on the connections 
between the two, through a more comprehensive examination of irony, violence, and 
liminality. Naomi Lebo i  (1978) al o di ing i he  he o b  a g ing ha  he 
presence of historical contemplation in Musil  no el i  i ed o a high allego ical pi ch , 
hile Zeno, ill bo nd b  sociability and his psychology, lives in historical comfort, 
despite all that rages around him (204). Therefore, while both are modern strangers 
caught in the same historical and liminal time period, the two operate in different 
inside/outside thresholds though bounded by the same chaos. While Ulrich is situated in 
the Eye of a hurricane, Zeno sits in the in the Eye of the storm looking outwards.  
Although, this chapter focuses primarily on pre-WWII work, Walter M. Miller 
Jr. s science fiction novel A Canticle for Leibowitz will also be discussed alongside the 
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notion of divine violence, repetition, and messianic time, outlined by the works of Ernst 
Bloch, Walter Benjamin, and Giorgio Agamben. By doing so, I hope to shed light on the 
development and the difficulties of the modern stranger within secularized modernity 
upon the monstrousness of violence and war entering into the collective conscience of 
society, and whether it is possible to define violence as messianic or is the modern era 
simply caught in a cycle of destruction?  
THE GREAT WAR, IRONY, & DARK UTOPIAS 
 
The Great War and Modern Memory by Paul Fussell (1975) examines the 
literature of World War I, studying the various myths, writing styles, and consciousness 
that had been transformed as a result of the war. Although it was the Romantics that first 
revolutionized irony from a literary device into a new form of consciousness of seeing the 
contradictions of everyday life, twentieth century romantic irony went further by focusing 
on the ambiguity of modern life by taking a more versatile, critical, and existential form, 
forming a perspective that would dominate most of early to mid-twentieth century art and 
literature (Berg 53-56). As Fussell argues, the modern use of irony began to change after 
WWI as many of the meta-narratives of the nineteenth century began to crumble under 
the weight of modern warfare. The ascendancy of irony in the 1920s according to Fussell 
and Susanne Christine Puissant (2009) is directly associated with the outbreak of WWI, 
which ushered in a world of irony that completely altered both literature and the modern 
consciousness Modris Eksteins  remarkable book Rites of Spring: The Great War and the 
Birth of the Modern Age (1989) studies the cultural history of World War I and its 
aftermath. Eksteins also places WWI as the threshold of the changing ideological 
landscape but his study of the war is inserted between an examination of the disordered 
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society waiting to shatter and the postwar era looking to reassemble it itself. Eksteins  
book is extremely useful in constructing a correlation between the modern stranger, 
liminality, and WWI, as he defines the solider battling in the liminal chaos of No Man s 
Land as the representation of the new modernist era that is built on a paradoxical and 
i onic opia g o nded on hopele ne  and fai h. Ek ein  decla e  he oldie  no  j  a 
harbinger but the very agent of the modern aesthetic, the progenitor of destruction but 
al o he embodimen  of he f e  (213).  
 In regard to this sentiment, I will also explore how new modern forms of irony 
stimulated by thinkers such as Leopardi and Baudelaire discussed in the previous chapter, 
were able to reshape and resacralize the utopian spirit and its relation to violence. By the 
twentieth century, the monster of modernity had mutated into a disease, an uncanny 
sickness epitomized by violence that had been spreading throughout the world. While the 
Creature in Frankenstein personified monstrosity in its totality, especially for its creator, 
who falsely believed that the monster was something external from him, monstrosity 
becomes consciously acknowledged as part of humanity, yet something that is still 
foreign and invading. Rendering it a human sickness implied that it could be cured, a 
perspective that further allows for the monster to be something external and alien even 
though it belongs to the human self, and therefore, is still able to be removed. However, 
the solution  was as problematic as it was simple, and in the face of remedies conducted 
through modern science and psychoanalysis that looked to cure society, an ironic reading 
of post-WWI life challenged the rational binaries of sickness/health. Almost a century 
earlier, Kierkegaard (1841/1989) rightfully saw irony, as he did with despair, residing on 
a liminal plane between sickness and health, positivity and negativity, faith and 
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incredulity, and the divine and secular.49 This existential battle would become the 
stranger s most enduring war within the secularized modernity of the twentieth century, 
he e a c e fo  hi  ickne  co ld onl  eme ge f om a ma e  o e  i on  h o gh a 
p oce  of di ing in o he ea of i on , no  in o de  o a  he e, of co e, b  in o de  
o come o  heal h , happ  and b o an  (Kie kegaa d, Irony 326, 327). Faced with the 
outbreak and aftermath of the First World War, many saw that looking into both societal 
sickness and the self s monstrosity was the best way to overcome its power over us, in an 
ironic and liminal space between the impulse of the utopian spirit and succumbing to 
nihilism, boredom, and dread. Shelley, Leopardi, and Baudelaire s monstrous modernity 
had finally exploded onto mass society.     
 Though the ironist may laugh at the absurdity of what the world holds sacred, 
i on  doe  no  nece a il  nega e h o gh la gh e  b  i  a he  [ ]he aid and n aid 
o king oge he  o c ea e ome hing ne  (H cheon, Edge 61). In Hutcheon s seminal 
book Irony s Edge (1994/2003), she defines irony in liminal, oscillating terms, where 
meaning i  simultaneously do bled (o  m l iple)  (58), and no  a ejec ion of he li e al. 
Since irony is saying opposing meanings at once, the ironist is never truly removed from 
the sacred while uttering the profane but balances on the edge of the secular and sacred 
bina . I on , e peciall  mode n i on , e i  in liminali , be een he pace be een 
face and ma k  (He man  79) and e en ha  he opian abili  o open p ne  pace, 
literally be een oppo ing meaning , he e ne  hing  can happen  (H cheon, Double 
 
49 Irony is healthiness insofar as it rescues the soul from the snares of relativity; it is a 
sickness insofar as it cannot bear the absolute except in the form of nothing, but this 
sickness is an endemic disease that only a few individuals catch and from which fewer  
eco e  (Kierkegaard, Irony 77-8). 
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31). D. C. Muecke (1969) similarly argues that there is a transcendent element to modern 
irony, creating a liminal space between the spiritual and moral spheres of heaven and hell. 
Containing both a complete sense of freedom and an element of destruction, modern 
i on  bl  he line  of abo e  and belo  and he eb  c ea e  a oid o  bo omle  pi  
in the realm of ethics and morality (Muecke 229-30). Yet, located in the darkness of this 
black hole, a new concept of utopia is able to develop after the First World War, indebted 
to the works of German philosopher Ernst Bloch and his paradoxical vision of utopia. 
Published in the immediate aftermath of WWI, Ernst Bloch s The Spirit of Utopia 
(1918/2000) moves away from the blueprint form of utopia that has become analogous 
with totalitarian thought, in favour of a more radical and iconoclastic usage based upon a 
strong and critical form of irony. Influenced by two major events of the early twentieth 
century, WWI and the Russian Revolution, Bloch  no ion of opian hope i  bo n in he 
da kne  i elf  (201). U opia, acco ding o Bloch, i  inhe en  in he nhappine , de pai , 
and frustration found in the present; This internal darkness manifests itself from what is 
missing in each individual and it is in this internal darkness where the spirit of utopia  
offers us hope that precisely fuels or inspires our movement towards a better future. 
Bloch argues that it is through the something missing  within our present world, the lack 
or blind spot, which subsequently shows us a better future by imagining or attempting to 
fill what is absent in our present. Therefore, the lived experience of the present is utopian 
in itself, given that it exposes what is lacking in our present world by showing us an 
opposite or an alternate vision of the future outside of one curated by linear progress. 
Here Bloch distances himself from Hegel, and even Marx, in favour of the subjectivity 
found in the philosophy of both Kant and Kierkegaard. He supports Kant s pursuit of the 
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secret of ourselves; a process of ongoing deepening or self-encounter, for it is in this self-
encounter where the utopian spirit is created through an absence (ibid. 3; 187). 
Nonetheless, Bloch does not completely dismiss Hegel but rather believes in a synthesis 
of both Kant s and Hegel  philo oph  o  a  he e p e e  in he ph a e Kan  b ning 
h o gh Hegel  (ibid. 187), he e he pi i  of opia con ained i hin each indi id al 
channels itself in o he e e nal o ld o  he he o ld of he o l  (ibid. 3). 
Together with Ernst Bloch s iconoclastic utopian theory, I will examine 
anthropologist Maurice Bloch s re-evaluation of liminality, which states that two 
different thresholds of violence define one s rite of passage. In Prey Into Hunter: The 
Politics of Religious Experience (1992), Maurice Bloch further expands the liminal 
structure by magnifying the theme of violence that Van Gennep and Turner only allude in 
their liminal theories. Bloch claims that for Van Gennep and Turner, violence is only 
found in the initial transcendent stage of passage from the everyday world into the liminal 
econd age, he e he claim  he na i e i ali  of he pe on i  mbolicall  
an i hed  (37); ho e e , for Bloch, violence becomes a double passage that reoccurs 
in the last stage of the religious ritual as well, where the individual reintegrates herself 
back into the mundane world without cancelling the transcendental, making violence for 
Bloch, a e l  of he a emp  o c ea e he an cenden al in eligion and poli ic  (7).  
Finally, this dialectical oscillation consisting of utopia and violence culminates in the 
question of mystic violence and divine violence. The problem is first raised by Walter 
Benjamin in C i i e of Violence  (1921/1986), in which he defines and structures the 
various discretions concerning violence and law. The difference between mythic and 
divine violence for Benjamin is that mythic violence is lawmaking, divine violence is 
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law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if 
mythic violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates; if the 
former threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without 
pilling blood  (ibid. 297). With mythical violence, Benjamin claims it is impossible to 
epa a e iolence f om la , in ha  iolence i  ei he  la making o  la -p e e ing  
(ibid. 287). In contrast to mythical violence is what Benjamin regards as divine violence, 
which exists outside of the legal sphere and is a violence of pure means , or means 
without ends. To differentiate the two, Benjamin uses the examples of the political strike 
as mythic law and the general strike as divine law. The political strike looks to change 
law in the existing social structure, therefore is still lawmaking, while the general strike is 
revolutionary and looks to destroy state power and existing social order, thereby making 
it more anarchist in nature (ibid. 291-2). Benjamin s resacralized notion of divine 
violence resembles that of God s because it both protects the sacredness of human life 
and is beyond the realm of human law. Benjamin s equivocal concept of divine law is 
nonetheless problematic, as the ambiguity in what Benjamin constitutes as divine law is 
subject to various interpretations, including ones that can lead to horrible consequences. 
 Benjamin s notion of divine violence is closely tied to his idea of messianic time , 
which is in contrast to the homogeneo , emp  ime  of human history ( The e  261). 
While he ec la  ime of p og e  i  emp  and epe i io , me ianic ime, he ime of 
he no  (ibid. 263), i  a monadic and momen a  ime ha  ha e  he epe i ion of 
history and connects past, present, and future. This moment seems to be where both 
messianic time and divine violence intersect with one another to become whole (Butler, 
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Parting 218). Judith Butler (2012) reaffirms Benjamin s argument in her assessment of 
C i i e of Violence , b  a e ing ha   
[t]his sacred or divine sense of life is also allied with the anarchistic, with that 
hich i  be ond o  o ide of p inciple  he ana chi m o  de c ion ha  
Benjamin refers to here is to be understood neither as another kind of political 
state nor as an alternative to positive law. Rather, it constantly recurs as the 
condition of positive law and as its necessary limit. It does not portend an epoch 
yet to come, but underlies legal violence of all kinds, constituting the potential for 
destruction that underwrites every act by which the subject is bound by law (85-6). 
 
Benjamin s concepts of the messianic and divine violence have likewise been very 
influential in the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. For Agamben (2005), 
messianic time is not necessarily removed from secular time but  
is that part of secular time which undergoes an entirely transformative 
c ac  This is not the line of chronological time (which was representable 
but unthinkable), nor the instant of its end (which was just as unthinkable); nor is 
it a segment cut from chronological time; rather, it is operational time pressing 
within the chronological time, working and transforming it from within; it is the 
time we need to make time end: the time that is left us [il tempo che ci resta] (The 
Time that Remains 64, 67-8). 
In regard to divine violence, Agamben (1995/1998) expands on Benjamin s theory by 
interjecting his own concept of sovereign violence and the figure of the homo sacer. 
Although not exactly the same, there is a liminal correlation between the two because  
sovereign violence, like divine violence, cannot be wholly reduced to either one 
of the two forms of violence whose dialectic the essay undertook to define. This 
does not mean that sovereign violence can be confused with divine violence. The 
definition of divine violence becomes easier, in fact, precisely when it is put in 
relation with the state of exception. Sovereign violence opens a zone of 
indistinction between law and nature, outside and inside, violence and law. And 
yet the sovereign is precisely the one who maintains the possibility of deciding on 
the two to the very degree that he renders them indistinguishable from each other 
(Sacer 64). 
 
Agamben s sovereign, who is both inside and outside the law, acts as the liminal link 
be een he di ine iolence and he poli ical, fo  he o e eign i  he poin  of 
indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into 
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law and la  pa e  o e  in o iolence  (ibid. 32). The protagonist of Agamben s study, is 
the abstruse Roman figure homo sacer (sacred man), who was a criminal that was both 
excluded from and included in law, as he could be both killed by anyone, yet could not be 
sacrificed because he was considered sacred. Here the sacred oscillates between the pure 
and impure, which creates a liminal and ambiguous atmosphere where the impure is 
made from the pure, and vice versa (ibid. 77). Since the sacred man is outside both divine 
and profane law, it allows for the possibility of the homo sacer to become the threshold 
where sovereign violence and law are able to interconnect. Agamben concludes that with 
the indistinctness of the sacred, this stranger has entered the collective ocie  in ha  e 
are all virtually homines sacri  (ibid. 115). Despite his post-911 critics ( i ek 2002, 
Butler 2004; Connolly 2005; Kalyvas 2007) concerned with the apolitical, totalistic and 
ni e ali m of hi  claim, b  a ing i all , Agamben i  poin ing o he po ibili  o  
potential of the homo sacer existing within everyone, as a hovering spectre of the modern 
age political and secular age. Agamben s stranger is a reflection of modernity s liminality, 
a  omeone ha  i  f om he emo e pa  ho b ing  in o foc  a di bing elemen  in 
our political present  and poin  o a d  a po ible f e  (de la D an a e 211). Ye , 
both the opportunity and problem lie in that the possibility that exists in statelessness is 
not actually defined, and as a result can manifest itself in violent extremes or even in an 
impasse.  
 From this perspective, Benjamin s ambiguity in completely outlining the idea of 
divine violence has also led to a problematic discussion of what represents violence that 
could be defined as sacred. For instance, Derrida (1990/1992) argues that the uncertainty 
of Benjamin s essay and ambiguity surrounding the secularized concept of divine 
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violence could lead to the temptation  to regard the Nazi final solution as divine violence. 
On the other hand, Slovenian theorist Sla oj i ek (2009) l ima el  di ag ee  i h 
Derrida s assessment, arguing that Nazism simply represented mythical violence as he 
infamo l  claim  he p oblem i h Hi le  a  ha  he was not violent enough, that his 
violence was not essential  enough. Nazism was not radical enough, it did not dare to 
disturb the basic structure of the modern capitalist social space (which is why it had to 
foc  on de o ing an in en ed e e nal enem , Je )  (151). Al ho gh i ek ma  be 
right in a traditional understanding of Hitler and Nazism as fascist and nationalist forces, 
the compelling recent work of Timothy Snyder (2016) has challenged this conventional 
assessment by arguing that Hitler s plan was to completely destroy the existing social 
structure through the final solution by creating a liminal world based on chaos and 
iolence. Acco ding o S nde , Hi le  a  a biological ana chi  (52) who sought to 
destroy ideas such as the State, nationalism, capitalism, communism, and monotheism by 
eliminating what he believed to be the artificial culture or non-race  of the Jewish people, 
deeming them a universal enemy that created the new artificial world that surrounded 
him. At the very least, Synder s new assessment of the final solution and WWII creates a 
new discourse on the subject that still makes Derrida s deconstructive criticism of 
Benjamin s essay a valid one and encourages certain understandings of the destructive 
forces of the present. 
THE STRANGER IN NO MAN’S LAND 
 
Max Beckmann once said that the purpose of painting, especially after the war, 
was to show humanity their horrible fate (Elger 209), a fate maybe unknown to the 
general populace, but to the WWI solider, it was a doom that was ever present in 
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everyday modern life. The Night moves beyond time by encompassing the Europe s past, 
present, and future of violence; the past through the imagery of the WWI solider, who 
still shows the wounds from battle; the present is depicted by the violence that is 
currently happening, while the future is shown through the hint of pleasure we are 
subconsciously gaining that is being carried off with the child. Beckmann went to war 
with patriotic enthusiasm, as did many young men all across Europe who quickly enlisted 
to serve their countries; however, once he experienced the violence and horror of modern 
warfare, he suffered a nervous breakdown and was invalided out of the military (Beckett 
26). Like many artists of his day, Beckmann ingenuously believed that the war would be 
both a coming of age ritual process and a positive inspiration for his artistic work. In 
some sense, Beckmann was half right. The war failed him in his ritual process towards 
manhood, a failure that would see him fleetingly place that sacredness into the god-like 
cha ac e  and ocial and poli ical opiani m  of he a i  (Clair112). The sentiment 
would not last, as he would eventually mock himself as a messianic figure in 
Selbstbildnis als Clown (Self-portrait of a Clown) (1921)50, as the war ultimately left him 
spiritually in the liminal planes of the WWI battlefield. Nonetheless, the experience of 
modern trench warfare, although not the courageous and heroic experience the young 
German artist expected, significantly influenced his work through the haunting 
nightmares that remained. Suffering from the traumatic shell shock  (PTSD), 
Beckmann s new attraction  to violence seemed to be a search for an identity, as a way 
 
50 The description of the painting in the book The Great Parade (2004) argues that 
[h]e e he p ophe  i  e ealed a  b ffoon, he g ide a  ma . Beckmann  image a  
himself as clown is presented in a pose borrowed from gothic renderings of the mocking 
of Ch i fo  eali  i  impe io  o opiani m; he a i  i  condemned to be the 
epheme al di ipa e  in hi  o n ine o able enn i  (Clai  112). 
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of e o ci ing ome hing i hin him elf  (Beckett 21-2). The ange, and fatalistic 
feeling of afe  ha  o nded him on ha  fi  da  (Beckmann163) di ipa ed da  b  
day as the excitement of warfare gave way to the monotony of violence. The First World 
War was originally thought as a meliorist war of progress, but ironically became the 
culmination of modernity s technological utopian values failing (Fussell 8), becoming a 
blatant example of the return to barbarism that Leopardi had warned of. Although 
Expressionism retained its focus on the individual, the war nonetheless turned it from a 
private, egocentric art movement to one that encompassed a social and revolutionary 
atmosphere (Elger 205). Beckmann s works, like many postwar Expressionist art, now 
examined humanity as made of strangers, helplessly caught in a changing world of 
technological violence and absurdity. (ibid. 211). The WWI solider entered a war that 
began traditionally on horseback though quickly transformed into a modern horror of 
trenches, tanks, planes, Zeppelins, and gasmasks, while its aftermath marked the end of 
many European Empires. As with the French Revolution, WWI was an irredeemable 
break from history, which exposed the monster lurking along the borders of optimism, 
rationalism, and scientific discovery. 
 Notwithstanding the pivotal change in modern warfare, the war may have not 
ushered in a new age but rather was the illuminating event of the chaotic modern world 
that led up to it. Philipp Blom (2008) argues that the time period between 1900-1914 was 
far less optimistic, enthusiastic, and naïve of the monster of modernity than many like to 
believe. It was an age characterized by velocity and the vertigo that came with the 
exhilarating and frightening nature of the modern age (Blom 2). Although the turn of the 
century was met with technological wonder and amazement, the years leading to WWI 
 134 
were also defined by a multitude of theories clashing against the bedrock of positivism, 
leading to feelings of uncertainty, while the rational was challenged by Sigmund Freud s 
theories of the unconscious and the modernist and avant-garde art movements (ibid. 403-
6). In response, young men like Beckmann were trying to solidify their identities and 
reestablish the gender binaries, battling the rising suffragette movement with the 
traditional idea of masculine courage (ibid. 398-400). Soldiers looked to complete their 
rite of passage to manhood through warfare and patriotism and conclude their sacred 
journey by coming out of the war as masculine heroes. But the war seemed to just 
reemphasize the ambiguity, liminal, and violent nature of the modern world for these 
young men. 
The soldiers that were lucky  to survive and return to civilian life became 
extremely alienated and detached from their fellow citizens, unable to re-assimilate into 
regular society. In essence, post-war soldiers became a unified though unorganized front, 
as there seemed to be more of an affinity through isolation and existential anguish among 
each other than to their nation states. In spirit, the soldiers remained in No Man s Land 
long after the war. The liminal battlefield located between the two trenches of rival 
nations or empires, ended up embodying a group that would forever be referred to as the 
lost generation . British officer and author Charles Edmund Carrington argued that the 
oldie  e ning f om a  ha ed a ec e  bond  ha  co ld ne e  be comm nica ed  
(cited in Leed 12, 13). The unsettling image of No Man  Land and he nkno n o ld 
be ond i  (Leed 14-15) became something that was eternal for Carrington and most 
soldiers. Caught between two binary trenches, the violent space of No Man s Land is 
where the soldiers became modern strangers. If war was a rite of passage for these young 
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men, it was one where they remained liminal, unable to fulfill the third and final 
reaggregation phase of the passage to manhood. Despite being driven into that void by 
their respective countries, the nationalism that was enforced in the trenches became 
suspended in No Man s Land. At that moment, they become strangers to the reasons of 
the conflict, leaving them with the struggle to survive and constantly toeing the line 
between life and death. By 1916 the fraternization between fronts, exemplified by the 
Christmas truce of 1914, had dissipated. Soldiers were no longer under the illusionary 
perception of being heroes. Instead they lost their identities and individuality and became 
nameless and unknown, completely alienated from their commanding officers. For the 
soldier caught in No Man s Land, the war had lost its original cause and the lines of 
heroism become blurred or essentially destroyed, a sentiment that quickly seeped into the 
trenches, which no longer held any distinction from No Man s Land as the war went on. 
British artist and solider Paul Nash perfectly captures this uncanny space in his painting 
The Void (1918) as he depicts the hellish desolation of war, where the lines between 
trench and No Man s land are virtually erased by all the carnage.  
While Britain fought to preserve balance, order, and social values, for Germany, 
the war was touted as a spiritual conflict, a chance to change the world and to liberate it 
from a reality that had been fashioned up to that point, a reason why many German artists 
fully backed the war when it originally began (Eksteins 118-9). If the war originated as a 
spiritual conflict for many, it continued as such once it was finished, taking on a new 
identity as the war progressed. Historian Modris Eksteins examines how Remarque s 
novel Im Westen nichts Neues (All Quiet on the Western Front) (1929/1984) created both 
a spiritual affiliation between soldiers and a reactionary attempt to destroy that 
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connection. All Quiet, which follows German solider Paul Bäumer and his fellow 
combatants  passage from students to killing machines, is a novel more about the post-
war disillusionment of the individuals in the trenches, even though it focuses on the 
experiences and events of the war that ultimately ruined them.51 By 1916, many believed 
the war would be endless (Fussell 71), and although the conflict did end two years later, 
in many regards, those soldiers were quite accurate. As Eksteins argues of Remarque s 
no el, [o]nl  he f a e ni  of dea h emain , he com ade hip of he fa ed  (281). Upon 
its release, the book was an accomplishment and enjoyed great success. It unified the 
spirit of the soldiers through the mutual horror they suffered, regardless of what side they 
fo gh  on, o hich a  e e an and poe  He be  Read ackno ledged i  a  the Bible of 
he common oldie  (ibid. 286). Wi h All Quiet, Remarque was able to describe the war 
and the soldier s experience of it better than any historian or politician, since the new 
horrors of trench life, the actual experienced war, was something completely foreign to 
the outside observer.  
The novel exemplifies this theme at the point when Paul returns home on leave 
and feels estranged from his family, unable o ge  id of hi  Befangenheit  ( sense of 
angene ) that overcomes him and the Sch i  ( distance ) and Schleie  ( veil ) 
that exists between him and the rest of society (Im Westen 138; All Quiet 160). While on 
leave, he is ultimately excluded from a war discussion, and his experiences are dismissed 
by his old head-master as merely individual or subjective (ibid. 142; 167). He is accused 
of being unable of seeing the bigger picture. Here, Paul is removed from a war he faces at 
 
51 The postwar consciousness of the novel was missed by many critics, which ultimately 
led Remarque to write a sequel Der Weg zurück (The Road Back) (1831) that clearly 
addressed the sentiment of the lost generation  (Eksteins 283).  
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every waking moment, furthering his alienation from society, which sadly leads to his 
acknowledgment that the only home he has left is on the front with his fellow soldiers, 
with both friend and enemy. Only a few hundred miles away, the world of normal  
society becomes completely alien and strange for Paul, while the war slowly became 
strangely familiar. As a result, the novel s destruction of national boundaries, and 
subsequently, blame and fault, became extremely problematic for many nationalists, 
politicians, and traditionalists, who tried to reinforce these divisions and binaries and 
reaffirm the war guilt of their former enemies, which ultimately led to numerous critical 
attacks by various journalists and politicians (Rites 293-9). Carl Gustav Jung (1946/2014) 
argues that the war did not end with the battles of 1914-18 but continued on to embody 
the other, the uncanny, and the unconscious of human psyche still lingering in a liminal 
battle (2-3). The hollow-spiritual war would continue to endure in the soldier; however, 
once they were returned to ordinary society, there was no liminal void to exercise these 
demons in, leaving them in a difficult position of understanding the fragility of life but at 
the same time, also the complete meaninglessness of it.  
TRENCHES, VIOLENCE, AND THE CITY 
 
Remarque s All Quiet and Beckmann s The Night reflect on the continuing 
violence in soldiers  everyday lives; however, Beckmann allocates or transmits the 
violence of postwar consciousness specifically inside the modern urban space. The Night 
carefully indicates how the violence of the war has entered the city s streets, home, and 
private lives of Europeans, though the painting could even be interpreted as arguing that 
it was the chaotic and artificial city that had entered the war. Commenting on his first day 
at the front, Beckmann uncannily connects its pec acle o ci  pace: [ ]nfo ge able 
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and strange. In all those holes and sharp trenches. Those ghostly passageways and 
a ificial fo e  and ho e angle n eal ci ie , like l na  mo n ain  (163). While 
No Man s Land represents the spiritual battle and the liminal void embodied by each 
individual solider, the trenches uncannily represent the chaotic urban space of the modern 
city. The association of trenches with city streets has been well documented, from the 
British armies that allocated English street names to their channels (Fussell 42-3; Gilbert 
x; Pike 286), to the trenches  structure and atmosphere reflecting each country s culture 
(Fussell 44-5). Although it may have been done to give the trench a sense of home, the 
ambiance of modern warfare was closer to urban life than the soldier originally thought. 
Like the congested city, the trenches were made of twisting corridors and labyrinth-like 
streets and tunnels that a man without a map 52 can easily become lost in. Just as 
Baudelaire brought the uncanny from the Parisian underworld out into the consciousness 
of i  ci i en , he a  ignaled an na oidable hif  f om concei ing he nde g o nd a  
a distinct space, either hidden in a world of metaphors or a separate physical realm, to 
accep ing i  a  a dominan  fea e of e e da  life  (Pike 301). While the majority of 
people were well removed from the war, WWI lessened the distinction between warzone 
and normal society. Although nowhere near the extent of WWII, violence entered the 
cities like never before, as demonstrated with the German Zeppelin raids over London.  
 
52 I am evoking the structure of feeling the city that James Donald explores in Imagining 
the Modern City (1999): for him, the city does not consist of the objective/subjective 
binaries. He a he  ee  i  fa  mo e ab ac l  concep al and in en el  pe onal , 
ome hing ha  link  all ci ie  oge he : [i]  i  the city, not a ci (x). This, along with 
Donald  interesting view of city exploration is similar to the morally ambiguous WWI 
olide  ca gh  in No Man  Land, where the experience of city dwelling is like the film 
Moetsukita chizu [The Man Without a Map] (1968). Based Abe  no el of he ame name 
[The Ruined Map] (1967/2011) the film follows a detective who cannot solve a case 
because he does not know what the case actually is anymore. 
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Not only did the trenches have an uncanny relation to the modern city, 
con c ing a pa od  of them (Fussell 43), but they also reflected the conspicuous fast-
paced and ferocious atmosphere of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
metropolis. While the Crimean war gave Europe a glimpse of a modern and meaningless 
war, by the time of WWI, the technological age had already cemented itself, and the 
notion that warfare could remain traditional, pure, and even spiritual, was now impossible. 
Years before the war, the Futurists had already amalgamated human and machine in their 
revolutionary and utopian ideal. Their artificial optimism  (Poggi 2009) celebrated 
technology through symbols of cars, machines, and cities, containing a resacralized 
spirituality in which the machine was able to transcend the desires and limitations of the 
human body and mind (Poggi 241). The horrific aftermath of the war did little to 
discourage most Futurists, even reinforcing their attitudes, despite the war altering the 
perception on a grand scale in regard to the relationship between human and machine. 
Despite having its critics from its inception, futurism had a profound influence on the 
pre-WWI avant-garde art movements across Europe. It was after the war that the first 
phase of Futurism began to decline, largely due to their utopian vision of violence 
(Bondanella & Bondanella 242), the synergizing of human and machine, and the its 
newfound affiliation with Italian fascism. English painter Wyndham Lewis critiqued the 
Futurism s romanticism of machines as simply melodramatic or misguided (Ray 338; 
Rabaté 36). His depiction of war in A Battery Shelled (1919), presents soldiers as 
dehumanized killing machines, depicting the cult of machine  in far grimmer and 
circumstances, while removing the glamour of violence that found in Futurism in favour 
of ep e en ing a fa e a  an o dina  affai  (Mao 251). The sentiment of Futurism s 
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Extended Man  would continue to be critiqued in postwar films such as Fritz Lang s 
Metropolis (1927/2002) and Charlie Chaplin  Modern Times (1936/2010), which showed 
humans as becoming virtually enslaved by advancing technology. Shelley s cyborgian 
nightmare and anxiety of humanity obtaining too much knowledge fulfilled its prophecy 
after the turn of the century in the modern city and culminated horrifically with WWI, 
two sentiments that Robert Musil s novel Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (1943/1967) 
(The Man Without Qualities) (1995) further explores.  
The novel s protagonist, a modern stranger and ex-soldier named Ulrich, is an 
intellectual and alienated individual, caught in a time of rising uncertainty, largely due to 
a world of increasingly divided ideologies and illusions. Musil, who began writing the 
uncompleted novel in 1921, sets the story s beginning in 1913 Vienna and opens with the 
line [ ]be  dem A lan ik befand ich ein ba ome i che  Minim m  (9) ( [a] ba ome ric 
low hung over the A lan ic ) (3), foreshadowing the war that was hanging over, what 
Musil represents, as an increasingly divided Europe that was ignorant of the violence that 
was fast approaching. The novel s beginning also shows how this technological violence 
had already emerged before the war from the city streets. The chaotic hustle and bustle of 
the modern city closely resembles the structure of both a machine and chaotic modern 
warfare: 
Autos schossen aus schmalen, tiefen Straßen in die Seichtigkeit heller Plätze. 
Fußgängerdunkelheit bildete wolkige Schnüre. Wo kräftigere Striche der 
Geschwindigkeit quer durch ihre lockere Eile fuhren, verdickten sie sich, rieselten 
nachher rascher und hatten nach wenigen Schwingungen wieder ihren 
gleichmäßigen Puls. Hunderte Töne waren zu einem drahtigen Geräusch 
ineinander verwunden, aus dem einzelne Spitzen vorstanden, längs dessen 
schneidige Kanten liefen und sich wieder einebneten, von dem klare Töne 
absplitterten und verflogen. (Der Mann 9) 
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(Automobiles shot out of deep, narrow streets into the shallows of bright squares. 
Dark clusters of pedestrians formed cloudlike strings. Where more powerful lines 
of speed cut across their casual haste they clotted up, then trickled on faster and, 
after a few oscillations, resumed their steady rhythm. Hundreds of noises wove 
themselves into a wiry texture of sound with barbs protruding here and there, 
smart edges running along it and subsiding again, with clear notes splintering off 
and dissipating.) (Qualities 3) 
 
This tumultuous scene ends with a fatal car crash, thereby foretelling the violence of the 
impending war, but more importantly, the spectacle it creates and the question of guilt 
and responsibility it leaves the reader with: 
Diese beiden hielten nun plötzlich ihren Schritt an, weil sie vor sich einen Auflauf 
bemerkten. Schon einen Augenblick vorher war etwas aus der Reihe gesprungen, 
eine quer schlagende Bewegung; etwas hatte sich gedreht, war seitwärts gerutscht, 
ein schwerer, jäh gebremster Lastwagen war es, wie sich jetzt zeigte, wo er, mit 
einem Rad auf der Bordschwelle, gestrandet dastand. Wie die Bienen um das 
Flugloch hatten sich im Nu Menschen um einen kleinen Fleck angesetzt, den sie 
in ihrer Mitte freiließen. Von seinem Wagen herabgekommen, stand der Lenker 
darin, grau wie Packpapier, und erklärte 
mit groben Gebärden den Unglücksfall. Die Blicke der Hinzukommenden 
richteten sich auf ihn und sanken dann vorsichtig in die Tiefe des Lochs, wo man 
einen Mann, der wie tot dalag, an die Schwelle des Gehsteigs gebettet hatte. Er 
war. durch seine eigene Unachtsamkeit zu Schaden gekommen, wie allgemein 
zugegeben wurde. Abwechselnd knieten Leute bei ihm nieder, um etwas mit ihm 
anzufangen; man öffnete seinen Rock und schloß ihn wieder, man versuchte ihn 
aufzurichten oder im Gegenteil, ihn wieder hinzulegen; eigentlich wollte niemand 
etwas anderes damit, als die Zeit ausfüllen, bis mit der Rettungsgesellschaft 
sachkundige und befugte Hilfe käme. (Der Mann 10-1) 
 
(The pair now came to a sudden stop when they saw a rapidly gathering crowd in 
front of them. Just a moment earlier something there had broken ranks; falling 
sideways with a crash, something had spun around and come to a skidding halt  a 
heavy truck, as it turned out, which had braked so sharply that it was now 
stranded with one wheel on the curb. Like bees clustering around the entrance to 
their hive people had instantly surrounded a small spot on the pavement, which 
they left open in their midst. In it stood the truck driver, gray as packing paper, 
clumsily waving his arms as her tried to explain the accident. The glances of the 
of the newcomers turned to him, then warily dropped to the bottom of the hole 
where the man lay there as if dead had been bedded against the curb. It was by his 
own carelessness that he had come to grief, as everyone agreed. People took turns 
kneeling beside him, vaguely wanting to help; unbuttoning his jacket, then closing 
it again; trying to prop him up, then laying him down again. They were really 
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only marking time while waiting for the ambulance to bring someone who would 
know what to do and have the right to do it). (Qualities 4-5) 
 
The role of responsibility keeps being passed on, only to finally rest on the deceased 
victim, because in actuality, no one knows whom to blame. Later, Musil broadens the 
violent spectacle of modern culture and the problem of guilt with the story of Christian 
Moosbrugger, a condemned man on trial for the murder and raping of a prostitute. Ulrich, 
like many other people in Vienna, becomes completely fascinated with Moosbrugger, a 
seemingly gentle and friendly man who commits a grizzly and shocking murder. The 
character Clarisse takes her fascination with the murderer past a mere interest to 
something far more obse i e and nheal h , he e Anziehung und Abstoßung 
mischten ich da in  einem onde ba en Bann  (144) [a] ac ion and ep l ion 
blended in o a pec lia  pell  (152). Beca e of hi  liminal di po i ion in ocie , a  a 
result of his rebellious act against order, Clarisse places a heroic, even revolutionary 
quality upon him. Therefore, Moosbrugger represents not just Ulrich s doppelgänger but 
also modern society s uncanny and irrational underbelly and liminal disposition; 
Moosbrugger, like Frankenstein s Creature, becomes the novel s uncanny other or 
stranger. Suffering from hallucinations, Moosbrugger is unable to distinguish illusion 
f om eali , in ide and o ide, and he efo e, canno  e abli h a fi ed iden i , a  da  
ie helle  Wa e   beiden Sei en eine  d ch ich igen Gla and  (239) like clea  
wate  on bo h ide  of a an pa en  hee  of gla  (258). A  S efan Jon on (1996) states, 
Moo b gge  ignal  he end of cha ac e , an e eme e ample of a pe on ho i  no 
longer one, the opposite of order, stability, unity, coherence, and reliability. He is an 
incarnation of all conceivable terrifying qualities that a community would like to imagine 
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ha  i  ha  nde  con ol  (51). Th o gh hi  p e ence, he no ion  of c iminal and ic im 
blur to similar effects as in Frankenstein.  
As in the opening scene of the novel, in which the accident s onlookers look to 
project blame upon either the victim or chance, Moosbrugger, who lacks any moral 
understanding, is now seen as the victim by many; a victim of the modern experience. He 
becomes problematic scapegoat, as society projects its monstrosity on to the murderer, 
though paradoxically reflecting a sense of victimhood back towards the same society. 
Ulrich sees a correlation between society and the ambiguous darkness within 
Moo b gge  a  a collec i e en i : Das war deutlich Irrsinn, und ebenso deutlich bloß 
ein verzerrter Zusammenhang unsrer eignen Elemente des Seins. Zerstückt und 
durchdunkelt war es; aber Ulrich fiel irgendwie ein: wenn die Menschheit als Ganzes 
träumen könnte, müßte Moosbrugger entstehn  (76). [ ]hi  a  clea l  madne , and j  
as clearly it was no more than a distortion of our own elements of being. Cracked and 
obscure it was; it somehow occurred to Ulrich that if mankind can dream as a whole, that 
d eam o ld be Moo b gge  (76-77). Not only does Musil address society s 
enchantment towards violence, he likewise leaves us to contemplate whether 
Moosebrugger is a victim of the modern experience, simply a symbol of the modern 
experience, or both.  
The question remains unanswered, for when Moosbrugger is sentenced to death, 
Ulrich and the rest of society are able to push him and what he represents back into the 
unconscious. Nonetheless, Moosbrugger, whose story is interspersed throughout the 
novel, plays a vital part in Qualities, where the sickness of a society is not an end but 
rather a path to healing a civilization (Payne 114). With the Moosbrugger question, Musil 
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presents modern society with the problematic impasse between free will and 
responsibility, which essentially leaves us betwixted in the moral space of Frankenstein  
caught between causation and Chance. Philip Payne (1988) claims in his study of Musil, 
that through Moosburger, the author addresses the question of whether freedom is an 
illusion or not. Payne argues that Musil does in fact acknowledge the verity of free will as 
ome hing con aining bo h fac  and m e  (131). Ho e e , Moo b gge  i  al o a 
p od c  of hi  en i onmen , an allego  of ocie  collec i e d eam , hich ffe  
from the same unresolved en ion  be een f agmen a ion and ni  (Pi e  10). I  i  
because of this uncanny representation of society that the media and citizens of Vienna 
o e a e he mon o ne  of Moo b gge  in o de  o po a  him a  he l ima e 
o he  (ibid.) a he  han seeing him as the uncanny other. Musil uses the Moosbrugger 
affair as a symbol of the fascination with violence and chaos that turn-of-the-century 
Vienna, and as an extension Europe, was engulfed in.  
WWI did little to exasperate the societal unconscious desire or interest for 
violence. Depictions in art and cinema, especially in Germany, became much more 
violent in postwar Europe, not just with Expressionist painters like Beckmann and his 
contemporary Otto Dix, but also with new film directors. Along with his famous silent 
dystopian film Metropolis, Lang s thriller M (1931/2002) stands out as one of the 
filmmaker s greatest achievements. Written by his wife Thea von Harbou, M is a film 
about a serial killer who preys on little children and whose terror stretches across the 
streets of Berlin, its homes, the police department, and even the criminal underworld. 
Lang, who was greatly influenced by the Expressionist paintings of the modern city, 
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channels the same sensations of fear, violence, and city space on to the screen.53 For most 
of the film, the pathological killer is only visible as a shadow; a haunting spectre bringing 
fear to the city streets. As an unknown creature that could strike at any moment, the 
spectre rules the streets through fear and violence, affecting the everyday lives of citizens, 
police, and even criminals (Wunrow). Lang s technique of not showing the killer 
dislocates the shadow from the rest of humanity, though when his physical form is finally 
revealed, he is no longer the monstrous entity of the beginning of the film but simply a 
sick, pathetic, and scared human being. In actuality, this becomes a far more monstrous 
scene, as Lang removes the illusion of the supernatural other and reveals that the evil 
plaguing the city is simply a normal person. Moreover, it points to the metropolis as a 
liminal space between human and inhuman; between connectivity and the ability to be 
dehumanized within the chaotic crowd. Musil s and Lang s killers share a liminal 
strangeness. Both have fractured identities with both society and themselves. 
Moosbrugger inability to differentiate between external and internal reality (Jonsson 52), 
is similar to how society is unable to distinguish him as either victim or monster; sane or 
insane. This same ambiguity shows up at the end of M, shortly after Lang transforms the 
killer from a spectre into a human. Unlike Moosbrugger, whose crime only came to light 
for society after he had been arrested, Lang s serial killer Beckert is not a monster  
locked away, whose situation can be intellectually pondered or fetishized, but rather a  
prevailing problem in the streets of Berlin, where the uncanny fear and violence that the 
killer represents cannot be repressed into a cage as with Moosbrugger. Lang reveals the 
killer s name quite early in the film, but the name Hans Beckert still lacks any concrete 
 
53 The e ial kille  fi  ic im ha  he la  name of Beckmann.  
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identity or any tangible relationship with the shadow that haunts the city of Berlin. 
Through most of the film, Beckert s identity, for both him and society, is tied to the 
haunting spectre and not the tangible person.  
The physical Beckert is even dislocated from the shadow himself, to a point 
he e he hado  ha n  he kille : I s there all the time, driving me out to wander the 
streets, following me, silently, but I can feel it there. It s me, pursuing myself. I want to 
escape, to escape from myself! But it  impo ible  (M 1:42:55  1:43: 25). Lang depicts 
the serial killer not necessarily as an evil other, evoking violence on the good of the city, 
but as representing an illness, a disease of modernity that exists within society. Like, 
Moosbrugger, Beckert portrays himself as both victim and perpetrator. His defense is that 
he i  a  m ch a  a ic im of he pec e a  he e  of ocie : I can t help myself! I have 
no control over this evil thing that  in ide of me, he fi e, he oice , he o men ! Who 
knows what it  like o be me?  (ibid. 1:42:25 - 1:44:33 ). Maria Tartar (1995) has stated 
that by the film  end, Becke  an fo m  f om a cold-blooded murderer to abjec  ic im  
(161). Alternatively, Stephen Brockmann argues in A Critical History of German Film 
(2010) that Lang makes it difficult to completely sympathize with Beckert, or with either 
the criminal underworld or the police, who exercise their own rational sense of judgment, 
leaving i  ie e  p ofo ndl  n e led i h no ea  an e  (126). B ockmann 
presents a strong argument, in that Lang makes it quite equivocal, since it is never 
e ealed, a  o he he  if an  capi al p ni hmen , imp i onmen , o  institutionalization 
in a p chia ic a d  i  he be  en ence a  a aining j ice, e peciall  ince nei he  
choice is able to expunge any of the crimes committed (ibid.). Moreover, like 
Moosbrugger, Beckert is the uncanny representation of his society and is therefore unable 
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to be truly judged by a society that is both fascinated and responsible for him. The ending 
of M is terrifying and unnerving because it leaves both the individual and society once 
again in a liminal state with no one to turn to, and no real sense of order or judgment to 
cling o. Who kno  ha  i  like o be me?  become  he man a ha  can epi omi e all 
of modernity 
SICKENSS AND IRONY: ZENO’S IRONIC UTOPIA 
 
The world after 1918, cast from its illusions, was facing a very grim reality; yet 
out of this chaos, new forms of utopia still managed to smolder hope in the modern era by 
paradoxically diving into its terror rather than ignoring it. Chaos turned utopia, or at least 
the hope of it, continues secularized modernity s act of resacralization within its uncanny 
and liminal nature, between what is said and unsaid. Restoring of irony leads a utopian 
viewpoint that essentially rises from the ashes of violence, and also one based on the 
internal darkness of the modern stranger. The returning soldiers of the Expressionist 
movement began a paradoxical messianic drive that was biopolitical but strictly formed 
through an internal void. However, this resacralizing messianic spirit was not just a 
characteristic of the Expressionist art movement. Lisa Marie Anderson (2011) uses the 
e m E p e ioni  Me iani m  o b ild pon he d  of e p e ioni m and he 
messianic (Sokel 1959; Vietta & Kemper 1997) by arguing that the messianic spirit not 
just found in a branch of, but a representation of all of Expressionism54, but more 
impo an l , al o he config a ion mode n age a  ell. Fo  he , he econ c ion of 
 
54 By Expressionism, Anderson follows the claim by expressionists such as Walter 
Rheiner (1919) and Iwan Goll (1921) that it is more of a worldview [weltanschauung] 
(12) o  a de igna ion of an a i de (Gesinnung) a he  han an a i ic config a ion  
(13). 
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Je i h and Ch i ian Me ianic i  a pa  of all mode ni m  and e p e ioni m a  a 
hole ep e en  mode n e a  (10, 11). I ag ee with Anderson s comprehensive definition 
of he me ianic hich I ha e a emp ed o o line in hi  o k, in ha  me iani m i  
not always characterized by an outward turn to the socio-political, but sometimes 
involves the process strictly internal too the a i  o  h man being  and ha  i  ignifie , a 
pa ic la  con ella ion i hin he Mode ni  e o king  of he ac ed  (11). A  i h he 
modern stranger, post-WWI messianism in particular, operates in an internal/external 
paradox of self and other, between the spiritual becoming of the individual and the world 
at large.  
The postwar Expressionists quickly located themselves and their mission in the 
ci , fo  he ickne , c ime and in  (ibid. 168) ha  he ci  ha ed i h he a  allo ed 
for a space that embodied the struggles they had experienced on the front. The anti-
bourgeois and metropolitan fascination seemed to once again give the modern stranger 
the early urban spark that was originally unearthed in the Flowers of Evil. Returning from 
the war, Beckmann channels the creative spirit that he expected to gain from the war back 
to the modern city streets that symbolically spawned modernity s violence. In the spirit of 
Baudelaire, Beckmann argued that the rightful place of the artist is in the city and in its 
crowds:  
But right now, perhaps more than before the war, I need to be with people. In the 
city. That is just where we belong these days. We must be a part of all the misery 
that s coming. We have to surrender our heart and our nerves, we must abandon 
ourselves to the horrible cries of pain of a deluded people. Right now we have to 
get as close to the people as possible. It s the only course of action that might give 
some purpose to our superfluous and selfish existence that we give people a 
picture of their fate. And we can only do that if we love humanity.  
Actually it s stupid to love humanity, nothing but a heap of egoism (and 
we are a part of it too). But I love it anyway. I love its meanness, its banality, its 
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dullness, its cheap contentment, and its oh-so-very-rare heroism. But spite of this, 
every single person is a unique event, as if he had just fallen from Orion (184). 
 
In this passage, Beckmann admits to the inanity of hope in a world of nothingness but he 
nonetheless still opts for choosing to see its beauty and sacredness through an ironic 
perspective. The contradictory axioms of WWI such as the Great War  and The War to 
End All Wars  allowed for effortless ironic criticism from many postwar writers and 
artists who had fought in the trenches. The anti-modern element of modernity could no 
longer be suppressed, allowing for an intensification of modernity s waste : ambivalence 
and chao  (Ba man 1991). A  F ell a e , [ ]he i on  hich memo  a ocia e  i h 
the events, little as well as great, of the First World War has become an inseparable 
elemen  of he gene al i ion of a  in o  ime  (33). I on  a  one of he fe  po ible 
ways for soldiers to cope with or protect themselves from the meaninglessness of modern 
warfare, and also an outlet to critique the violence engrained in liminal modernity.  
In Italo Svevo s third and final novel La coscienza di Zeno (1923/2015) (Zeno s 
Conscience) (2000), the author constructs an ironic position encompassing themes of 
identity, sickness, science, and progress through the eyes of an elderly stranger 
emini cing abo  hi  pa  life and e pe ience . S e o, a ma e  i oni  (Molone  311), 
produces a protagonist in Zeno Cosini, who becomes a modern twist or ironic use of 
Stoic philosophy. Reflection and meditation are mirrored through a lens of the 
psychoanalytic practice of free association, resulting in an ironist conclusion that is both a 
positive and negative assessment of modern science. There is an insurmountable division 
for S e o, be een hi  pa iali  o a d  dep h p cholog  and he p choanal ic 
principle of curing disorders (ibid. 312). Through his own introspection, Zeno s irony 
comes to its most devastating, yet utopian conclusion in the closing of the book, when he 
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imagines a superbomb exploding at the centre of the earth. Besides foreshadowing events 
that would take place during the world s second great  war, Zeno transforms the 
destruction of the world as the only possible way to remove the sickness from humanity:  
Forse traverso una catastrofe inaudita prodotta dagli ordigni ritornerem alla salute. 
Quando i gas velenosi non basteranno più, un uomo fatto come tutti gli altri, nel 
segreto di una stanza di questo mondo, inventerà un esplosivo incomparabile, in 
confronto al quale gli esplosivi attualmente esistent saranno considerati quali 
innocui giocattoli. Ed un altro uomo fatto anche lui come tutti gli altri, ma degli 
altri un po  più ammalato, ruberà tale esplosivo e s arrampicherà al centro della 
terra per porlo nel punto ove il suo effetto potrà essere il massimo. Ci sarà 
un esplosione enorme che nessuno udrà e la 
terra ritornata alla forma di nebulosa errerà nei cieli priva di parassiti e di malattie. 
(La coscienza 480-1) 
 
Perhaps, through an unheard-of catastrophe produced by devices, we will return 
to health. When poison gases no longer suffice, an ordinary man, in the secrecy of 
a room in this world, will invent an incomparable explosive, compared to which 
the explosives currently in existence will be considered harmless toys. And 
another man, also ordinary, but a bit sicker than others, will steal this explosive 
and will climb up to the center of the earth, to set it on the spot where it can have 
maximum effect. There will be an enormous explosion that no one will hear, and 
the earth, once again a nebula, will wander through the heavens, freed of parasites 
and sickness (Zeno 436-7). 
 
Zeno is not advocating a senseless destruction of the world but in its inevitability, sees it 
as the only way to free humanity from its inherent sickness, as an apocalyptic remedy for 
a fractured and unsettled modernity. Living on the brink of WWI, Zeno affirms the 
material victory of the not necessarily the weak, but the the man with ambiguous 
qualities , or as James Joyce s brother Stanislaus argues, a weakness that has nothing to 
do i h inep ne  b  in ead a de ached kep ici m ha  allo  fo  he ob ene  of 
c i ic  (ci ed in Lebo i  208). Af e  gaining elf-consciousness of his weaknesses , 
Zeno begins to understand where truth and strength truly lie for him. Brian Moloney 
(1972), argues that Zeno s irony exists within his own self-deception, for like many 
mode n , Zeno ha  o pa  a p ice fo  hi  hope: ha  p ice i  elf-decep ion .I  ma  ell 
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be that we have no freedom, that our behaviour patterns are predetermined, but it may 
ell be oo ha  o  ill ion  a e o  p o ec i e de ice  (318). Th o gho  he no el, 
Zeno is able to build and simultaneously cast-off his own illusions with his use of irony, 
which allows him to make sense of the absurd world surrounding him.  
Throughout his confessions, we see that Zeno s ironic disposition towards himself 
is a result of placing a sort of perfection on certain people around him, which leads him to 
both inaction and a lack of responsibility. Hi  [ ]elf-deprecating Irony is designed to 
exculpate him, by making him appear to be the buffoon or blunderer who has in no way 
been responsible for what has happened, the perpetual victim either of circumstances or 
his own good intention  (ibid 312). Ho e e , a  he g o  olde , Zeno i  able o eali e 
that all the people in his life that he thought to be stronger or better than him were 
actually just as weak or strange. Once he is able to see the sickness in that image, he 
begins to feel more comfortable within his own self. Zeno now begins to realize that the 
perfect image of health he has sought after his whole life has been merely an illusion 
based on utilitarian and rationalist ideas about progress. In contrast to a world built upon 
specialization, Zeno s inability to be interested in one idea or profession alienates him 
from family and society. As with Musil  Ul ich, hi  openne  o all pe pec i e  c ea e  
he po en ial fo  mo al ambig i  (Sch a  94), hich lead  o a me apho  of humanity 
where sickness exists at every position: 
ad un capo della quale sta la malattia di Basedow che implica il generosissimo, 
folle consumo della forza vitale ad un ritmo precipitoso, il battito di un cuore 
sfrenato, e all altro stanno gli organismi immiseriti per avarizia organica, destinati 
a perire di una malattia che sembrerebbe di esaurimento ed è invece di 
poltronaggine. Il giusto medio fra le due malattie si trova al centro e viene 
designato impropriamente come la salute che non che una sosta. E fra il centro ed 
un estremità  quella di Basedow  stanno tutti coloro ch esasperano e 
consumano la vita in grandi desiderii. ambizioni, godimenti e anche lavoro, 
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dall altra quelli che non gettano sul piatto della vita che delle briciole e 
risparmiano preparando quegli abietti longevi che appariscono quale un peso per 
la società. Pare che questo peso sia anch esso necessario. Lasocietà procede 
perché i Basedowiani la sospingono, e non precipita perché gli altri la trattengono. 
Io sono convinto che volendo costruire una società, si poteva farlo più 
semplicemente, ma è fatta così, col gozzo ad uno dei suoi capi e l edema all altro, 
e non c è rimedio. In mezzo stanno coloro che hanno incipiente o gozzo o edema 
e su tutta la linea, in tutta l umanità, la salute assoluta manca. (La coscienza 358) 
 
(At one end is Basedow s disease, which implies the generous, mad consumption 
of vital force at a precipitous pace, the pounding of an uncurbed heart. At the 
other end are the organisms depressed through organic avarice, destined to die of 
a disease that would appear to be exhaustion but which is, on the contrary, sloth. 
The golden mean between the two diseases is found in the center and is 
improperly defined as health, which is only a way station. And between the center 
and one extreme  the Basedow one  are all those who exacerbate and consume 
life in great desires, ambitions, pleasures, and also work; along the other half of 
the line, those who, on the scales of life, throw only crumbs and save, becoming 
those long-lived wretches who seem to burden on society. It seems this burden, 
too, is necessary. Society proceeds because the Basedowians push it, and it 
doesn t crash because the others hold it back. I am convinced that anyone wishing 
to construct a society could do so more simply, but this is the way it s been made, 
with goiter at one end and edema at the other, and there s no help for it. In the 
middle are those who have either incipient goiter or incipient edema, and along 
the entire line, in all mankind, absolute heath is missing.) (Zeno 316) 
 
As critics have argued (Saccone 66; Minghelli 196), Zeno s Conscience is a novel 
about the sickness and disease found in modernity. In the previous quote, Zeno s dream 
sees humanity being pulled between two extreme diseases. On side there is what Zeno 
regards as the Basedowians, who push society toward a future of technology and science, 
while its religious and conservative counterpart pulls it back in order to keep things from 
collapsing. Not only does sickness reside in both extremes, but also in a life of the 
ange  li ing be i  and be een hem, making ickne  e i  along he en i e line  
and therefore, removing the notion of perfect health for all of humanity. Therefore, 
strangerness is still a sickness according to Zeno, but is also something unique that allows 
him to distinguish and understand the absurdities and illness of modern society, rather 
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than being unaware of them. If initially Zeno was a stranger because he rejected the 
values and ideas that were conjured up in the modern world, which made him 
subjectively sick, he nonetheless continues to remain a stranger by not only accepting this 
sickness, but also taking pleasure in it. 
Zeno refuses to define life as strictly progressive, and instead describes it as 
something in constant motion. In order for one to appreciate it, they must be in a constant 
motion themselves: Già credo che in qualunque punto dell universo ci si stabilisca si 
finisce coll inquinarsi. Bisogna moversi. La vita ha dei veleni, ma poi anche degli altri 
veleni che servono di contravveleni. Solo correndo si può sottrarsi ai primi e giovarsi 
degli al i  (La coscienza 359) ( I al ead  belie e ha  a  an  poin  of he ni e e he e 
you are settled, you end up being infected. You have to keep moving. Life has poisons, 
but also some other poisons that serve as antidotes. Only by running can you elude the 
former and take advantage of he la e ) (Zeno 317). Zeno s deluded and self-conscious 
world ends up being a microcosm of the world that surrounds him, and only when he 
acknowledges this does he begin to turn his attention from his own small world to the 
vast one that surrounds him. Zeno comes to recognize that humanity can only conquer the 
world by conquering itself. He comes to this conclusion once he is able to conquer, or at 
least understand, his own fears and sicknesses as well as those that reflect the 
characteristics of a world he once deemed as strong. The novel s final chapter sees Zeno 
connect the inner world and outer world through the outbreak of World War I, as the 
absurdity of humanity now comes crashing against the absurdity of his own world. The 
only antidote for this poisonous world, outside of its pure annihilation, is paradoxically 
found within, as other poisons, such as self-consciousness, allow the individual to explore 
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the beauty and originality of life. As with Beckmann turning violence, demons, and 
nightmares into captivating works of art that question the modern world s thirst for 
violence, the poisons and diseases of modernity ironically become moments of 
resacralization for Zeno, and a possible element for transcending oneself beyond the 
same poisons. In the early twentieth century, irony acts as a replacement for spirituality 
and sacredness in secularized modernity, based on the analogous character of divine God-
like language and irony (Berg 54; Booth 737). As with the clouds in Baudelaire  The 
S ange  ha  ho   ha  i  ab en  o  lacking in he p e en  o ld, hi  i onic pi i  
allows us to imagine a better future by trying to fill in what is absent and wrong in 
modern society. As with Zeno s Basedowian utopia, Blochian utopia begins in the 
darkness and must manifest internally, within the individual, beginning as something 
spiritual and subjective before it is able to spread across the collective.  
However, creating a utopian vision based on the ephemeral and fragmented 
aspects of the modern stranger and an ironic use of despair can be problematic. Even 
though Bloch s view is not a cynical one, if despair is necessary in realizing hope and a 
spirit or vision of utopia, then a utopian world will always be paradoxical since it must 
continuously be flawed. How can we achieve the best possible world when we are reliant 
on not just a flawed world that lacks something, but also one that needs to reach total 
darkness and desolation, in order to see it? A continuous process of the utopian spirit 
must consist of a state of despair and as a result, motion can paradoxically become 
stagnation. An ironic utopian vision based on the gaze of the modern stranger, transitory, 
ironic, and even malicious, may have saved the utopian spirit for the modern age but 
nonetheless can lead to questions that recognize it as ultimately self-defeating. What does 
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this alternative and modern notion of utopia say about the violent ways that one will use 
to engage with it, in order to realize their imaginings? This problematic tension may have 
been why Baudelaire, Leopardi, Beckmann, and Svevo through Zeno, distanced 
themselves from ever coming to terms with utopian progress. In the poem the 
L Alba o  ( Alba o ), Baudelaire captures the essence of what he felt utopian ideals 
amount to. Whereas the albatross flies powerfully and gracefully in the sky, on land, in 
the space of lived experience, it transforms into an awkward and clumsy animal that 
becomes easily susceptible to human violence.  
DIVINE VIOLENCE & MESSIANIC TIME IN MILLER’S LEIBOWITZ  
 
It may be one thing to situate a utopian spirit  in despair, but utopian and 
revolutionary ideals tend to become an excuse for violence. The relationships between 
the two became so strong that after witnessing the atrocities of WWII, Karl Popper 
(1950) ultimately declared that the two were inseparable. However, if modern society 
cannot remove violence from its existence, is it truly wrong to attempt a resacralization of 
it? In consideration of Maurice Bloch s notion of rebounding violence, the outsider not 
only consumes the world left behind but also expends the liminal violence of the rite of 
passage. Bloch s theory of violence creates a more cyclical journey instead of the 
individual following on a complete linear departure from their original starting point. It is 
at this stage of rebounding violence  that Bloch argues the religious turns into the 
political, and the individual must recognize the collective and the other (6). It is 
mboli m of ebo nding iolence, hich a  bo om i  conce ned i h he ni e al 
social, political, intellectual and emotional problem of h man fl idi  (ibid. 98).  
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Although Bloch s study focuses on the religious ritual outside of modern Western 
culture, his theory can be applied to secularized modernity and the process of 
resacralization, especially as he claims that this idea of rebo nding iolence i  a i-
ni e al  (1), ince i  a emp  o ol e he in in ic impa e of he h man condi ion, ha  
i  ho  h man being  can be he con i en  elemen  of pe manen  in i ional 
c e  (19). For Maurice Bloch the idea of rebounding violence  allows the human 
to become political. These ruminations on a form of violence that remain with the 
individual allows them a transformed vivacity because the second stage of violence 
becomes something external. This notion of the other differentiates the first violent stage 
f om ha  of he econd in a i e of pa age, in ha  he econd age incl de  an alien  o  
e e nal  alidi . The ebo nding iolence manife  af e  he i al i  comple ed ei he  
a  mbolic con c ion of a pe manen  o de , o a d a  a mili a  con e , o  
finally, culturally inwards towards people of a lower class (81). According to Bloch, the 
individual therefore retains a spiritual and violent facet of the past, and in turn creates 
new ones during the violent liminal phase. Therefore, the question arises: how do we 
extrapolate this intrinsic  violence into everyday life? These biopolitical and spiritual 
elements of violence become the core of messianic time and of the problematic dilemma 
of divine vs. mythic violence. The messianic drive of modernity may very well be why 
Pa l de Man (1971) cha ac e i e  mode ni  a  being ob e ed i h adical ene al  
and ne  beginning  (150, 152). Thi  ob e ion co ld po en iall  lead o a p edicamen  
that holds humanity in a perpetual state of negative liminality, a series of repetitious 
violence of destruction and rebirth, and apocalyptic repetition. 
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 In contrast, Agamben, paraphrasing Gianni Carchia, argues that messianic time 
canno  be apocal p ic ince he messianic is not the end of time, but the time of the 
end   a  a  b   a d  d  (All that Remains 62; Carchia, 144). 
H , A a b  c c  a  a  [ ]  a ca c  a d   a  da , 
because the apocalyptic can likewise be viewed the same way that Agamben views 
a c , a    a  a  b   a d  d  ( b d). I  A Canticle 
for Leibowitz, Miller blurs the lines between messianic and apocalyptic time, while divine 
violence can be either seen as remaining in its ambiguous state or not existing at all. 
Situated in an environment of a post-apocalyptic world, Canticle focuses on the Abbey of 
Saint Leibowitz, which duplicates and archives the scientific and cultural knowledge of 
the pre-apocalyptic twentieth century, hoping that humanity can once again learn and 
progress through experience and knowledge. What makes Miller s apocalyptic/post-
apocalyptic work so distinctive is that the novel is separated into three new yet familiar 
epochs, each a  600 a : Fiat Homo  (M d a /Da  A ), Fiat Lux  
(R a a c /E ), Fiat Voluntas Tua  (I d a  A /M d ). T  b  
ends with a new apocalypse that either represents the messianic coming through an act of 
divine violence or the continuous apocalyptical cycle of destruction and rebirth with no 
end in sight. Similar to Benjamin and Agamben, Miller s messianic time exists in 
conjunction with the empty, homogeneous time that is waiting to manifest itself. This is 
shown through the character of the nomadic Jewish wanderer, who Miller alludes to as 
living through all three epochs, just under different names Although it is never stated 
whether or not it is the same man throughout the whole novel, the fact that the three men 
look familiar, seemingly know information from past epochs that would be impossible 
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otherwise. Moreover, in the second epoch, this wandering nomad regards himself as 
immortal and is seemingly waiting for the messiah.55 Living in secular time, the wanderer 
waits for the messianic moment to uncannily manifest itself as either disastrous or 
illuminating; it either continues the cycle or breaks it. As Ralph C. Wood (2001) explains, 
Canticle   a ca c  b ca   c c   a  c a   s in 
an atomic holocaust. Rather it is an apocalypsis   a  : a  ,  a 
a    d  d c   a    a  d  , c   ab   
 a d b    a    dd  - not only the causes of our culture s 
deep self-d c  b  a   c  (27, 29).  
The novel s open ending leaves us with two possibilities of hope: the first 
possibility comes from the monastery leaving the planet before the end of the world with 
all the knowledge it has accumulated in the last one thousand years or so. This offers a 
glimmer of hope as humanity looks to reestablish itself far away from Earth, in an 
attempt to break the apocalyptic cycle. However, humanity escaping this Earth in search 
of another does not allow humanity to escape from itself. With the monastery bringing 
with it all the knowledge that arguably led to its destruction, what makes this attempt to 
escape the cycle any different than previous ones? As the Abbot Zerchi asks 
God/himself: Listen, are we helpless? Are we doomed to do it again and again and 
again? Have we no choice but to play the Phoenix in an unending sequence of rise and 
fall? Assyria, Babylon, Egypt, Greece, Carthage, Rome, the Empires of Charlemagne and 
he T k Are we doomed to it, Lord, chained to the pendulum of our own mad 
 
55 The character refers to himself as Lazarus, who Jesus raised from the dead, and is also 
alluded to the mythical figure of the wandering Jew, a Medieval Christian folklore of a 
Jewish man who is cursed by Jesus with immortality when he is unwilling to help Jesus 
while carrying the cross.  
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clockwork, helpless to halt its swing?  (Canticle 266-7). This possibility of escape does 
not exclude the disillusionment that may come with the failure of realizing the messianic 
moment. After WWI, the Expressionists  understanding of violence as a sense of renewal, 
faith, and hope quickly faded to disillusionment, which essentially ended their messianic 
vision and the movement itself (Anderson 176-7). Somewhat similarly, Futurism s love 
of the artificial came to its ironic apex when the prewar ideology of man over machine 
changed into a divination of machine under fascism. Hollow and artificial Catholic 
messianic symbols were secularized into futurist art under fascism, and as a result, 
destroyed its original ideology, while its revolutionary movement of speed slowed under 
its political alignments (Poggi 244-5). The notion of waiting for a messianic moment in 
ime o  fo cing i  h o gh an conf ing no ion of di ine iolence ha  ecen l  led i ek 
(2016) o gi e  a obe ing me age: Thi , pe hap , i  he mo  dep e ing le on of 
horror and suffering: there is nothing to be learned from it. The only way out of the 
vicious circle of this depression is to change the terrain towards concrete social and 
economic anal i  (42). Redemptive violence is a myth based on artificially constructed 
binaries of good and evil, and instead increases violence through the amplifying and 
exchanging of irrational fears.  
 The novel s second messianic possibility exists in the character of Rachel. Rachel 
is the conjoined dead twin of the poor tomato farmer Mrs. Grales, who is constantly 
seeking Rachel s baptism that the Abbott Zerchi is hesitant to perform. During the 
climactic new apocalyptic, Mrs. Grales  death comes the birth of Rachel, who exhibits a 
new child-like personality upon re-animation. Ironically, the radiation that will eventually 
eliminate humanity is what brings Rachel to life, which gives her a transcendent, divine, 
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and eternal quality. Rachel becomes a particularly symbolic representation of the modern 
stranger or even homo sacer, for she is beyond human, both pure and impure, neither 
dead no  li ing: Who, hen, a  Rachel? And Wha ?  (Canticle 334). Rachel, animated 
from the nuclear fallout, is born out of the darkness and violence of our world but 
becomes a true messianic figure when she rejects Zerchi s baptism. She does not require 
either the old world s religion or scientific discovery. Even when she gives the Eucharist 
to Abbott Zerchi, it is for his salvation rather than hers and as a result, breaks away from 
the previous cyclical world. A  a c ea e nei he  concei ed in in no  ha ing had an  
occa ion fo  in  (Wood 40), Rachel ep e en  a p omi e of e ec ion  (Canticle 
336), a me ianic fig e ha  i  a di pen e  a he  han a ecei e  of g ace  (Wood 40). 
Miller seems to be reversing Bloch s spirit of utopia in that society s collective violence 
and darkness is manifested within the individual rather than the other way around. 
Canticle s ending still leaves us with an uncanny monster created out of scientific 
de c ion and iolence, al ho gh he i  bo n o  of he Immac la e Concep ion  
(Canticle 279) and is removed from the original sin of the society that created her, 
allowing us a new form of hope. Rachel therefore, becomes the new uncanny creature 
without having to deal with the patriarchal, imposing, and detrimental figure of a 
Frankenstein, and at least at some level she is free to cultivate herself on the liminal 
world that is made up of the ruins of the past but is also on renewed ground.  
The book must end there for the utopian character to exist. Just as Musil s Man 
Without Qualities, which has critics divided on whether a finished novel would have 
produced a utopian vision of a different outcome to history or simply end in the historical 
failure of WWI (Grill 162), the book ends in liminality, with an ambiguous, 
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sideshadowing possibility rather than having an either/or utopian or anti-utopian vision. 
By sitting between the said and unsaid, Miller gives humanity the free will to ultimately 
choose for itself. Through the monster/spectre Rachel who ends the novel standing over 
the ashes of a failed world, Miller ultimately leaves us with the ironic hope to transcend 
the past through the monstrous , though still acknowledging that humans may very well 
choose a cyclical repetition of violence and monstrosity . De Man is correct in 
diagnosing modernity s obsession with new beginnings, even violent ones; yet, in a 
liminal and fragmented world of conflicting perspectives and moral ambiguities, it seems 
that the two are inseparable. Reminiscent of Baudelaire s albatross, Musil s Ulrich aptly 
argues, Roheit und Liebe nicht weiter von einander entfernt seien als der eine Flügel 
eines großen bunten stummen Vogels vom ändern  (29) ( b ali  and love are no 
fa he  apa  han one ing of big, colo f l, ilen  bi d i  f om he o he ) (25).  
As we have seen, the stranger is often associated with dread, violence, and a fear 
of the unknown; frequently represented by a shadowy figure lurking in alley ways, the 
dark corners of city streets, and our unconscious imagination. Yet, the modern stranger 
more often than not offers us an ironic and paradoxical perspective that challenges the 
iolence of mode ni  h o gh a co n e  o  ehea al of iolence  ha  open  p a pace 
for the critique and resignification of accepted cultural p ac ice  (San al 30). The 
modern stranger s use of irony as a counterviolence to violence itself, allows us to expose 
modernity s violent tendencies through self-reflectivity, both internal and societal, 
creating a liminal space of violence and nonviolence, of action and inaction.  
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Boredom is an experience of modernity, of modern temporality  
  - Elizabeth Goodstein, Experience Without Qualities: Boredom and Modernity 
 
At first boredom drove me to despair, but then, as it increased instead of diminishing, habit little by little 
made it less frightening to me and more susceptible to patience. My patience with boredom finally  became 
really heroic  
- Giacomo Leopardi, Zibaldone 
 
Boredom is the threshold to great deeds. - Now it would be important to know: What is the dialectical 
antithesis to boredom? 
- Walter Benjamin, Passagen-Werk 
 
A utopia canno , b  de ni ion, incl de bo edom, b  he utopia  we are living in is boring 





Ac ion film , p edominan l  cha ac e i ed b  p open i  fo  spectacular action, a 
narrative structure involving fights, chases, and explosions, and in addition to the 
deployment of state-of-the-art special effects, an emphasis in performance on physical 
fea  and n  (Neale 48), have become a cornerstone of not just Hollywood but in 
films across the world (Artz 196), usually dominating the highest grossing films of the 
year. Action, as a film genre, is a relatively new phenomenon, evolving around the 1980s, 
when its entertainment factor was fixated typically on glorifying violence (Kendrick 83). 
Up until it then, action was simply an mb ella e m con e ing a en e of mo emen , of 
eloci , of h ill  (ibid. 82), a f ndamen al elemen  ha  i  fo nd in mo , if no  all film  
(ibid. 83). Action, therefore, is a result of something happening  in a story; the more 
something happens, the more the narrative is established and the less boring we tend to 
find the film, novel, or show. Consequently, the more we tend to view movies as 
entertainment rather than art, as embarking on a thrill ride! , the more action we require 
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within them. Yet, in regard to the films of Michelangelo Antonioni, words such as action  
adventure,  and violence  become radically different and take on new meaning. 
Ironically, these new meanings are intertwined with one of action s antitheses; boredom.  
What is boredom? Answering this question is both extremely important and 
challenging, since the word has a lot of weight today, yet it is still an extremely vague 
mood. Its usage is gravely dependent on subjective feelings and opinions, 
notwithstanding its shifting definitions throughout time. Boredom s equivocal nature has 
been examined and debated by philosophers in some aspect or other for centuries. From 
Isocrates to Plutarch; from Pascal to Schopenhauer, Leopardi, Baudelaire and Nietzsche; 
from Kierkegaard to Russell, to Heidegger, Satre, Camus, and Eric Fromm, the topic has 
been endlessly debated, yet it has never been pinned down to any sort of clear designation. 
Despite the subject s apparent exhaustion, it has not diminished in contemporary 
discussions (Svendsen 2005; Toohey 2011; Schneider 2016), although one might ask if 
boredom is still a significant problem in our society. Is it even possible to be bored 
anymore, since socio-technological advancements have given us the opportunity, or at 
least the illusion, to escape boredom whenever possible? Asking such questions of 
boredom might be considered gratuitous in comparison to more troubling societal 
questions that we are currently facing, yet as I have established, especially in regard to 
the modern stranger, uncanny and liminal struggles that may haunt us from the shadows 
may point to larger problems that exist in society. In this concluding chapter, I would like 
to reexamine this exhausted  concept that was touched upon when discussing Baudelaire 
and Leopardi in Chapter 2. There, I discussed how boredom (ennui and noia) for the two 
poet-philosophers is an intrinsic and melancholic characteristic of modernity itself. The 
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world for them was an incessant theatre of dreams and illusions that in turn plays out as a 
repetitious boredom bordering on tragedy. As argued by Baudelaire and Leopardi, 
boredom was not an ailment that could be easily cured or forgotten, but was something 
that was entrenched in, even intrinsic to the human spirit. It was a forever present and 
reoccurring sense of consciousness that comes from a both a desire of living and, as Luce 
Irigaray (1977/1985) maintains, an impulse for death (115). The connection between 
boredom and secularized modernity is apparent through the fact that it has been largely 
discussed in philosophy and literature since the advent of modernity to our present day; 
nonetheless, it would be imprudent to think that it is a mood that is precisely restricted to 
the modern age.  
Instead of distinguishing boredom into categories or binaries, I am arguing that 
the modern age actually creates a more ambiguous and fragmented understanding of 
boredom as an uncanny and liminal state of in-betweenness and displacement that shares 
the burden of being part of the encompassing and significant aspects that define 
secularized modernity. I shall encounter this enigma by examining the films of Antonioni 
and the writings of contemporary American author Tao Lin, from post-war ennui  to 
contemporary boredom . Antonioni s masterful existential trilogy  of L Avventura 
(1960), La Notte (1961), and L Eclisse (1962), along with the appendage Il Deserto 
Rosso (The Red Desert) (1964) are connected not only through actress Monica Vitti but 
likewise through the examination of an alienated society located in a postwar 
Italy/Europe, where the lingering horrors of WWII were mixed with the economic 
miracle , resulting in an apathetic hangover that underscores the contemplative triviality 
of secularized modernity and the difficulties of interconnecting with one another in said 
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world. Lin tackles the same themes of alienation and boredom as Antonioni. Although his 
novel Taipei (2013) partly takes place in the Taiwanese capital, Lin s stories are 
predominantly located in contemporary America and focus on a generation that is 
ingrained in a technological world where communication is dominated by social media 
and technology. Both artists assess similar themes that simultaneously express the various 
types of boredom and show how these tend to also blend into one another, defining the 
modern experience of the stranger. Boring is never a positive attribute one would assign 
to a film or novel, yet both Antonioni and Lin force the reader and viewer into a state of 
boredom, to fully experience the sensation, and as a result, connect the audience and 
characters in innovate ways. Notwithstanding that both exclude any spiritual or 
transcendental aspects from their work, it is through this void or exclusion that they 
paradoxically move towards the threshold of sacredness. By adding the work of Sara 
Ahmed, I shall also discuss how mood and boredom in the twenty-first century are still 
tied to a tradition or spirit of the modern stranger, yet look to re-imagine the figure for an 
every changing modernity.   
THE DIFFICULT TASK OF DEFINING BOREDOM  
 
One of the challenges of analyzing boredom stems from the issue that boredom, 
and moods hem el e , a e ambig o  and a e all  de c ibed a  ambien , ag e, 
diff e, ha , and in angible  feeling  e end o fall in o, a he  han ob ain (Ahmed, 
Mood  13). In A Philosophy of Boredom (2005), Lars Svendsen asserts that mood , 
generally speaking, are seldom intentional subjects as far as we are concerned  they are 
p eci el  ome hing one find  one elf in, no  ome hing one con cio l  look  a ,  e en 
mo e o i h bo edom, hich i  a mood ha  i  pified b  a lack of uality that makes it 
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mo e el i e han mo  o he  mood , o he poin  he e one migh  no  e en kno  he  
are actually bored or have any direct reason for their boredom (14). Ambiguity has not 
stopped individuals from trying to understand the different types of boredom one may 
encounter in life. One of the most famous and often cited twentieth century theories of 
mood and boredom comes from Martin Heidegger s lecture-course The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics (1929-30). Heidegger sees mood (Stimmung) as something that 
i  defined f om o  a nemen  o a d  he o ld and i  no  ome hing me el  a  hand. 
They themselves are precisely a fundamental manner and fundamental way of being, 
indeed of being- he e  (67). In regard to boredom, Heidegger also characterizes its 
liminal na e b  de c ibing i  a  a silent fog in the abysses of Dasein  (77), although he 
does compartmentalize its ambiguous essence into three different forms, each becoming 
more profound  or deeper. The first form of boredom Heidegger discusses is when an 
individual is bored by something, as in waiting for something, which is a type of boredom 
that depends on the spatiotemporal situation, and not the individual s place in the world. 
The second form is when one is bored with something, and although this form is less 
intense than the first and may not be acknowledged by the individual at the time, it is 
more lasting and troubling because it is essentially about being bored with the ways we 
alleviate boredom. Lastly, and most importantly, is what Heidegger refers to as 
p ofo nd bo edom , a feeling of emp ine  he e all hing  a e en eloped in 
indifference and seem to lose their meanings. This form of boredom is immeasurable and 
endless and is not confined to certain situations. Profound boredom i  being held in 
limbo,  he e nlike he o he  o, i  i  he f ndamen al a nemen  of he mode n age 
(164). Boredom as indifference may seem to fall under what Heidegger categorizes as a 
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lack of a nemen , ho e e , ince e a e ne e  i ho  an a nemen , a lack of 
a nemen  i  ill an a nemen  b  one ha  i  ncann  ince i  emain  concealed o  
hidden f om  b  i  none hele  p e en  (68).  
As Heidegger argues, boredom becomes a telling refusal  where a lack of 
possibilities enables an understanding that this (non)attunement points to our very 
existence and also our own possibilities. Heidegger s concept of a lack of attunement  is 
reasonably very ambiguous, since its basis is of a liminal understanding. Sara Ahmed 
defines Heidegger s lack or non-attunement as an experience of ho  e can be in a 
world with others where we are not in a responsive relation, where we do not tend to 
pick up  on ho  he  feel  ( Mood  18). Ahmed appropriately likens this vague 
a nemen  of no  being in ha mon  o ha  of he ange  in ha  [ ] ange appea  
a  he edge  of a oom, diml  pe cei ed, o  no  i e pe cei ed, l king in he hado  
(ibid.). The link between the two is prominent enough that one may even argue that 
without some sort of modern understanding of boredom as emptiness, the concept of the 
modern stranger, and modernity itself, could not even exist.  
This does not mean that there was no understanding of an existential boredom 
until secularized modernity. Christianity, for example, understood acedia, a form of 
spiritual boredom or apathy of the soul, as a significant problem of the Middle Ages. The 
sentiment reappears in modernity with thinkers such as Kierkegaard who famously 
a e  ha  bo edom i  he oo  of all e il  (Either/Or 285), while Baudelaire, as does 
Walter Benjamin (Arcades Project, Con ol e D ), link  ennui as a secular and modern 
form of acedia, efe ing o i  a  he malad  of Monk  (Intimate Journals 42). In 
mapping out a complicated history of boredom, Patricia Meyer Spacks (1995), however, 
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maintains that there is a delicate distinction between boredom and ennui/acedia. To begin 
with, Spacks states that the English word bore  did not exist until the late seventeenth 
century, while boredom  was not widely used until the early beginnings of nineteenth 
century modernity (8). Spacks determines a continuing shift of boredom due to 
secularization and a collapse of the Christian world ie  (11), e l ing in a change f om 
a mo ali ic o a ociological ie  of bo edom  (21). Following Seán Desmond Healy s 
(1984) division of boredom into simple  and hyper , Spacks examines how boredom 
breaks away from the French ennui that was used n il hen: Bo edom  acco ding o 
Spack  a  no  (i  no ) he ame a  enn i, mo e clo el  ela ed o acedia. Enn i implie  
a judgment of the universe; boredom, a response to the immediate  (12). Spacks goes on 
o a g e ha  [e]nn i belong  o ho e i h a sense of sublime potential, those who feel 
hem el e  pe io  o hei  en i onmen  If onl  beca e i  eem  mo e dignified, 
many people would rather suffer ennui than boredom, despite its presumably greater 
mi e  (ibid.). Spacks  analysis is a crucial addition to the long history of work on 
boredom, yet her linguistic interpretation tends to eliminate the ambiguous nature of the 
word s meaning. Although useful, there is a problem when trying to compartmentalize 
boredom into various categories because boredom operates in the realm of liminality. 
Seeing that words such as ennui and noia in their native languages of French and Italian 
retain boredom s ambiguity and multifaceted definitions, it is difficult to preserve the 
nineteenth century uses of the words boredom and ennui as the defining differences 
between them, since the meanings of these words alter depending on context. Explicitly 
separating boredom from ennui is also problematic, since it was also in the nineteenth 
century that Baudelaire reinvented the word ennui by connecting boredom with 
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melancholy, thereby changing it into something far more existential than its meaning 
during the Middle Ages. Furthermore, since the word boredom is virtually the only word 
we presently use for the mood in the English language, could it not be argued that the 
word boredom  has now gained the same liminalness and ambiguity that ennui and noia 
retained in their native languages? 
 Nonetheless, these divisions, or lack thereof, in boredom are still continuously 
debated. In Boredom: A Lively History (2011), Peter Toohey, working from Spacks and 
Healy, separates boredom into the binaries of simple and existential; however, the 
separation is actually a ruse, as he essentially argues that existential boredom is a myth of 
modern society in that it is not really boredom at all but part of depression. Like Spacks, 
Toohey argues that for nineteenth and twentieth century writers, existential boredom is 
de c ibed a  a kind of emptiness  resulting from the sufferer s seeing him- or herself as 
i ola ed f om o he , he e ch indi id al  a e li ing in a ec la i ed o ld he e 
religion no longer offers solace. They inhabit a fragmented and divided world where 
regional and even personal lo al ie  ha e been lo  (196). In contrast, Toohey claims 
ha  o  c en  ocie  i  one in hich adi ion and comm ni  ha e di appea ed  
(ibid). Toohey deceptively solves the problem of ambiguity in boredom by shifting 
existential boredom into another ambiguous term - depression, though he fails to 
acknowledge any connection between the two56. Neither does Toohey examine any 
correlation between hopelessness, permanent liminality, and boredom (Szakolczai 2000; 
 
56 In contrast, Reinhard Kuhn (1979) a g e  ha  he di imila  pe  of bo edom a e 
often confused with ennui because they can never be completely divorced from it. They 
do contain certain elements of ennui, they often coexist with ennui, and they sometimes 
e en b ing abo  enn i  (9). Mo e ecen l , Michael Raposa (1999) reestablishes the 
ela ion hip be een he o b  defining enn i a  bo edom colo ed b  melanchol  (34).  
 170 
Thomassen 2016) and how these relate to secularized modernity. For instance, in 
Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-Between, Bjørn Thomassen claims 
ha  [ ]he inci a ion of con an  and in an  liminal e pe ience ha  o cha ac e i e  
cultural life in our contemporary period easily turns into nullifying boredom, 
en ele ne  and no ma i e nihili m  (2). A more interesting re-examining of boredom 
comes from Sianne Ngai (2005) with her concept of stuplimity , what she describes as 
a conca ena ion of bo edom and a oni hmen   a bringing oge he  of ha  d ll  and 
ha  i i a e  o  agi a e ; ha p, dden e ci a ion and p olonged de en i i a ion, 
e ha ion, o  fa ig e  (271). Acco ding o Ngai, he pa ado ical f ion of bo edom and 
blime hold  oppo ing affec  oge he  (ibid.), and although she does set up a binary, 
she nonetheless keeps boredom in a more ambiguous and liminal light. Keeping with the 
more recent examination of boredom, Ngai places the shift in boredom as part of the of 
the secularization process of the modern age in that it removes the sacred transcendence 
of he blime in fa o  of epe i ion o  a e ie  of fa ig e  o  mino  e ha ion , a he  
han a ingle, majo  blo  o he imagina ion  (272).  
The major separation between boredom and existential boredom seems to exist 
for many scholars (Spacks, Toohey, Ngai, and Elizabeth Goodstein (2005)) because it is a 
historically specific experience. Even though boredom is not exclusively a modern 
characteristic, with the advent of secularized modernity it does gain a shifting importance 
as it moves from a metaphysical problem to a psychological one and from the individual 
o he ma e . A  Eli abe h Good ein i e , i  i  no  ha  bo edom a  ch i  he ke  o 
theorizing modernity, but rather the problems of theorizing boredom are the problems of 
heo i ing mode n e pe ience mo e gene all  (407). Although I agree with these 
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arguments, due to boredom s liminal essence, and since the sacred can equally exist in 
the profane world, I do not necessarily believe that these occurrences result in a clear 
dislocation between boredom and ennui, or a total removal of the sacred, as Toohey and 
Ngai suggest. As Mladen Dolar argues of boredom s liminal companion, the uncanny, the 
scared or spiritual aspects are not necessarily removed but instead distilled into profane 
existence, remaining hidden in society s shadows but not complexly absent. Either as a 
part of the spiritual or as a psychological understanding, sacredness has become a spectre 
with secularized modernity or what Tillich (1965/1987) describes as sacred emptiness  
or the sacred void . In a world where God is absent (non-existent) and religious 
traditions and symbols have lost meaning, a void or empty space has occurred that 
defines our contemporary world entrenched in ennui/boredom. Yet paradoxically, it is the 
same space where the sacred resacralizes into new ideas.  
THE (IN)ACTION FILMS OF MICHELANGELO ANTONIONI 
 
Speaking of Russian filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky, philosopher Thorsten Botz-
Bornstein (2007) describes the director  e of ac ion in hi  film  a  no ac ion  o  
a he  [ ]he kind of ac ion ha  canno  be een  (6). This uncanny form of action that 
Tarkovsky implemented was highly influenced by the works of Antonioni. Beginning 
with his 1960 breakthrough film L Avventura (The Adventure), Antonioni deconstructed 
the concept of both action and plot and marked both a stylistic shift that better captured 
the psychological elements of modern ennui than his previous films had. This lack of plot 
and slow pacing in his films may estrange many viewers, but this is precisely why his 
films succeed in capturing the film s subject matter of alienation and boredom in a much 
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more captivating and satisfying way. The dissolving of action, its inaction, is what 
constructs the action of the film. 
As Seymour Chatman (1985) argues, anxiety in Antonioni  film  occ  in 
visual details of plot, behavior, and composition so veiled and subtle that Antonioni risks 
making he a dience impa ien  and bo ed  (66); ho e e , b  bringing the audience into 
the same physiological and emotional state of the characters, the more boring the film 
becomes, the more interesting it turns out to be. For example, L Avventura is about a 
young woman s (Anna) disappearance during a boat trip in the Mediterranean with her 
lover (Sandro), best friend (Claudia), and a group of friends. While searching for the 
vanished woman, Sandro and Claudia become attracted to one another, yet at the same 
time, this plot  has little to do with what the film is about; it is neither a murder-mystery 
nor really a romantic love story. This groundbreaking film lacks any real plot or focus 
and instead is pulled along by the human situation or inner turmoil and relationships (or 
lack of) of the film s main and peripheral characters. The adventure  that the characters 
emba k on i  in e nal, an emo ional ad en e a ph iological and mo al ad en e 
which makes them act different to the established conventions and criteria of a now 
o moded o ld  (An onioni in Cha man & Duncan 71). Action in Antonioni s films 
establishes revolutionary ideas through invisible and uncanny conduct; action is 
recognized through the characters  emotions in a modern age where people have become 
pi i all  ad if  (Cha man & D ncan 71) and fea ing he mo al nkno n  (An onioni 
33). 
By distancing the film s meaning from narrative plot and thereby dissolving the 
na a i e i elf, An onioni s camera often lingers on temps morts or dead time, where the 
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central element in the camera  foc  i  he ligh  o  he one of objec  and in i e  
viewers to collaborate in the film s creation of meaning, which remains, however, far 
f om a bi a  (Ca lo o i 61, 63). Doing so makes Antonioni a master of deconstructing 
the MacGuffin distinct from that of Alfred Hitchcock, who used objects as false plot 
motivators in order to establish the plot, while Antonioni uses the plot itself as a 
MacGuffin, and as a result, undermines the narrative itself rather than using it to establish 
one. In this regard, while greatly influenced by the filmmaker, Antonioni can likewise be 
seen as an anti-Hitchcock . Instead of using the MacGuffin to create suspense, his usage 
gradually removes any suspense in the film (Chatman & Duncan 75), leaving the 
audience pondering an unsolved crime, or whether there was any crime to begin with. As 
the film progresses, Anna is slowly forgotten, and her disappearance becomes less 
important to both the characters in the film and the audience watching it. This allows 
Antonioni to show the inner turmoil of human relationships and of the self and other, not 
through dialogue or narration but instead through the cinematic image and inaction  
between characters.  
The inaction or slow movement of both plot and Antonioni s camera, what David 
Bo d ell (2005) de c ibe  a  ded ama i a ion  (152), replicates the boredom and 
alienation of Antonioni s characters. Antonioni uses dedramatization to great effect as the 
more boring  the film becomes, the more interestingly both his film and characters 
develop. Unlike his contemporary Federico Fellini s La Dolce Vita (1960), who used the 
exhaustion of the spectacle to reach similar themes, Antonioni explores ennui through 
tediousness, as the more time passes with nothing  happening, the more we feel 
connected to the characters  state of anxiety and alienation. It is no wonder Antonioni s 
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work is shrouded in ambiguity. His characters lack traditional film development but are 
rather used as cinematic devices latched onto their surrounding landscapes, allowing for 
symbolic expressions and explorations of the philosophical dilemmas and questions that 
humans endure within the confines of modernity. In The Material Ghost: Films and Their 
Medium (1998), Gilbe o Pe e  a g e  ha  [p]lace a he  han ac ion, i a ion a he  
than event, is Antonioni  chief conce n  (370). Even this form of symbolic alienation is 
hard to pin down in Antonioni s films, since it is done predominantly through landscapes 
that offer differing, often contradicting, interpretations. For example, the volcanic Island 
of Lisca Bianca that is the setting for Anna s disappearance near the beginning of the film 
and the image of Mount Etna that makes up the foreground of the film s final shot 
bookend L Avventura with landscapes that simultaneously reflect beauty, terror, infertile 
violence, and a sensuousness that exists within the human condition; though like the 
volcanoes themselves, they remain dormant or silent within us.  
As stated, one of Spacks  defining distinctions between boredom and ennui is 
how boredom does not place the individual above or superior to their environment. The 
deserted and lonely settings and landscapes in Antonioni s films mirror the characters  
psyche, blurring the characters into the landscapes that surround them. Antonioni 
achie e  hi  b  ing fa  ho , gi ing  a di loca ed and aliena ed ance of c i ical 
de achmen  (Pe e  90), and he eb  linking he idle pe iod  of e e da  banali  and 
the dehumanizing  of both the characters and landscapes (Delezue, Cinema 5). Gilberto 
Perez brilliantly aligns Antonioni s camera with the perspective of the stranger: 
The paths of strangers in Antonioni, the paths of the stranger that is his camera, 
are an unsettling relativistic geometry mapping the space and time of modern life, 
a web of lines of orientation and disorientation that come together at unexpected 
meeting points and drift apart in directions unforeseen. (382) 
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Describing the scene in L Eclisse, where Monica Vitti s character Vittoria stares out of 
her window only for her gaze to come upon a stranger watching her from his window, 
Perez describes how all the strangers  gazes (Vittoria, the stranger watching her, the 
came a, and he a dience) c ea e he effec of o  ddenl  eeing o el e  a  he 
o ld di an l  ee   (379). Thi  i  aken o i  limi  a  he end of he film, hen all 
the humans completely disappear from the film s final shots, although the removal of 
characters does not necessarily diminish their presence. In L Avventura, Anna s 
disappearance is foreshadowed even when she is in the film through her attitude. The 
little time she is on screen, Antonioni makes it transparent that Anna is both emotionally 
and spiritually absent. We instantly see that Anna wishes to be alone and is bored with 
he elf, he  f iend , and he  ela ion hip i h Sand o. Anna e en anno nce  he  noia  
with the whole trip and leaves to swim on her own (0:14:20). When everyone joins her, 
Anna lies about a shark swimming around that ends the fun. Although she states to 
Claudia that she did not know why she made up such a story, Anna s malaise suggests 
that she is wishing for either some kind of excitement or possibly even death to 
extinguish her anguish. The main thing that separates Anna from her friends is not 
necessarily her ennui but the fact she acknowledges and to some extent embraces it. Yet, 
once Anna disappears, she becomes the film s spectre that haunts the rest of the cast, 
especially Sandro and Claudia.  
In Cinema 2: The Time-Image (1985/1989), Dele e a g e  ha  in The 
Adventure, the vanished woman causes an indeterminable gaze to weigh on the couple - 
which gives them the continual feeling of being spied on, and which explains the lack of 
co-ordination of their objective movements, when they flee whilst pretending to look for 
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he  (8). However, Anna s haunts the others through the ennui and existential boredom 
that infects both Sandro and Claudia, who appeared cheerful prior to her disappearance, 
then slowly become alienated and bored with modern life and its relationships.  
Paradoxically, by making his characters fade into their environments, Antonioni 
simultaneously dislocates the viewer from the same environment or space. Even if 
bo edom i  a e pon e o he immedia e  a  Spack  claim , in film and li e a e, a i  
still tend to place their characters above the environment (Lundin 240, n31). A 
paradoxical combination of Antonioni s dislocation and absorption leads us back to a 
connection with ennui, where the individual is both part of the immediate and the infinite, 
placing humanity in an exterior/interior state of a liminal environment. This is especially 
evident in Red Desert, a film whose landscapes are dominated by grand images of 
industrialization and technology, a symbolic image of human achievement and modernity 
over Nature. The factories represent the world the characters have been absorbed into, but 
one that at the same time signifies humans  abili  o p od ce hei  o n en i onmen : I 
think the complex horizon filled with factories is much more beautiful, even esthetically, 
than the uniform green line of the pine forest. Because behind the factories, you sense the 
presence of human beings. They e ali e  (An onioni 1964, 00: 03:38  00:03:57). 
Antonioni now points to a world where the sublime has been technologized and produced 
by humanity instead of God or Nature. Antonioni s changing landscapes juxtapose 
humanity s natural and artificial characters, symbolizing both what we cannot escape and 
what we can modify within ourselves.      
 Antonioni s films may dwell on the theme of a sacred void within a modern 
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technologizing world57, but he does not place blame on it. Antonioni s themes of 
boredom and alienation are a reflection of our ambiguous and liminal world, where a 
nostalgic view of the past and tradition collides with optimism for the future, leaving us 
with the inability for action and communication. In a statement released during Cannes in 
1960, Antonioni argued that  
we make use of an aging morality, of outworn myths, of ancient conventions. And 
we do this in full consciousness of what we are doing. Why do we respect such a 
morality? The conclusion which my characters reach is not that of moral anarchy. 
They arrive, at best, at a sort of reciprocal pity. That too, you will tell me, is old. 
But what else is the e lef  o ?  (An onioni 144). 
 
For Antonioni, the temporal-liminal enigma of secularized modernity has resulted in the 
inability to properly communicate with one another and has also become a catalyst of 
alienation and boredom. The result is an indication of the frailty of modern love, one of 
secularized modernity s last standing habitats of secularized sacredness. The fleeting 
moments of connection in L Avventura and L Eclisse may ostensibly point to a difficulty 
or even inability of achieving modern love and communication for extended periods of 
ime, lea ing  i h a en e of olip i m  (Brunette 47), he e he fail e  of h man 
connec ion empha i e he dea h imp l e fo nd in bo edom  (Paliwoda 166). Although 
the genuine connection between the two modern strangers Giuliana and Corrado in Red 
Desert does in fact dispute this idea of solipsism as an explicit theme of Antonioni s 
films, and despite both characters finally meeting someone who may truly understand 
their strangerhood, this relationship does not lead to any form of sustainable happiness or 
 
57 Speaking of Red Desert, Cooper and Skrade (1970) claim ha  he canno  concei e of a 
more powerful, gripping, unrelenting illustration and experience of Tillich s analysis of 
the sources and reality of contemporary man s dilemma than Antonioni  [film] , in ha  
the individual  place doe  no  kno  him an mo e  (8,9). 
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love, since it is difficult for even a substantial connection in liminal space to solidify into 
promising or utopic resolutions.  
DIGITAL BOREDOM  
 
Bertrand Russell commented in The Conquest of Happiness (1930/2015) that 
[ ]e a e le  bo ed han o  ance o  e e, b  e a e mo e af aid of bo edom. We 
have come to know, or rather to believe, that boredom is not part of the natural lot of man, 
but can be a oided b  a fficien l  igo o  p i  of e ci emen  (37). This fear of 
boredom has been exacerbated since Russell s statement rather than alleviated, even 
leaving us with a fear of becoming bored with what we use to alleviate boredom, which 
could result in a transition from simple boredom into a profound, more existential 
boredom. This is where the writings of Tao Lin can be situated, with stories that carry the 
torch of the modern stranger living in ennui in much the same vein as Antonioni did with 
his films. Despite using a different medium, Lin s work seems to continue and develop 
these lingering themes of boredom, unhappiness, and the hardships of communication. 
Lin takes his contemporary generation and links them to the early modernist 
existentialists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who are suffering from a form of 
ennui and meaninglessness that manifests itself in the bombardment and totalizing 
discourse of information rather than an onslaught of the modernist spectacle. His themes 
rest on millennial boredom and laziness told through plotless  and detached narratives 
that can unquestionably result in a hypnotic and frustrating reading experience. In 
focusing on the boredom of daily activities, Lin s Kmart realism  shadows Jean Paul 
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Sartre s famous novel Nausea (1938)58, what many consider the cornerstone novel of 
existential sickness and boredom. Although Sartre s first novel is possibly a significant 
inspiration for Lin s work, Lin advances Sartre s novel by focusing on modern strangers 
rather than outsiders. Whereas Sartre s protagonist Antoine Roquentin is mainly a recluse 
in the mold of Fyodor Dostoevsky s Underground Man, someone who abhors the contact 
of others, Lin s characters are highly social beings; contemporary flâneurs that are both 
engaged yet, simultaneously, feel removed from their physical and digital surroundings, 
which in many cases become hard to distinguish from one another. Due to its permanent 
liminal characteristics, cyberspace no longer has the ability to dislocate someone from the 
physical world, since being in a state of dislocation has become commonplace.  
While Lin s early work, such as Eeeee Eee Eeee (2007), Shoplifting from 
American Apparel (2009), or his short story collection Bed (2007), showcase a promising 
talent in modern literature, his last novel Taipei (2013) establishes him as one of the great 
voices of contemporary America. Taipei, like most of Lin s writings, focuses on the 
current generation born into Internet culture, social media, and smart phones, immersed 
in tools that, at least initially, cast away boredom at will. It also emphasizes the struggle 
for meaning in a modern age while containing the lingering discontent of generations past. 
Lin however, shows how monotonous alleviating boredom can become, pointing to an 
 
58 Lin s most obvious Sartrian allusion of boredom and absurdity may come in the short 
o  Lo e I  a Thing on Sale fo  Mo e Mone  Than The e E i  f om Bed:Stories 
(2007), although a lot more playful:  
People began to quit their jobs. They saw that their lives were small and 
threatened, and so they tried to cherish more, to calm down and appreciate things 
for once. But in the end, bored in their homes, they just became depressed and 
susceptible to head colds. They filled their apartments with pets, but then 
neglected to name them. They became nauseous and unbelieving. They did not 
believe that they themselves were nauseous, but that it was someone else who was 
nauseous that it was all, somehow, a trick. A fun joke. (10) 
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uncanny unhappiness that we should not be feeling anymore. As the main tool we use 
when trying to hastily end boredom, and with our ability to accesses it at any place and 
any time, the Internet has led many people to assume that we have ended, or at least 
reduced the amount of boredom we have to endure (Mann 115). Lin s portrayal of 
cha ac e  con an l  eaching fo  ocial media i  ne e  fa  a a  f om he bo ed 
e p e ion  (Taipei 5, 8, 27, 29, 138, 157, 170) that dominates their emotions. Lin likens 
the world of social media to drug use, something that can create excitement and an 
altering of reality but can also lead us into a perpetual liminal state, back into boredom if 
overused, as his characters live constantly within a social media or drug induced tedium. 
The Internet, or more specifically, the language of social media, seamlessly 
blend  in o o dina  life a  o d  ch a  nf iendable  (ibid. 15) interchange between 
online life and ordinary life. This alters even what his main protagonist Paul, who is 
strongly based on Lin himself, believes an intimate and physical relationship should be: 
something that is simply just around or being on in the background; something that is 
always there and used but not necessarily something to be fully engaged with. Paul 
continuously associates his life and humans with computers, compares the lights of the 
city to GIF files, and obsesses over a girl s Facebook page but never shows the same 
obsession with the physical girl herself. In Paul s Internet life, conversations are to be 
stored and returned to later, or possibly never, all the while spending his day doing 
p e c ip ion d g  and ef e hing T i e , T mbl , Facebook, Gmail in a con in o  
cycle with an ongoing, affectless, h mo le  eali a ion  (ibid. 76), thereby making the 
two indistinguishable. The Internet easily blends into Paul s life and does not need to be 
e en i el  efe ed o ince i  i  al a  he e. A  Pa l him elf a e , echnolog  
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seemed more likely to permanently eliminate life by uncontrollably fulfilling its only 
function: to indiscriminately convert matter, animate or inanimate, into computerized 
matter, for the sole purpose, it seemed, of increased functioning, until the universe was 
one comp e .  (ibid. 166-7). B  being omnip e en  b  al o an ab ac ion nde ec able 
in conc e e eali  (ibid. 167), technology, dominated by the Internet, is able to 
subversively control one s perception or attitude towards life, without allowing for any 
sacred space. While floating in the background, virtually unseen, the Internet is not 
something you necessarily need to activate, like the jacking in and out as described in 
William Gibson s cyberpunk novels. There is no action; there is no immersing yourself in 
it and then getting out.  
Boredom takes on a similar liminal stance for Paul and his social group, in that its 
continuous presence makes it seem it is not even there; when it completely surrounds you, 
boredom becomes something hard to acknowledge: 
Pa l became a a e of him elf a ing, an fi ed,  a  he cen e  of he c een, 
with increasing intensity and no thoughts. He focused on resisting whatever force 
was preventing him from moving his head or neck or eyeballs until finally
suddenly, it seemed he calmly turned his head a little and asked if Erin was 
bored. 
I don  kno . A e o ?  
I can  ell,  aid Pa l. A e o ?  
Ma be a li le. Do o  an  o go?  
Yeah,  aid Pa l, and lo l  ood. (Ibid. 214) 
 
Boredom also seems to be a result of too much information and a lack of mystery. 
Everything is out in the open in Paul and his friends  lives; nothing is secretive from his 
love life to his drug use, but unlike Frankenstein, who was horrified by learning the truth, 
Paul s group is simply bored. Paul and Erin may have a relationship of full disclosure but 
in the end fail to communicate meaningfully and also lack a mysteriousness to be excited 
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about; there is never anything they could learn from each other in the future of their 
relationship. And although total disclosure allows them to understand more about 
hem el e  and hei  f e, a  B ian Williem  (2015) a  of he no el, [ ]he 
en me a ion of po ible f e  clo e  do n f e po ibili ie  (232). Echoing 
Leopardi, since the possibility to a better future is always in the cards, the present 
becomes worthless, and as a result so does the future, therefore keeping Paul in a 
continuous process of permanent liminality and boredom. However, as with Antonioni, 
Lin does not seem to portray social media (technology) as the cause of his generation s 
ills but rather more of a catalyst in understanding the void left by modern existence.  
This critique does not come from an outsider, from an older individual who 
cannot understand modern technology. Like all modern strangers, the critique comes 
from within, from someone born into its world. This is the reason why as much as 
boredom and even a breakdown of communication is allocated to social media use, Lin 
does not shy away from showing us that Paul and Erin s digital  relationship also 
flourishes in both communication and creativity as much as it seems to be damaged by it. 
The problem comes from the fact that young people like Paul and Erin are not allowed to 
be bored, where the fear of boredom has forced them to constantly seek entertainment, 
which eventually leaves them exhausted with the concept of constantly trying to entertain 
themselves. While seeing his reflection in his computer screen, Paul links humanity and 
technology together within a liminal space, as a place of both utopian imaginary and a 
place of the secular void:  
He minimized Safari and saw his face, which seemed bored and depressed, his 
default expression. He maximized Safari and imagined millions of windows, 
positioned to appear like one window. He closed his eyes and thought of the 
backs of his eyelids as computer screens; both could display anything imaginable, 
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so had infinite depth, but as physical surfaces were nearly depthless. (Lin, Taipei 
170) 
 
It is a profound boredom that allows Paul to witness a lack that in turn serves as a thirst 
for desire. Paradoxically, it also serves as knowledge that desire is perpetually 
unquenchable, thereby leaving Paul in a state of inaction and boredom. According to 
Ahmed in The Promise of Happiness (2010), since [h]appiness is an expectation of what 
follo  and [ ]he e  e pec a ion of happine  gi e   a pecific image of he f e , 
i  ac all  p o ide  he emo ional e ing fo  di appoin men  (29), e peciall  if e 
continually wait for happiness or if we continuously feel that the future is lost for us.  
The fear of the future, of modern boredom s immortality  (Goodstein 6), pulls 
Paul into the past , possibly in an attempt to find remnants of the sacred. His family s 
Taiwanese culture and his racial background are a part of, yet also detached from his 
identity, since Paul is very much a modern American product. Lin seamlessly brings the 
modern stranger into his protagonist through a liminal interpretation of Paul s social, 
racial, and geographical character. Paul lives in a world where the traditional myths have 
fractured and crumbled but like Antonioni s films, are still spectres haunting us in the 
background. He is being pulled apart from the present/future of his current life of friends, 
drugs, social media that defines his contemporary New York existence, along with the 
cultural and traditional values of his parents, represented by Taipei, which, although it 
does not directly speak to him, nonetheless preoccupies him continuously. Paul is caught 
in a liminal sphere of past/future and tradition/advancement, where falling back into 
tradition paradoxically allows him the illusions of new sensations. This is something that 
Antonioni s characters are unable to achieve because tradition for them is repetition of 
their daily lives. As for Paul, who lives a stereotypical New York lifestyle, in order to 
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feel o  of cha ac e ,  in a o ld ha  i  i elf o  of cha ac e , o  o e perience 
blandl  o he o ldl  e ci emen  (Lin, Taipei 41), which a modern stranger such as 
Paul needs, he must go visit his parents in Taipei, the only place where he is able to feel 
this uncanny displacement. Visibly belonging yet socially estranged, Paul begins to 
e pe ience he ncann  hen he i i  Tai an, a  Taipei i  able o di p  he o -of-
con ol fo ma ion of ome incomp ehen ible o ld ie  (Lin, Taipei164). Although he 
used to never leave his parents  or uncle s apartment on previous visits, he begins to 
in e nali e  and ie  he foreign  Tai ane e capi al in b e en  ip  a  le  like a 
ci  han i  o n o ld, hich he co ld lei el  e plo e fo  ea , o  ma be 
indefini el  (ibid). In Taipei, his displacement is far more uncanny than it is continual, 
as life is for him in New York, allowing Paul to experience some sort of sacred or utopian 
perspective removed from social media and the Internet, yet linked through exploring the 
physical city itself. While back in New York and looking at the movies that he and his 
ne  ife E in filmed he e, Taipei eemed go hic and l na i h he pa e ac i i  and 
structural density of a fully colonized moon that had been abandoned and was being 
recolonized; its science-fictional qualities seemed less advanced than ancient, haunted, of 
a f e da k age  (ibid. 240). Taipei is able to reveal uncanny truths not only about his 
own life but also about his relationship with his casual friend turned wife. 
 Yet a modern stranger in liminalness cannot simply fall back into tradition as a 
solution, especially with customs that no longer fit the fleetingness of the modern world. 
Fo  e ample, Pa l and E in b ing hei  Ne  Yo k  life of computers, social media, and 
drug use to Taiwan, something he tended to exclude on previous visits. Even though 
these are not exclusive to New York, and very well exist in modern Taiwan, Paul is no 
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longer able to coagulate his spatio-temporal binaries, as his New York life and Taiwanese 
life become the same. The illusion has only lasted so long for Paul, until he comes to 
e m , a  Ado no (1991) once claimed, i h he no ion ha  di an  place  a e no longe  
 as they still were for Baudelaire s ennui  diffe en  place  (191). Addi ionall , Pa l 
and Erin subscribe to the old tradition of marriage simply because it is still customary for 
a relationship to end there in our society, not necessarily out of a want or desire. A 
marriage ceremony is supposed to complete the rite of passage from child/adolescence 
into maturity and adulthood, yet Erin and Paul s relationship is grounded too much on a 
liminal plane for it to succeed in such a way. Their relationship, which is originally solid  
or working in its liminalness, does not change after marriage, yet it is the expectation that 
something should and it failing to do so that proves to be the demise of their relationship. 
Lin argues that although revisiting the past and tradition can lead one to experience 
emotions and feelings that seem uncanny and therefore exciting, nevertheless, relying on 
or conforming to traditions and customs that no longer speak to our needs, without at 
least a reimagining of them, can no longer advance or save us from our liminal existence, 
and a  a e l , a i  he mode n ange  in a defa l  e p e ion  of ennui.  
A HEROIC LACK OF ATTUNEMENT 
 
As we see with the work of Lin, Antonioni s expressions of modern malaise still 
remain significant problems in contemporary and modern times. It is true that stories 
about bored well-to-do white people, as in Antonioni s films, are not as attractive as once 
perceived, especially in world where far more significant social injustices have become 
more present. But that argument would be misleading, especially if we ignore the ironic 
and spiritual spark that exists within those stories. William Pamerleau (2011) recognizes 
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ha  Tillich ega ded a  ac ed emp ine  in An onioni s films, where the absence of 
God, he pi i al, o  a he  he a a ene  of he lo  of meaning  (47). The ca ed oid 
epitomized by existential boredom, identifies a moral or existential problem or void that 
essentially becomes spiritually substantial in the modern world (ibid. 5-6). Although 
stating a materialist argument, Henri Lefebvre s (1974/1991) claim ha  pace i  ne e  
empty: it al a  embodie  a meaning  (154), none hele  applie  o Tillich s ironic and 
paradoxical understanding of empty space because even nothing must contain something. 
Metaphorically, we can compare Tillich s view of empty space with a quantum theory of 
empty space in that it is not really empty but bursting with energy (Habegger 92). The 
idea of sacred emptiness is acknowledging that there is a sacred spark or energy in 
emptiness; energy in boredom.  
Antonioni s films are also important because they predominantly deal with female 
protagonists and therefore female  boredom, especially in the Red Desert, which 
highlights what Ahmed (2010) and Betty Friedan (1963)59 claim as the 1960s myth of the 
happy housewife. Even prior to the optimistic economic boom of the postwar years, 
women were not allowed to be happy, let alone bored, and therefore, their boredom 
o ld no  be aken e io l , hich fo  omen a  nfai l  connec ed o elfi hne  a  
oppo ed o he bene olence ha  engage  one in meaningf l ac ion  (Spacks x). For the 
most part, historically boredom or ennui was considered as an unacceptable trait for a 
woman to possess, commonly disregarded as superficial or lacking any self-reflection or 
 
59 In the revolutionary book The Feminine Mystique (1963), F iedan nea h  he 
p oblem i h no name , a n poken and ide p ead enn i ha  ho e i e  end ed 
d ing he po a  ea  ha  con i ed of a ange i ing, a en e of di a i fac ion, a 
yearning that omen ffe ed in he middle of he en ie h cen  in he Uni ed S a e  
(57). 
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soulful weight (Pease 22-3). Where male ennui was regarded as o lf l and ennoblingl  
indi id ali ed , omen faced a do ble anda d a  bo edom fo  hem a  a mp om fo  
the lack of self (ibid 23). Yet, in spite of this, it was the upper class women of the 
eighteenth century, most notably in Britain, that transformed boredom into a literary 
endea o , a  bo edom ha n  he ma gin  of m ch omen s fiction  (Spacks 70). This 
however did nothing to transform the misconception of bored women throughout 
modernity. By the nineteenth and early twentieth century, boredom became 
predominantly generalized as an upper class woman s problem or experience, either 
romanticized or portrayed as a mental illness (Pease 25). The doctors and psychologists 
of the time blamed these discontents with women s inability to cope with modernity (ibid. 
30), when the problem was simply because they were not allowed to partake in it. Even 
when the newly educated New Woman rose in society at the end of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, modernist texts rarely showed women struggling for 
independence in the workplace but instead portrayed as bored characters stuck at the 
typist desk and lacking agency (ibid. 21).  
This is a reason why women have been frequently overshadowed by men as 
modern strangers or outsiders in both literature and film, despite continuously being 
affec  alien  (Ahmed, Happiness 49). In 1888, B i i h i e  Am  Le  a g ed, [ ]he 
female club-lounger, the flâneuse of St James Street, latch-key in pocket and eye-glasses 
on he no e, emain  a c ea e of he imagina ion  (cited in Elkin 11), largely due to the 
fact that women were not allowed the freedom and independence to access public space 
in the same way as men (Wolff 34-5). Levy s statement is somewhat ironic because the 
flâneuse, al ho gh pe hap  in i ible  (Wolff 1985/1990; Gleber 1999), did exist. The 
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rise of the shopping malls allowed the women to experience the art of flânerie in public 
space (Wilson 101), while George Sand (born Amantine Lucile Aurore Dupin), who 
dressed as a man in order to experience the freedom of modern urban space, the 
quintessential space of modernity, offers a more radical example of the flâneuse. Deborah 
Parsons (2000) claims that women were able to bring something different to the act of 
flânerie: 
A female observer corresponding to the social figure of the 
 flâneur can be found in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
when women were achieving greater liberation as walkers and observers 
in he p blic pace  of he ci Whe ea  Benjamin s flâneur increasingly 
becomes a metaphor for observation, retreating from the city streets 
once the arcades are destroyed to a place of scopic authority yet static 
detachment, women were entering the city with fresh eyes, observing it 
from within. It is with this social influx of women as empirical observers 
into the city street that aesthetic, urban perception as a specifically 
masculine phenomenon and privilege is challenged. (6) 
 
While traditionally modern strangers or boredom with weight  has been a dominated by 
the male perspective, authors such as Virginia Woolf, or filmmakers such as Agnès 
Varda and Chantal Akerman, continued to challenge and push the boundaries of 
patriarchal society by focusing on the women strangers of modernity. 
Antonioni s bored female characters carry with them the soulful and 
individualistic ennui that was wrongly only associated with men, and while a feminist 
critique of boredom exists in these films, Antonioni does not divide boredom into male or 
female but instead uses these women characters to represent the bored individual, the 
everyman  so to speak, of secularized modernity. Regardless of whether Antonioni s 
films were intentionally feminist or not60, the heroines played by Monica Vitti helped 
 
60 A  Pe e  B ne e a g e , An onioni gen inel  eem  o ha e mi ed feeling  o a d  
men as men, toward the male way of being in the world. (Or do we read the films this 
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change the dynamics of how women can be portrayed in films by both shedding light on 
a growing, unspoken problem for women but likewise how that problems connects to 
everyone. This brings us to the question of can it be revolutionary or heroic to be bored 
o  nhapp ?  P edominan l , bo edom i  de c ibed a  a nega i e mood o  e pe ience, 
usually referring to a lack of something: spiritual sacredness, meaning, or simply 
entertainment/enjoyment. All forms of boredom contain their own nuisances; however, 
all seem to be defined as a mood or disposition that was measured as negative. From the 
sinful, evil, or as a slothful device of the devil that characterized acedia, to the 
contemporary nihilism that is attached to modern equivalent, boredom seems to lack any 
positive elements. The fact that boredom or not being in the mood  is so closely tied to 
evil or nihilistic predispositions compels us to render it as a negative and unfortunate, 
though necessary side effect  of modern secular life, similar to the way Durkheim 
(1897/1975) align  icide i h he f ee in i  of P o e an i m. Nonetheless, 
boredom can still be seen as a catalyst for change, creativity, and progress. A 
p chological d  in 2011 ho ed ha  [p]eople ho feel bo ed e pe ience ha  hei  
current situation is meaningless and are motivated to reestablish a sense of 
meaningf lne  ( an Tilb g & Igo  1790), and he efo e a emp  o e cape f om. 
Ironically, escapism lies in the similar liminal realm as boredom, and likewise, shares a 
negative and passive undertone to it, as it is often seen as an immature stance of being 
unable to cope with reality. If boredom is an over-dwelling on reality, and escape a 
rejection, a combination of the two can be seen as a movement in liminal space that is 
 
way because feminism has altered our interpretive frame? Certainly our reading of 
L avventura  gende  d namic  o ld ha e been diffe en  in 1960) . Ho e e , B ne e 
goe  on o a  ha  e en [ ]hen men become he cen al cha ac e he critique 
become  b le  and mo e conflic ed, b  i  doe  no  di appea  (34).  
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able to create a realm of possibility, both permanent and temporary. In his study of 
escapism, Ty-Fu Tuan (1998) a e  ha  e capi m allo   o do ome hing 
e ao dina , namel  ee  ha  i  no  he e. Seeing ha  i  no  he e lie  a  he 
foundation of all h man c l e  (6). As with liminality, both boredom and escapism can 
therefore be positive elements in one s life, though can become problematic if either is 
prolonged or perpetual, resulting in unhappiness. 
De pi e ha ing e e a ion  of p od cing a heroic model of the unhappy 
e ol iona  (Happiness 169), Ahmed does see a politicized notion of unhappiness and 
the stranger, which seem to be intrinsically related: 
The history of the word unhappy might teach us about the unhappiness of the 
hi o  of happine . In i  ea lie  e , nhapp  mean  ca ing mi fo ne o  
o ble.  Onl  la e , did i  come o mean mi e able in lo  o  ci c m ance  o  
e ched in mind.  The o d e ched al o ha  a suggestive genealogy, coming 
from wretch, referring to a stranger, exile, or banished person. The wretch is not 
only the one driven out of his or her native country but is also defined as one who 
i  nk in deep di e , o o , mi fo ne, o  po e ,  a mi e able, nhapp , 
o  nfo na e pe on,  a poo  o  haple  being,  and e en a ile, o , o  
de picable pe on.  Can e e i e he hi o  of happine  f om he poin  of 
view of the wretch? If we listen to those who are cast as wretched, perhaps their 
wretchedness would no longer belong to them. The sorrow of the stranger might 
give us a different angle on happiness not because it teaches us what it is like or 
must be like to be a stranger, but because it might estrange us from the very 
happiness of the familiar. (ibid. 17) 
 
The sorrow of the stranger , living in a liminal or sacred void allows us an alternative 
view or shadow of modernity even while modernity itself was establishing. The same 
spectre that has haunted secularized modernity, that haunts the ending of Frankenstein 
through ambiguity, has remained, although mutated, altered, or adapted to the uncertainty 
and liminalness that is modernity. Ahmed gets closer to the idea of boredom and even 
inaction when discussing moods, specifically the concept of non-attunement in her essay 
No  In he Mood  (2014). In he face of a fic ional p blic mood of happine  and 
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na ionhood, Ahmed claim  [n]o  o be made happ  i  o ef e he p omi e of hi  
con e ion  and o i hd a  f om he i a ion  o  no  being in he mood fo  happine  
become  a poli ical ac ion  (28). Once again, Ahmed brings in the concept of the stranger, 
the person who is out of place or alienated from their surrounding environment, however 
one that has shifted with the consequences of modernity, becoming radicalized.  
Ahmed may have concentrated her analysis of the stranger to simply indicate migrants, 
ee , and omen, ha  he ega d  a  affec  alien , a defini ion ha  goe  be ond he 
modern stranger. However, Ahmed s work channels the same essence of the monstrous, 
uncanny, and liminality that has defined the concept of the modern stranger throughout 
secularized modernity.  
There is a correlation between Ahmed s relationship between non-attunement, the 
stranger, and political action, and Adorno s arguments of boredom and political 
indifference. Although I am not entirely convinced of Adorno s argument that 
[ ]hene e  beha io  in pa e ime i  l  a onomo , de e mined b  f ee people fo  
themselves, boredom rarely fig e , since it is arguable if truly autonomous time is even 
achievable, and that no matter how free people are, repetition is unavoidable, as is the 
boredom that will ultimately be a part of it, I do agree that boredom and political apathy 
can be closely related (192). On the other hand, in Happiness Ahmed warns us against 
viewing unhappiness as a heroic stance because it can lead to indifference (169), but 
neither inaction nor boredom necessarily means doing nothing , just as not selecting a 
side does not automatically result in indifference. The liminal space between an attitude 
of you are with us or against us  can be considered a political action in itself. The 
inaction of not standing for a national anthem by black American athletes, for example, 
 192 
becomes a political action that while stems from violence and treatment of black 
Americans, eventually works as a protest by exposing the singing of the national anthem 
before sporting events as a boring symbol of a the recurrent, illusionary, and repetitive 
mythos of a happy and united nation. The ironic statement is not necessarily against the 
idea of a united and happy nation but what the currently belief of a united and happy 
nation is. People may argue that nothing is held sacred anymore and tradition no longer 
matters but protests such as these are not against the secularized sacredness of nationhood, 
but a protest against a failing illusion of sacredness; in a way, sacredness can only be 
challenged by sacredness itself.  
Boredom is an essential and ineradicable aspect of modern life, especially since 
contemporary ways of evading it, through tools such as the internet and social media, 
have paradoxically also allowed for its perpetualization. It therefore depends on how we 
navigate and channel the liminal mood of boredom, both internally and externally, while 
likewise being cautious circumnavigating through the fascinating new digital 
technologies, which are liminal in themselves.  
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VI: THE SACREDNESS OF DIGITAL LIMINALITY 
 
 
And he e doe  he ne bo n go f om he e? The ne  i  a  and infini e  (Major Motoko Kusanagi) 
  - Ghost in the Shell (1995)  
 
Men seldom moved their bodies; all unrest was concentrated in the soul  
  - The Machine S op , E.M. Fo e  
 
If God made anything better, he kept it for himself.  (Peter Riviera) 
  - Neuromancer, William Gibson 
 
There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other 
and couples the machines together. Producing-machines, desiring-machines everywhere, schizophrenic 
machines, all of species life: the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning 
whatsoever. 
- Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze & Guattari, 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Werner Herzog s documentary Lo and Behold, Reveries of the Connected World 
(2016) begins with computer scientist and internet pioneer Leonard Kleinrock taking us 
h o gh ha  He og a e  a  g o nd e o of one of he bigge  e ol ion  e a  
h man  a e e pe iencing he bi hplace of he in e ne  (0:00.56  0:01:05). Opening 
he doo  o he mall comp e  lab, Klein ock look  in o he came a and claim , [ ]e a e 
no  en e ing a ac ed loca ion i  a hol  place  (ibid. 0:01:34  0:01:38). This sacred 
space, preserved, or rather re-assembled to its 1969 aesthetic, is a secular shrine 
venerating the advent of the sacred and liminal space of our contemporary world - the 
threshold between reality and virtuality; between the physical and the digital worlds that 
is the Internet. Many scholars and academics have labeled, both positively and negatively, 
the internet or virtual space as liminal (Madge and O Conner 2005; Yang 2006; 
Pimenova 2009; Holt 2011), in that it dissolves various boarders but also signifies the 
main source of a shift of uncertainty in how we define the human. Cyberspace uncannily 
blurs the lines of what is alien and what is familiar in an entirely new way, especially in 
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regard to the human consciousness. While the cyborg is the technological transformation 
of meat  to metal or the breakdown of such binaries, cyberspace dissolves this material 
relationship altogether, establishing something more abstract and immaterial. 
In a similar sense, the Internet has even replaced God as our source of a spiritual 
mechanism. The self-p oclaimed echnopagan Ma k Pe ce belie e  ha  comp e  can 
be as sacred as we are, because they can embody our communication with each other and 
with the entities  the divine parts of ourselves  ha  e in oke in ha  pace  (cited in 
Davis 176). William Indick similarly claims in The Digital God: How Technology Will 
Reshape Spirituality (2015), 
[t]he internet has already been compared to God. Like the monotheistic God, it is 
abstract and distant; yet, simultaneously, it can be personalized and contextualized 
into the present. In its own way, the internet shares with God the same divine 
qualities of omniscience, omnipresence, and possibly even omnipotence. It is 
quite possible that the internet will give rise to a new form of spiritual perception 
 a Digi al God. (206) 
 
This new Digital God  is paradoxical because unlike spiritual insight, which is internal, 
he ne  ac ed pace i  an e e nal en a ion a place he e e e one i  pe pe all  
online.  Fo  man  people, being connec ed o he In e ne  a  e e  momen  ha  become 
a p chological nece i , an e i en ial lifeline  (ibid.). Seeing God i hin he In e ne  i  
part of the ongoing process of secularization/resacralization that largely epitomizes 
modernity. In The In e ne  a  a Me apho  fo  God?  (2000), Cha le  Hende on a e  
ha  [i]f he In e ne  i  coming o be een a  a me apho  fo  God, i  i  no  beca e he 
new metaphor dropped magically from heaven, but by the same process through which 
most religious symbols have been born: naturally out of the everyday experience of real 
people  (80). Oliver Krueger (2004) uses Thomas Luckmann s individual and modernity 
induced theme of in i ible eligion  o a g e ha  he In e ne  can ac  a  a p o ide  b  
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al o a mi o  of eligion, a  he In e ne  e eal  no  onl  he de elopmen  of 
institutionalized religions like Christianity but also, in an extensive way, of the individual 
constellations of Thomas Luckmann s invisible religion or the so-called individual 
pa ch o k- eligion  in E ope, No h and So h Ame ica, and Japan  (184). The 
Internet is not an entity of mythical perfection and flawlessness as God has been 
perceived by traditional monotheistic religions but instead can be seen as an even more 
liminal representation of Frankenstein s Creature, a reflection that conceptualizes the 
fractured modern human existence. Cyberspace, therefore, seems to further challenge the 
idea of the unitary self by dissolving the binary of both self and other, alongside the self 
and self, in that unlike the cyborg that is still confined to the idea of the corporeal, 
cyberspace predominately removes or at least manipulates the use of the physical body. 
Yet, although we seem to have a complex situation where individual and community are 
intertwined online, we have also seen an intensification of surveillance and loss of 
privacy as a consequence.  
The Internet has further infringed on our private space, more than any metropolis 
could ever imagine. Whereas one lost one s privacy in a city simply during social 
interactions, the Internet haunts us like a spectre by recording and remembering 
everything about us, making social and public life a continuous experimentation and 
spectacle that never ends, all this despite the internet s paradoxical anonymity, thus 
making it just as secretive and mysterious as it is revealing. As a result, the Internet Age 
seems to have placed us deeper in a realm of permanent liminality. Arpad Szakolczai 
designates this liminal condi ion hen an  of he pha e  in hi  e ence become  
frozen, as if a film stopped at a particular frame. This can happen both with individuals 
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undergoing an initiation rite  and with groups who are participating in a collective ritual, 
a social drama  (212). S akolc ai e  he e ample of monk  li ing in mona e ie  ho 
con in o l  pe fo m i e  fo  a pe fo mance hich ill onl  be gi en in he ne  o ld  
(ibid.). The most unlikely of the differen  fo m  of pe manen  liminali  i  hen [ ]he 
age of p epa a ion can be pla ed endle l  hile he pe fo mance i  po poned fo e e . 
Szakolczai points out that the opposite is also true in that [o]ne can al o imagine 
situations in which it is the performance that is being staged endlessly, and all the actors 
become pinned do n o  iden ified b  hei  ole  (214). Szakolczai seems to find this 
a e le  belie able  e en ho gh he ackno ledge  ha  in Ulysses (1922), James Joyce 
uses the individual who i  o n o  b  he d  of pe manen  pe fo mance  a  
a che pe fo  he mode n condi ion  (ibid). Joyce s representation seems more in line 
with the modern stranger of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, since his two 
main characters in the novel were outsiders to the rest of their social environment rather 
than part of the norm; however, the notion of a permanent performance being staged 
endlessly as an archetype seems to be more indicative of the current Internet Age.  
This chapter focuses on the literary interpretations of cyberspace, the symbolic 
space of the Internet, from incarnations of cyberpunk, beginning with Gibson s Sprawl 
trilogy and the Ghost in the Shell series to more current and realistic  depictions of 
social media and online life in literature such as The Circle (2013) by Dave Eggers. What 
we notice is that there is, at least initially, a continuation of similar themes of 
secularization/resacralization. However, there seems to be more of a negative shift in how 
we ultimately view the Internet, the more entrenched it becomes in our reality. Both the 
concept of the Internet as a resacralized source of the divine and that of the modern 
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stranger were resurrected and intertwined in the early nineteen eighties through the 
fascinating literary and film movement of cyberpunk. Ridley Scott s Blade Runner 
(1982/2007), Neuromancer (1984), and Ghost in the Shell (1995/1998) are three of the 
most widely known cyberpunk works and can be seen a sort of holy trinity  of the 
science fiction subgenre. What these three major works have in common is that they are 
all influenced by noir crime fiction, they describe worlds in which the divisions between 
West and East in one way or another are beginning to break down, they deal with the 
uncanny relationship between humans and technology and self, and finally, they all in 
some way deal with the concept of the modern stranger. However, since the main topic 
on the chapter is the Internet and cyberspace, I will concentrate on William Gibson s 
Sprawl  trilogy (Neuromancer, Count Zero (1986), and Mona Lisa Overdrive (1988)) 
and the Ghost in the Shell series.  
The dystopian settings of these two future universes take place in similar, post-
WW-III, balkanized worlds, where the United States has fractured into various sections 
or urban city-states and where Japan has become the strongest and most stable economic 
nation in the world. More importantly, they are worlds in which these nation states are 
continuously subjugated by corporations and more importantly, pervasive technology, 
where both cybernetic implants and artificial intelligence culminate in the creation of 
cyberspace. With all the similarities these stories share, they ironically differ from one 
another by focusing on contrasting perspectives of a similar world. While Ghost in the 
Shell follows a group of individuals that try to uphold the Law, the Sprawl novels 
concentrate on the Underworld of crime and the personalities that navigate within it. The 
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Sprawl novels 61 emphasis is on one of the fracture sections of the Unites States known 
as the Boston-Atlanta Metropolitan Axis, a sprawling  mega-city that encompasses most 
of the eastern American Seaboard. The Sprawl s influence on the novel is overshadowing. 
While only Count Zero s setting is located there, as Tom Henthorne (2011) argues, it 
e e  a  an emblem  fo  Gib on s concept of the universal cityscape and his fictional 
o ld a  a hole, ince he en i e o ld eem  o be de eloping a p a ling 
monoculture that incorporates into itself elemen  f om mo  of he ind iali ed o ld  
(114). Several critics (McHale 1992; G. Miller, Jr. 2016; Rapatzikou 2004) reference 
Foucault s heterotopia62 when describing both cyberpunk and the Sprawl, rightly 
directing us away from seeing Gibson s world as simply dystopian, including Wendy Hui 
Kyong Chun (2006), who makes convincing claims of seeing it as a heterotopia since it 
im l aneo l  ep e en , con e , and in e  p blic pace  and place  (52). This is 
also emblematic of the main characters that Gibson centres his stories on, as its criminals, 
mercenaries, hackers, and drug addicts have almost a physical and even a transcendent 
connection to the Sprawl s fragmentation either through cyberspace or the sub-cultures 
found within the city s streets. The Sprawl becomes an overarching symbol of the 
fragmented self of the modern stranger, and not just of the world that constantly 
surrounds them.  
 
61 This chapter will focus on the three novels, although the Sprawl universe was 
in od ced a  ea l  a  1981 in ome of Gib on  ho  o ie  ha  e e la e  complied in 
the collection Burning Chrome (1986). 
62 Foucault (1970/2005) argued that unlike utopias  cha ac e i a ion of being a pace ha  
i  an o de ed and a cohe en  hole, he e o opia i  a a e o gani ed in i e  o e  
different from one another that it is impossible to find a place of residence for them, to 
define a 
common locus beneath them all . The e a e di bing and di ie ing e al pace  
beca e he  ec e l  nde mine lang age  di ol e o  m h  and e ili e he 
lyricism of our sentences (xix) 
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The setting of Ghost in the Shell, on the other hand, predominately centres on the 
economically and nationally sound country of Japan, mostly through the perspective of 
the members of Section 9, an anti-terrorist and intelligence department that is led by the 
series  main protagonist, the cyborg Major Motoko Kusanagi. Section 9 was established 
in order to stop the criminal cyber-hackers that Gibson s novels tend to romanticize. 
However, their independence from government supervision likewise removes them from 
the nation state and establishes them within their own liminalness. Although it can be 
argued that the two stories examine two different sides of the same cyberpunk coin, it is 
through the use of the Internet that the two worlds traverse one another, as cyberspace 
acts as a liminal space where one is able to gain control that one normally would not have 
held but is also a space where that freedom can be regulated and controlled, allowing for 
both perspectives to intersect with one another, thereby continuously blurring the lines 
between restriction and liberation. 
   Mike Featherstone and Rogers Burrows (1996) define c be pace a  an 
information space in which data is configured in such a way as to give the operator the 
illusion of control, movement and access to information, in which he/she can be linked 
together with a large number of users via a puppet-like simulation which operates in a 
feedback loop o he ope a o  (2). In ega d o c be p nk, Fea he one and B o  
emphasize the relationship between human and technology:  
The term cyberpunk refers to the body of fiction built around the work of William 
Gibson and other writers, who have constructed visions of the future worlds of 
cyberspaces, with all their vast range of technological developments and power 
struggles. It sketches out the dark side of the technological-fix visions of the 
future, with a wide range of post-human forms which have both theoretical and 
practical implications; theoretically, in influencing those who are trying to 
reconstruct the social theory of the present and near future, and practically, in 
terms of those (largely young people) who are keen to devise experimental 
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lifestyles and subcultures which aim to live out and bring about selected aspects 
of the cyberspace/cyberpunk constellation. (3) 
 
Thi  ill ion of con ol  eem  o become e en mo e common and ignifican  heme in 
contemporary literature regarding cyberspace than it does with the early depictions in 
c be p nk. Al ho gh c be p nk doe  concen a e on he da k ide of the technological-
fi , i  i  a  m ch abo  i  opian and e ac ali ed a pec  a  i  i  of i  echnophobic 
ones. According to William Covino (1998), cyberpunk exercises an uncanny association 
of he ac ed and p ofane a  i  con ain  an imp l e ha  locates magico-religious 
beha io  in he ec la  ealm  e en ho gh i  al o ep e en  he implici l  ac ilegio  
a i de of he ocioc l al ebel  (41), ho gh, a  I ha e a g ed, he e o a e no  a  
mutually exclusive as once thought. Silvio Gaggi arg e  in The C bo g and he Ne  
(2003) that 
[n]ovels like Neuromancer and films like Ghost in the Shell contain examples of 
such entities [having a will of their own different from their creators]  
Wintermute and Neuromancer in Neuromancer, he P ppe  Ma e  in Ghost in 
the Shell. Such entities present themselves as hostile forces, though in the end, as 
is the case in these instances, they may reveal themselves to be quasi-religious 
higher beings, the next stage in an evolutionary process towards a higher form of 
con cio ne .  (135)  
 
Similarly, Frank McConnell (2009) connects religious spiritualism with Gibson by 
arguing that the novel Neuromancer i  a gno ic ke ing of he Divine Comedy  (149), 
thereby continuing secularizing/resacralizing the tradition of the modern stranger that was 
laid out by Baudelaire and Leopardi in the early nineteenth century. This liminal 
perspicacity of secular/sacred process with regards to technological media, interestingly 
enough, was carried out by nineteenth century Evangelical Christians in Antebellum 
America. In John Lardas Modern s absorbing work Secularism in Antebellum America 
(2011), he examines the resacralization process behind the evangelical passion of media 
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technology and comm nica ion ne o k : [ ]he diffe ence ha  ne  media echnologie  
and semiotic strategies made in recasting the production, distribution, and reception of 
e angelical o d  a  b an ial in making ec la i m a me aph ical ol en (9). A  
Modern desc ibe , he ec la i ing eligio  mo emen  belie ed in a em  of 
e angelical media ha  a  c cial in ega d  ie ing eligion a  a pe onal conce n  
(65). By incorporating scared Biblical text with not just ordinary life, but secular reason 
and technological progress of mass media, the evangelical Christians of Antebellum 
Ame ica a  hi  pa ado ical mi ing of ac ed and ec la  a  e eligion , hich 
e ol ed a o nd ol n a  a en ion and ema ici  (11). Sac ali , he efo e, a  
merged with a semiotic belief of technological progress, social connectivity, and media 
circulation. Evangelical secularism, as with cyberpunk depictions of cyberspace, saw the 
an i o  po e  of echnological media a  an [e]nd o bondage  and he beginning of 
individual freedom and belief (112). 
The central difference between cyberpunk and previous works regarding 
resacralization and the modern stranger, therefore, is not necessarily a breaking away 
from Judeo-Christian teachings, since cyberpunk is laden with its symbolism, but due to 
cyberpunk establishing itself within a world of post-globalization. Cyberpunk 
amalgamates Christian mythos with other religious and sacred imageries. This is why the 
Internet plays such a powerful and important role in cyberpunk, as Ronald Cole-Turner 
i e  in Science, Technolog , and he Mi ion of Theolog  (2001): fo  man , he 
In e ne  i  no  me el  he ke  mbol of globali a ion; i  i  i  d i ing fo ce e m  
recognize that the Internet links but does not homogenize or reduce cultures to a common 
global c l e i  b ing  he di e i  of he o ld o con cio ne  (147). E peciall  
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when it still encompasses an element of science fiction, cyberspace was a hybrid utopia 
of interconnecting knowledge and values, having the uncanny ability to blur borders and 
binaries and still being the perfect representation of both society and the individual in a 
liminal modern age. This immaterial, even spiritual value of globalization is 
differentiated from the more dystopian, physical or material aspects of globalization 
found within the technological cities and the dehumanizing multinational corporations 
that control these cyberpunk worlds.  
Cyberpunk depictions of technology and cyberspace are as much about autonomy 
as they are about control and addiction. As Chun points out, cyberpunk is more than 
fiction dealing with the technological fetishism of society. Equally, it is about self and 
o he , a  i  global i ion em  f om i  confla ion of acial o he ne  i h localne  
(29). Chun states that the cyberpunk classics like Neuromancer and the Ghost in the Shell 
film embod  a en e of high- ech o ien ali m , hich enable  a fo m of pa ing
invariably portrayed as the denial of a body rather than the donning of another that 
relies on the o he  a  di embodied ep e en a ion  (177-8), leading to a process of self-
alienation but also a source of sexual fetishizing. Both novels, according to Chun, 
orientalize the other, Japan in Neuromancer and Hong Kong in the case of Ghost in the 
Shell, which thereby configures the Internet as a space of escape from these locations. As 
Ch n a g e , c be pace allo  fo  pi ac  and a onom  and allo  he hacke  o 
a me he p i ilege of he impe ial bjec  (187-8). Chun s assessment, which does 
well in arguing for cyberspace as a space of control over the colonized other, however, 
overreaches with its Orientalizing claims, especially in regard to Ghost in the Shell. Since 
director Mamoru Oshii chose Hong Kong as the main inspiration for his unnamed Asian 
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metropolis because he felt it represented an optical representation of information, making 
it a perfect visual companion to the invisible cyberspace, Chun argues that Oshii 
fetishizes Hong Kong as a city of data, seeing it as a disorienting city with no past and 
future. However, Oshii was also heavily influenced by the cities of Europe, particularity 
Eastern Europe, especially for the second film of the series, Ghost in the Shell 2: 
Innocence (2004) and his live-action film Avalon (2001), which takes place in a 
comparable universe (Hanson 161). Therefore, Oshii s films, like other cyberpunk works, 
portray a sense of futuristic universalism and even normalness through their depictions of 
urbanism, while containing the idea of being a tourist or alien within this normalness. 
Although these cyberpunk works address the concept of the other, they ultimately destroy 
these binaries to establish a more post-globali ed and c l all  ambig o  (Do man 
43) philosophy of self/other than critics such as Chun acknowledge. 
 Relatedly, Andrew Ross (1991) famously critiques cyberpunk as a genre that 
fana ici e  he male, hi e middle-cla  concep ion of inne  ci  life  (146) and ha  
c be p nk as a tale about the respective psychogeographies of country (suburb) and 
ci  (147). According to Ross, cyberpunk  main claim o po mode ni  la  in i  
treatment of the less geographically distinct realm of space and time that was now 
available through information technologies, the cartographic coordinates of 
echno im la ed pace ha  ha e no fi ed geog aphic efe en  in he ph ical land cape  
(ibid.). Despite this critique, there is a direct link to the global cities that span Gibson s 
and Oshii s work, and their unique visions of the Internet that cannot be ignored, in that 
both seem to tear down boundaries in favour of a universalism. Samuel R. Delany (1994) 
rightly sees Ross  c i i e a  gge ing he ea ing a a  of he al/ ban di ide  a  
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[t]he microtechnology, that in cyberpunk, connects the streets to the multinational 
structures of information in cyberspace also connects the middle-class country to the 
middle-cla  ci  (cited in Dery198). While Chun and Ross s arguments examine the act 
of racial, class, and gender displacement in cyberpunk, the major emphasis of the chapter 
is the act of displacement in regard to resacralization and in relation to the modern 
stranger within cyberspace.  
HYBRID RELIGIONS OF CYBERPUNK 
 
  The Sprawl trilogy and the Ghost in the Shell series are witnesses of cyberpunk s 
liminal world of cyberspace, which, although it removes the physical property of the city, 
nonetheless retains, and in fact, supersedes its uncanny and liminal characteristics of 
fractured and technological space. The genre s assessment of progress takes a similar 
approach to Frankenstein, in that social evolution, most notably technology, is far too 
complex to designate any indication of linear progress. Although technology is ever 
present and domina e  he e f e o ld , he  a e al o con in o l  ha n ed b  i : In 
stories and films like Neuromancer, Ghost in the Shell, and Blade Runner, spectral 
entities unleashed by the modern machine haunt dark cities teeming with nocturnal life. 
The future they evoke is obscure and unknown, totally unlike well-illuminated destinies 
g a an eed b  he p edic able ma ch of p og e  (G een pan 76). Yet in this case, the 
worlds in cyberpunk fiction are liminal in their totality. Traditional boundaries are broken 
down on every level in worlds where humans are machines, technologies are human, and 
co po a ion  appea  o be bo h: Po e   mean  co po a e po e . The aiba , he 
multinationals that shaped the course of human history, had transcended old barriers. 
Vie ed a  o gani m , he  had a ained a kind of immo ali  (Neuromancer 203). This 
 205 
is not to say that cyberpunk s defining theme is centered on a negative perspective of the 
technological progress of humanity, for at times it also argues that it is its uncanny 
salvation. If corporations are liminal and therefore immortal, the humans in cyberpunk 
seem to be fairly influenced by them and also look towards the liminal in order to gain 
immortality. That being said, what is most interesting in regard to the topic of this study 
is that these tales of futuristic underworlds of crime, deceit, and technology alternatively 
consist of themes regarding the sacred and human connection. It is these human qualities 
of resacralization, such as human connection, which tend to be at odds with their 
technocratic world that propel most of the outsiders forward into a cybernetic world, and 
not only a sense of the power and money that control or define their societies.  
 Cyberpunk may seem to be anti-religious, especially in regard to Christianity. 
However, this is a symptom of its anti-authoritarian character rather than any abhorrence 
towards anything of a religious nature. To be certain, Christianity as an organized 
religion is continuously portrayed negatively in Gibson s Sprawl novels whenever 
mentioned. However, its symbolism formidably survives, which seems to be a common 
theme in a lot of cyberpunk, despite Samuel R. Smith s (2003) arguing that cyberpunk 
never portrays Christianity in a positive light (245).63 For instance, Neuromancer both 
revitalizes Christianity s apocalyptic focus (Di Tomasso 482) and its messianic mission, 
while also addressing the Christian dualism of body and mind presented through the AIs 
Win e m e and Ne omance : Win e m e a  hi e mind, decision maker, effecting 
change in the world outside. Neuromancer was personality. Neuromancer was 
immo ali  (269). The division between the two AIs also indicates a semblance to the 
 
63 For example, other cyberpunk films such as Blade Runner and The Matrix series are 
extremely transparent when using positive Christian metaphors and allusions.  
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hybridity of Christ, in that Wintermute elicits a God-like entity especially through its 
omnipresence, though it needs to merge with Neuromancer in order to establish a 
personality and unite with humanity through a resurrection of sorts.64 Gibson warps these 
biblical metaphors in a similar way as Shelley does in Frankenstein. Wintermute 
ironically references the biblical God when he sarcastically asks the novel s main 
p o agoni  Ca e if i  ho ld appea  o him in he ma i  like a b ning b h  
(Neuromancer 169), o  hen i  ell  Ca e I am ha  hich kno e h no  he o d  (ibid. 
173), symbolizing a fractured God. If God s word, through scripture, is complete and 
final, Wintermute acknowledges that without Neuromancer, it is incomplete and really no 
different from humans: a fractured god that is unable to fully understand itself. 
Neuromancer, on the other hand, through individuality, is likened to Milton s Satan. 
When Wintermute is able to finally integrate with Neuromancer at the end of the novel, 
despite the latter s unwillingness, it claims a sense of unity, of completeness through 
o he ne : I m he ma i , Ca e.  Ca e la ghed. Whe e  ha  ge  o ?  No he e. 
Everywhere. I m he m o al of he o k , he hole ho .  (ibid. 269). When Ca e 
asks, somewhat ironically, if this means it is God, the newly amalgamated digital deity 
e pond , Thing  a en  diffe en . Thing  a e hing .  (ibid. 270). Ca e e pec  
something to change65; he expects something different even though he is only able to 
appreciate Wintermute-Neuromancer in a familiar or traditional Western religious 
understanding. However, the Wintermute-Neuromancer entity understands that nothing 
 
64 I die oon, in one en e. A  doe  Win e m e  (Neuromancer 259) 
65 I go  no idea a  all ha ll happen if Win e m e in , b  i ll change ome hing!  
(Neuromancer 260). 
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has changed and it is simply continuing a secularizing-resacralizing process that motors 
throughout secularized modernity.  
Even in a Japanese anime like The Ghost in the Shell, Christian references are 
extremely prominent and are an important aspect of both films  philosophy, as director 
Mamoru Oshii was greatly influenced by the religion and often includes many references 
in his films (Ruh 43). This is most evident with the many biblical passages that the 
characters quote throughout both films. The most important occurs when the first film s 
complex villain, The Puppet Master, quotes Paul in 1 Corinthians 13:1266 to the series 
main protagonist Major Motoko Kusanagi, insinuating that, although powerful, both 
Major and The Puppet Master are incomplete, what they know is partial. However, like a 
possible Wintermute-Neuromancer merging, once they unite, they will be whole and all-
knowing. At the end of the film, the Major-Puppet Master creation references the 
Corinthians  passage that precedes it67 to Major s partner BatÙ, completing both the 
biblical quote but more importantly, acknowledging that the fusion of the two into 
cyberspace transcended them to a higher spiritual level of consciousness. In Innocence, 
BatÙ  g a dian angel  (1:09:45) no longe  need  a hell o ho  he  gho , imila l  o 
Jesus, who no longer needed his human body after rising from the dead. 
  However, Christianity s vital, yet understated role in cyberpunk only tells us half 
the story. When examining the divine/human hybridity of Christology in cyberpunk, it is 
 
66 Fo  no  e ee h o gh a gla , da kl  (Ghost in the Shell 0:32:39  0:32:40). 
67 The natural childhood and manhood of this life are analogous to the spiritual 
childhood of this life and the spiritual manhood of the life to come.   
When I a  a child, m  speech, feelings, and thinking were all those of a child. Now 




evident that it is more complicated than simple references to Christian thought and 
mythos. For one thing, in Ghost in the Shell and Neuromancer there is a reluctance of one 
of the entities that must merge with the other, essentially because one of the beings is the 
other to the other s self. The fusion of the two in both instances does not seem to be two 
halves of one thing uniting in perfection but is far more symbiotic as two others  uniting 
into hybridity. This is also reflected in the most prominent religion in the Sprawl novels, 
most notably in Count Zero, being Vodou. In comparing Vodou to Christianity and 
Scientology, the matrix cowboy Beauvoir likens it to the streets because it re-focuses life 
back towards the physical and material world instead of otherworldly phenomena. The 
sacred must live within the Earth and community: 
Vodou isn  like ha ,  Bea oi  aid. I  i n t concerned with notions of 
salvation and transcendence. What it s about is getting things done. You follow 
me? In our system, there are many gods, spirits. Part of one big family, with all 
the virtues, all the vices. There s a ritual tradition of communal manifestation, 
understand? Vodou says, there s God, sure, Gran Met, but He s big, too big and 
too far away to worry Himself if your ass is poor, or you can t get laid. Come on, 
man, you know how this works, it s street religion, came out of a dirt-poor place a 
million years ago. Vodou  like he ee .  (76-7). 
 
Gibson s vision of the urban streets is similar to Baudelaire s poetry and Lang s M, 
depicting it as a complex fragmented space, consisting of different individual lanes that 
intersect with one another, a pa ch o k  (Neuromancer 48, 103, 176) that determines its 
own liminal understanding. Beauvoir is effectively linking religion and the sacred to the 
streets in a similar perspective as Michel de Certeau  (1980) ie  of he ci . 
Referencing Certeau, Scott Bukatman (1993) a g e  ha  [c] be p nk na a i e  
construct trickster tactics within the machineries  of c be ne ic c l e  (212). 
One viewpoint is created by the strategists consisting of institutional bodies who 
have a synoptic view of the city as a unified whole. The city dweller, on the other hand, is 
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far more tactical and is never completely controlled by the strategies of these 
organizations. On a literal level, the Vodou disciples and the corporations create this 
division in the actual physical city. However, this conflict is also noticeable in how they 
deal with the sacred and God. For Beauvoir, trying to find God or transcending into one 
is impossible or at the very least, a futile endeavor. To them, the matrix or God  
ep e en  he o ld  (Count Zero 114). As we find out in Count Zero, the Wintermute-
Neuromancer AI that united in Neuromancer has fragmented into many different Vodou 
deities and a  no  he hole ho  a  i  a ed i  a ; hei  nifica ion impl  led o 
even further distortion and fragmentation. But Gibson s use of multiplicity is what 
separates his work from the binary structures that de Certeau engages in, as the lines 
between tactics and strategists in regard to the scared use of space are not clearly defined. 
It is the notion of hybridity that made Vodou have a lasting impression on Gibson and 
why it is such a powerful and essential theme of his Sprawl novels. After reading an 
article on Haiti s Vodou s beliefs, Gibson was greatly affected when learning that it was 
a hybrid faith made up of West African ancestral religions and Roman Catholicism, in 
which theologies intersect and saints and ancestral gods unite, resulting in a third religion, 
a eligion of in e na ional di e i  o  pi i al collage  (Ol en 305). Vodou becomes 
the trilogy  mo  impo an  eligio  mbol, no  onl  beca e i  i  an o la  eligion, 
c ea ed b  ho e hom he domina ed ocie  ma ginali ed  (ibid.), a perfect 
representation for the cyber cowboys that dominate his stories, but moreover, because 
supposedly, it is a liminal religion that transcends boundaries and borders, especially in a 
fictional world where nations, and therefore traditions, do not seem to exist anymore, 
surpassed by the matrix, which goes beyond any illusionary borders that are remaining.  
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Ghost in the Shell similarly extracts the idea that a fragmented world is defined by 
its greatest technological accomplishment, that is, the Internet. In this futuristic world, 
society has become heavily balkanized. Even what has been the United States is no 
longer united but fractured into various sections. On the other hand, Japan s borders 
remain intact: an island unified, yet seemingly isolated from the rest of the world. Still, in 
a world dominated by cyberspace, Japan s notion of strongly defined borders is also 
highly illusionary. Within the future society of Ghost in the Shell, ecogni able Japane e 
urban characteristics are difficult to distinguish among the intricate sprawl of multiple 
lang age  of e hnici ie  (Do man 43). Thi  e of m l ic l ali m goe  be ond he 
notion of immigration and merging cultures that is common inside a global city space. 
The merging in cyberspace of Major Kusanagi, a Japanese cyborg, and The Puppet 
Master, an American sentient computer, bypasses any designated national or cultural 
boundaries. No matter how much Japan deems itself to be secluded, the Puppet Master s 
infiltration of Japanese cyberspace, and subsequently the Major, liquefies the once 
considered strong boundaries of the nation-state that Japan believes are still intact. In fact, 
even the idea that the Puppet Master is American and the Major is Japanese is equally 
dissolved. Likewise, in the second film, BatÙ becomes almost a quoting apparatus, 
frequently referencing various religious and cultural traditions, from the Bible to 
Buddhism, from Weber and Descartes to Saito Ryokuu, indicating that knowledge and 
culture have become universal, intersecting, and globalized, predominantly due to the 
Internet Age. More so than during the advent of modernity, everyday life continuously 
becomes more liminal and culturally ambiguous, as both the cyborg and cyberspace go 
beyond notions of race, culture, and knowledge. 
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GOD IS (IN) CYBERSPACE  
  
  Despite the fact that Gibson s novels portray a world where Nature is dead, 
lea ing a bleak f e he e h man  can be cloned, c ogenicall  f o en, o  gicall  
manip la ed o e emble comp e  (S ile  186), technology actually plays a far more 
multifaceted role in cyberpunk, offering just as many possibilities of freedom and notions 
of the sacred as it does of corporate control or secularization. Gibson s novels are not 
simply cautionary tales about a possible future where the escaping of reality has taken 
over most people s lives but rather explore how one will navigate and find meaning in 
such a world. This is done by continuously alluding to cyberspace as a religious space of 
salvation and transcendence of the spirit, removed from the human body (what the 
hackers consider meat ).68 In On Belief (Thinking In Action) (2001), i ek a e  ha  in 
c be pace, e e n o he bodil  immediac , b  o an ncann , i al immediac  an 
thereby linking it to a pe of pi i ali ed ma e iali m  fo nd in Gno ici m (54). The 
mo emen  o a d  a highe  BODILY eali , a p o o-reality of shadowy ghosts and 
ndead en i ie , l ima el  lea e   o dige  he idea ha  h o gh he emo al of a 
corporal body, we must realize that such a body must have never existed in the first place 
and ha  o  bodil  elf-experience was always already that of an imaginary constituted 
en i  (ibid. 55). Ho e e , he cha ac e  in he Sp a l no el  a e endle l  o cilla ing 
between both bodily entities. The physical body that is a cage of the self, and the cyber-
 
68 The concep  of mea a e  o  e a e  a e ed in c be p nk li e a e o define 
both an organic computer system, such as the human brain, and humans in general. 
Gib on e  he e m mea  in he Neuromancer, as the term wetware was not used in 
cyberpunk literature until Michael Swanwick s Vacuum Flowers (1987/2016), and not 
popularized until Rudy R cke  no el Wetware (1988) (Rucker 2016).  
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body that lacks any corporeal restraints of the self, are constantly being exchanged 
whenever the hacker jacks in and out of the Matrix.  
  For the cyber hacker Case, the restriction from cyberspace and the subsequent 
imprisonment to one s body is likened to Adam and Eve s banishment from the Garden 
of Eden, where in both cases they are punished for breaking the one rule: the theft of 
knowledge. 
He s made the classic mistake, the one he s sworn he d never make. He stole from 
hi  emplo e S apped o a bed in a Memphi  ho el, hi  alen  b ning o  
micron by micron, he hallucinated for thirty hours. The damage was minute, 
subtle, and utterly effective. For Case, who d lived for the bodiless exultation of 
cyberspace, it was the Fall. In the bars he d frequented as a cowboy hotshot, the 
elite stance involved a certain relaxed contempt for the flesh. The body was meat. 
Case fell into the prison of his own flesh. (Neuromancer 6) 
 
In a world where knowledge is power, the multifaceted character Case equally represents 
Adam and Eve, but also Prometheus, or in modern terms, both Frankenstein and his 
Creature. Even more so than cybernetic implants, which are still just a technological 
extension of the physical body, cyberspace is an infinite realm of possibility, described as 
a colo le  oid  (ibid. 5) o  endle  beach  (ibid. 258), and i  ac  a  a palpable and 
recognizable afterlife that allows hackers like Case to transcend from meat  to immortal 
beings like the AIs that live within it. Case, seeing a vision of his dead girlfriend Linda 
Lee when he jacks at the end of the novel, also alludes to cyberspace as a technological 
afterlife. Moreover, the idea of God as either living in or actually being cyberspace, 
which is expressed first in Neuromancer, becomes more blatant in Count Zero: 
Specificall , he Finn aid, he Wig had become con inced ha  God li ed in c be pace, 
or perhaps that cyberspace was God, or some new manifestation of same. The Wig s 
en e  in o heolog  ended o be ma ked b  majo  pa adigm hif , e leap  of fai h  
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(121). This concept is unambiguously mentioned again in Mona Lisa Overdrive but in a 
far more liminal understanding:  
Tha  he ma i  i  God?  In a manne  of peaking, al ho gh i  o ld be mo e 
accurate, in terms of the mythform, to say that the matrix has a God, since this 
being  omni cience and omnipo ence a e a med o be limi ed o he ma i .  
  If i  ha  limi , i  i n t omnipo en .  E ac l . No ice ha  he m hfo m doe n t  
  credit the being with immortality, as would ordinarily be the case in belief  
  systems positing a supreme being, at least in terms of your particular culture.  
  Cyberspace exists, insofar as it can be aid o e i , b  i e of h man agenc   
  (129).  
 
The last of the Sprawl novels suggests that cyberspace is a god, not because it can 
transcend humanity into something that can reach its limits, but because it has the power 
to propel humans to further expand their limits.   
  In Ghost in the Shell there seems to be a divergence between the cyborgian body 
and the ghost  or soul  that they contain within them, which is a human aspect that 
seems to be impossible to clone or replicate and allows them to retain an awareness of 
both individuality and humanity, a penetrating conflict that the series  philosophy bases 
itself on. Nevertheless, the notion of cyberspace seems to be a liminal sphere caught 
between these two binaries, for although it is an extension of the technological aspect of 
the cyborg, the ghost is often associated and found within cyberspace rather than within 
the mechanized body (Endo 233). Major Motoko Kusanagi conceptually dives into 
cyberspace and virtually co-exists within it, making the ghost something far more than a 
spirit being incased in a cyborgian shell. This atypical connection or relationship between 
the ghost and cyberspace, however, does make Major existentially question her own self 
and humanity, as she asks her partner Ba : Wha  if a c be -brain could possibly 
generate its own ghost, create a soul all by itself? And if it did, just what would be the 
impo ance of being h man hen?  (Ghost in the Shell 0:42:53 -0:43:01). Major s ghost is 
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all that is left of her human self, and if a ghost could be generated artificially, as one 
could a human body, where does that leave humanity? A similar question is also raised if 
someone s cyber-brain is hacked, as the Puppet Master does, or the Laughing Man is able 
to do in the Stand Alone Complex series, where essentially they are able to hack one s 
ghost or soul. In Innocence, the cyber-hacker Kim suggests that mind and soul are no 
diffe en  ince bo h a e in e connec ed i h he ma i : H man  a e no hing b  he 
thread from which the dream of life is woven. If dreams, consciousness, even ghosts are 
no mo e han if  and a p  in he nifo m ea e of he ma i  (1:11:00  1:11:11). 
   There is a sense of amalgamating to form a unitary self in both Gibson s novels 
and in Ghost in the Shell, however in different ways. The unification of Wintermute and 
Neuromancer once again leads to further fragmentation, while in the case of Major and 
Puppet Master, the amalgamation is to achieve more of a concept of the unitary self, but 
one that still does not seem to be fixed within a single shell. However, cyberspace does 
have a more optimistic or God-like position in Ghost in the Shell than in the Sprawl 
trilogy. Whereas Gibson ultimately flirts with the idea of transcendence in cyberspace, it 
also seems to be slightly Sisyphean as a form of resacralization in Mona Lisa Overdrive. 
In Oshii s Ghost films, Major is able to transcend herself past the physical body, gaining 
both omnipotence and omniscience; a soul in a computer program69. Although it borrows 
heavily from Western and Christian ideals, the notion of the soul in the series goes 
beyond these traditions in that the spirit is not confined to one shell  but it is able to 
travel or coexist with another in a single vessel (Hasegawa 136), allowing it an even more 
 
69 She s gone. Some he e be ond ha  rift in the nifo m ea e of he ma i .  She s 
definitely alive. Merging somewhere on the vast net, or with the entire domain  
(Innocence 1:13:14  1:13:28). 
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liminal freedom than Gibson s novels. Whereas cyberspace has limits in the Sprawl 
no el , being impl  an e en ion of h man capabili ie , he In e ne  i  a  and 
limi le  (Ghost in the Shell 1:17:35 -1:17:37) for Major. Like God, Major tells BatÙ 
Al a  emembe  Whene e  o  en e  he Ne , I ll be b  o  ide  (Innocence 
1:32:00  1:32:09). Cyberspace can be a spiritual place, like when one prays to a God or 
a liminal space existing between heaven and earth. This is not to say that cyberspace in 
these cyberpunk works does not consist of dangers, as both have to deal with the serious 
threat of cyber hackers, although most of the time these cyber hackers tend to be far more 
multifaceted than traditional villains. As Pesce (1995) states, [a]ny discussion of 
cyberspace is a discussion about believing; if cyberspace is the imagination, then 
cyberspace contains what we believe it contains, nothing more, nothing less. Put another 
way, the only things we take into cyberspace are our preconceptions. These 
p econcep ion  can come in he fo m of p ej dice , a e , o  e en pi i al belief  (287). 
Possibly due to the technology s infancy, cyberspace in cyberpunk tends to take on the 
uncanny role of being a secular place of the sacred; either as a spiritual place to reach 
humanity s limits, or one that can even to outstrip them.  
STRANGERS IN CYBERSPACE 
    The matrix in cyberpunk is a habitation for liminal characters and modern strangers 
alike. The emblematic removal of the physical body in cyberspace, a symbolic 
representation of the instability of the unitary self, allows it to be a perfect place where 
the alienated and powerless modern stranger can become powerful and controlling; a 
liminal space where one can challenge both the boundaries and authority of the 
overshadowing culture. In the spirit of Baudelaire s flâneur or the hard-boiled detective, 
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who, as Benjamin argued, shared a sort of metaphorical relationship,70 the cyberpunk 
criminal hackers  or cowboys  are active observers that describe the uncanny reality of 
their liminal surroundings. Their backdrop is the globalized technological metropolis, 
where the reason, order, and law that run through the futuristic city streets are juxtaposed 
to the uncanny shadow that it casts on its disenfranchised low-lifes , drug addicts, 
criminals, and cyborgs71. As Lance Olsen (1995) describes in relation to Gibson s work, 
it provides a variable utopian space for societal outsiders:  
  d   c b ac ,  a  a a that manifests Gibson s idea of 
 a , a a     d    c  b a d a  b   
and does not exist, opens up in expectation, chance, burning bushes, voodoo 
d a   a  ca  a ,   b , all fences are 
d ,  d ad ca  da c ,   ca  d A a a ca   a  
continually chews away at its own boundaries and hence the reader s, 
problematizing everything from place to gender, identity to its own position in the 
d . Cyberspace is the symbolic territory of termite art. (296)  
Cyberpunk s cyberspace is both a representation of the alienated Western individual of 
modernity and a reflection of the physical world around them, but equally, it offers itself 
as a place where alienation can thrive as a positive element. In the first Ghost in the Shell 
film, Major originally both allocates and contrasts the comforting alienation of being 
underwater. Similar to cyberspace, Major feels an optimistic alienation, where the 
feelings of being fearful, cold, and alone allow for feelings of hope. Within her 
cybe ne ic bod , Majo  ill feel  confined, onl  f ee o e pand i hin bo nda ie  
(Ghost in the Shell 0:32:20  0:32:25), whereas the alienating aspect of cyberspace comes 
from its vast and endless opportunities, something she ultimately chooses. What 
 
70 See Walter Benjamin  On Some Mo if  in Ba delai e  (1939/2007). 
71 Among o he  o ce , Acke  e  Gib on  Neuromancer as a basis in creating the 
characters in Empire of the Senseless, as a disenfranchised cyborg subculture of the future 
(Clune 116; Houen 181) 
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cyberspace offers the modern stranger in cyberpunk fiction is a place where alienation 
and fragmentation are embraced as part of a continuous process of becoming rather than a 
form of alienation that occurs when the unitary self is unachievable. Case, for example, 
rejects the Wintermute-Nuromancer s proposal of living in cyberspace without the 
constraints of the physical body. It seems Case is unwilling to except an either/or binary 
of mea  and c be pace and finall  come  o e m  i h he fac  ha  cyberspace is not 
the end of the human body  (Pesce 285). With a total removal of the physical flesh, 
cyberspace lacks the liminal sphere of alienation, and therefore, the possibility of 
e ac ali ing, fo  he conc e e i  al a  p e en ed h o gh manife a ion a her than 
h o gh e oca ion  (ibid.). In the technological, fragmented world, life exists somewhere 
between the worlds of reality and cyberspace. After Case rejects the heaven  of 
cyberspace, this liminal state is metaphorically used to describe the transitional point of 
jacking out. It is at this moment where Case is in between cyberspace and reality that 
Gibson perfectly illustrates his and even our own world:  
There was a gray place, an impression of fine screens shifting, moire, degrees of 
half tone generated by a very simple graphics program. There was a long hold on 
a view through chainlink, gulls frozen above dark water. There were voices. 
There was a plain of black mirror, that tilted, and he was quicksilver, a bead of 
mercury, skittering down, striking the angles of an invisible maze, fragmenting, 
flowing together, sliding again.... (Neuromancer 244). 
 
While society s fragmentation is constantly being battled by a progression from 
transcendence into wholeness, ironically Gibson uses liminal language to describe Case s 
genuine moment of clarity, a phase when he is caught between the meat and the digital.  
  It was unproblematic for Gibson and Oshii to view the Internet as both liminal 
and optimistic in the early nineteen-eighties and even nineties, as it still was a form of 
technology that was more or less undetermined. Like much groundbreaking science 
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fiction, Neuromancer was both highly prophetic and erroneous in its vision of the future. 
Gibson s concept of the Internet is not necessarily what we have today in that it may not 
be he con en al hall cina ion  (ibid. 5) that we jack all our senses into, as he 
described it, although advances in virtual reality and AI may still prove him to be more 
accurate than once thought. It is nonetheless something that is omnipresent in our 
society72. We are all interconnected through it, and theoretically, it is a construct that we 
store our memories and experiences on. In another sense, it may be far more liminal than 
Gibson imagined, as we do not jack in and out of cyberspace, but instead, it has become 
something that never goes away in our lives. We are continuously jacked in  even if we 
are not directly engaging with it. The Internet has become too canny in many ways, as it 
uninterruptedly lives alongside our reality, and as a result, is far more colourless than 
Gibson s literary interpretation. Due to the fact that the current generation has been born 
only knowing the Internet, a world in which an aspect of themselves lives constantly in 
cyberspace, the worlds of das Heimliche and Unheimliche tend to overlap.  
     Although she was centering on the uncanny as a sexual threat, Cixous argues in 
Fic ion  and i  Phan om  (1976/2011) for an instance of overlap between the canny 
and uncanny that the Internet seems o ha e, in ha  he o d join  i elf again, and das 
Heimliche and Unheimliche join oge he , pai  p  (20). Due to its permanent liminal 
characteristics, cyberspace no longer has the ability to dislocate someone from the 
physical world, since being in a state of dislocation has become commonplace. Life 
online has become more of a reality for many people than the reality of their physical 
world, which has increasingly become much more illusionary. When people spend the 
 
72 "Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate 
operators, in every nation  (Neuromancer 51). 
 219 
majority of their time in liminal cyberspace, a sense of perpetual or permanent liminality 
or an endless performance can overcome the individual. Many individuals are using the 
Internet to experiment with their identity, either by imagining themselves as completely 
different people living a different life, even possibly in a different world, to presenting 
their real  self as something they may not actually be offline. What the Internet Age has 
done is that it has transformed the notion of the self, essentially removing it from the 
physical body. By being an omnipresent and an undetectable reality, technology 
dominated by the Internet, is able to subversively control one s perception or attitude 
towards life without allowing for any sacred space.  
CYBERSPACE: HEAVEN OR HELL? 
 
 There seems to be a major shift in works that deal with cyberspace from the 
eighties and nineties to more contemporary literature. One is the obvious shift from 
science-fiction to a fiction far more grounded in reality that evidently came about from 
the Internet playing a much more significant role in our lives. The other is that there 
seems to be a genuine shift from enthusiasm, or at the very least a reserved optimism, to a 
far more pessimistic interpretation of cyber-culture. This is evident in the most recent 
live action Ghost in the Shell (2017) film, in which cyberspace is viewed much more 
negatively at the film s conclusion than the original anime film, in which even Major 
refuses the amalgamation with the film s Puppet Master-esque villain on those same 
dystopic grounds. The negative aspects of the Internet were always present: hacking, 
security, privacy; however, these threats have become more realized in an individual s 
life, thereby altering these terrorizations from peripheral to commonplace. Although there 
are still some romantic depictions of hackers as being anti-capitalist anti-heroes, as in the 
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show Mr. Robot (2015 -), Internet culture and the cowboys  that ride amongst it have 
become something ominous and alarming in a lot of contemporary literature and film73. 
Moreover, more and more contemporary authors are writing about the shortcomings and 
consequences of the Information Age and Social Media. In Gibson s cyberpunk universe, 
as in our own contemporary world, information is everything, but unlike our current 
reality, for Gibson s worlds, information remains largely secretive. 
 A world without secrets has the ability to govern itself perfectly, as Dave Eggers  
The Circle argues, or rather the multinational technology company that provides the 
book s title. Eggers  novel tends to borrow heavily from what now have become cliché 
tropes of prototypical totalitarian dystopian novels such as 1984 (1949/1961) and Brave 
New World (1932/2007). Nonetheless, there are some fundamental changes in this 
dystopian society that make it resemble contemporary reality more closely than science 
fiction. The lack of individualism and privacy does not necessarily result from tyrannical 
thought control or social and biological engineering by a government or society, but 
rather by the people themselves. Yes, The Circle is a powerful Internet-based corporation 
in the mold of Google or Facebook. However, their power resides in giving the people 
the technological full disclosure that they desire, rather than through any serious form of 
propaganda, brainwashing, or torture. The Circle is represented as more of a community 
that, although it is walled off from the outside world, creates the apparatus for how 
 
73 Super Sad True Love Story by Gary Shteyngart (2010), Thomas Pynchon s Bleeding 
Edge (2013), Jennifer Egan s A Visit from the Goon Squad (2011), Nikesh Shukla s 
Meatspace (2014), Tim Ma ghan s Infinite Detail (2019), and Lin s Taipei are just some 
of the novels that showcase a rising skepticism of not just the actualization of cyber 
threats that hackers produce, but our dependence on our online, socially mediated lives. 
Likewise, many episodes of the popular television series Black Mirror (2011-) often 
e amine he da k ide o h mani  ela ion hip i h he In e ne  and echnolog  a  a 
whole.  
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people communicate throughout the world. Through the narrator, the protagonist Mae 
Holland describes her binaural opinions between the Circle and the rest of society: 
[o] ide he all  of he Ci cle, all a  noi e and ggle, fail e and fil h. B  he e, 
all had been perfected. The best people had made the best systems and the best systems 
had reaped funds, unlimited funds that made possible this, the best place to work. And it 
a  na al ha  i  a  o, Mae ho gh . Who el e b  opian  co ld make opia?  
(Eggers 31). The Circle s goal is to communicate its utopian values to the rest of the 
world via the Internet; to integrate or make a whole of the fragmented and disconnected 
world outside; to make the world as perfect  as the community of the Circle. The 
Circle s logo, a giant C, represents the incompleteness or fractured state of modern life as 
one of its founder s argues, but also the company s goal to connect it through the 
info ma ion high a , [ ]o an  info ma ion ha  el de  , an hing ha s not accessible, 
p e en   f om being pe fec  (ibid. 289). The p ojec  begin  hen poli ician  lives 
become completely online and therefore accountable at all times. This mission soon 
spreads to everyone. The Big Brother of the past is no longer needed; people will watch 
themselves, confirming the transition from the panoptical gaze to that of the cyborgian 
(Vidler 1992; Willet 1996). Unlike Vidler, who argues that the cyborgian gaze is based 
pon f agmen ed and ef ac ed line  (160), Egge  take on the cyborgian gaze is far 
more totalitarian. We have become a society of the AIs once feared; we have become the 
new Wintermutes and Puppet Masters. Not joining means you are hiding something, and 
therefore, according to the people of the Circle, stealing something from the rest of 
society. Not joining in means you do not belong and therefore are shamed, a major 
concern for Mae, and the Circle itself, when she first joins the community. Mae quickly 
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finds out that fitting in and communicating with everyone about oneself is far more 
important than the actual work she is doing. As the uncanny has been removed from 
cyberspace, secrets have become either monotonous in our reality, or, as in The Circle, 
regarded as dangerous.  
The removal of the uncanny in cyberspace seems to also remove the element of 
the sacred from it, but not necessarily the religiousness fundamentalism. Some of The 
Circle s most zealous and faithful followers see it as a movement that is fulfilling the 
established Christian crusade of regaining a wholeness that was previously lost in the 
Fall:  
Yo  connec ed i  all. Yo  fo nd a a  o a e all he o l . Thi  i  ha  e 
were doing in the church we tried to get them all. How to save them all? This 
ha  been he o k of mi iona ie  fo  millennia No  all h man  ill ha e he 
eyes of God. You know this passage? All things are naked and opened unto the 
eyes of God.  Some hing like ha . Yo  kno  o  Bible?  Seeing he blank look  
on the faces of Mae and Francis, he scoffed and took a long pull from his drink. 
No  e re all God. Every one of us will soon be able to see, and cast judgment 
upon, every other. We ll see what He sees. We ll articulate His judgment. We ll 
channel His wrath and deliver His forgiveness. On a constant and global level. All 
religion has been waiting for this, when every human is a direct and immediate 
messenger of God s will. (Eggers 398-9) 
 
The secularizing process of modernity s mission to replace God is complete. Mae and her 
collogues at the Circle react by ridiculing the fan, making him the reverse of Nietzsche s 
madman, one who comes, not to tell us that we have killed God, but that we have instead 
reestablished God.74 Although Mae thought him to be ridiculous, the opening line of the 
 
74 Although not exclusive to cyberspace, he ecen  fo ming of The Wa  of he F e  
by Silicon Valley pioneer Anthony Levandowski, a new church/religion that worships 
artificial intelligence, shows that this concept is not as implausible as one may think. 
Levandowski a g e  ha  [ ]hat is going to be crea ed ill effec i el  be a god , hile 
in i ing ha  [ ]he church is how we spread the word, the gospel. If you believe [in it], 
start a conversation with someone else and help them understand the same things  (Harris, 
In ide ). 
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no el, MY GOD, MAE ho gh . I  hea en  (ibid. 1) ho  bcon cio l  ha  he 
believes the sentiment to be true at some level. The hybridity, liminality, and uncanniness 
that once defined the sacred aspects of cyberspace have now been eliminated. The 
Internet is no longer a space of infinite possibilities but a space of closed perfection and 
regulation and has become a tool to conceal the liminal aspects of life that in its inception 
it validated. Although outlandish at times, a novel like The Circle is not alone in seeing 
the Internet Age as a new forming dystopia. The expression of individuality that 
cyberspace and social media once garnered is beginning to transform into something 






VII: STRANGE GENDER AND POST-HUMANISM 
 
 
You only have to look at the Medusa straight on to see her. And she s not deadly. She s beautiful and she s 
laughing  
- H l ne Ci o , The La gh of Med a  
  
The body is not a site on which a construction takes place; it is a destruction on the occasion of which a 
subject is formed  
- Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection 
 
The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, 
labour, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the 
parts into a higher unity 
- Donna Ha a a , A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist- Feminism    
in the Late Twentie h Cen  
 
She decided ha  ince he a  setting out on the greatest adventure any person can take, that of the Holy 
Grail, she ought to have a name (identity). She had to name herself    




The history of the modern stranger has been dominated, much like history, by the 
masculine gaze. Things slowly began to change after WWII when the rise of second 
wave feminism erected out of the chaotic world like Canticle s Rachel, looking to create 
social change out of the ashes left over. Simone de Beauvoir s groundbreaking Le 
Deuxième Sexe (The Second Sex) (1949/1989) was the first to wage war against the 
biological determinism of Freud  decla a ion ha  [a]na om  i  de in  (46), which 
governed and enforced gender roles in a patriarchal society. Not only did critiques of the 
patriarchy arise through more self-reflective men like Antonioni, by the 1960s, the ascent 
of gender studies went further to challenge the phallocentric stance of society. While 
Antonioni s critical representations are essentially limited since they themselves are still 
confined to the perspective of the male gaze, the works of intellectuals such as H l ne 
Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva, redefined gender classifications on their own 
terms. Donna Haraway pushed or blurred the boundaries even further by integrating the 
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liminal and uncanny cyborg with the rising post-gender and technocratic world, 
questioning the biological or natural principles of both the body and gender. Haraway 
looks to the biotechnological age to deconstruct the natural artificial, the human/machine, 
masculine/feminine binaries in an attempt to help usher in a rising post-gender world, 
through reinventing gender, politics, and identity. Regardless of technology s negative 
aspects, Haraway understands that we are not able to look backwards, since technology is 
part of our lives whether we want it to be or not. Her A Manifesto fo  C bo g  
(1985/2004) looks towards a hybrid utopian vision that is able to exist in the present 
world by locating the beauty within the monstrous aspects of the present. As Jeanine 
Thweatt-Bates (2012) argues,  
[p]osthuman has become a way of naming the unknown, possible, (perhaps) 
future, altered identity of human beings, as we incorporate various technologies 
into our human bodies and selves. It therefore functions as an umbrella term, 
covering a span of related concepts: genetically enhanced persons, artificial 
persons or androids, uploaded consciousness, cyborgs and chimeras (mechanical 
or genetic hybrids). Thus, the posthuman is not any one particular thing; it is an 
act of projection, of speculation about who we are as human beings, and who we 
might become. Posthuman is inherently plural, a disturbing ambivalence. (1) 
 
In order for the cyborg to witness its utopian characteristics, it must not be seen as 
something to be feared but rather to be embraced. As Rod Giblett (2008) argues, 
[ ]he ea  e can ef e o be Te mina o , e a e al ead  c bo g  (148). Ha a a s 
cyborg represents an open-mindedness and flexible device for an egoless and genderless 
world that dissolves hegemonic binaries and oppression. The cyborg represents the entity 
that is fully connected but removed from the outside world, blurring the lines of 
subjective and objective and re-imagining the Oedipal and Christian narratives of 
Western society.  
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Nonetheless, this new movement in feminist studies is channeling or elaborating 
on what already exists in the modern stranger, as argued from the beginning of this work, 
in that being an uncanny individual in liminal modernity positions the stranger in a 
paradoxical situation where secularization and resacralization incessantly orbit around 
one another. Many of the liminal and uncanny factors of the modern stranger found in 
Frankenstein were discussed in the opening chapter. However, I reserved the discussion 
of gender specifically for this section, which assesses the question within the subject of 
the modern stranger at its parturition . Despite lacking any really strong female 
characters, Shelley s novel may very well be the origin of gender and post-humanist 
critique of the male dominated secularized world. Critics such as Sandra M. Gilbert and 
Susan Gubar (1979) argue, the novel embodie  oman s helpless alienation in a male 
ocie  (247), hile he ep e ion of omen and, pecificall , of female e ali  
contributes to the novel s monstrousness. Victor s refusal to create a female reveals the 
erogeneity of the science of tha  fi  c ea ion  (Cottom 69). However, the main struggle 
concerning gender in the novel has more to do with authorship and language. Cecilia A. 
Feilla (2008) claims there is a direct connection between the Creature s liminality and 
hybridity and Shelley as a female author: 
Mary Shelley presents the women writer as self-po e ed a he  han imi a ing 
or rejecting men s writing, she accepts her position, her text and her creature as 
monster and thus founds a place for women s writing in the liminal space of the 
monstrous. Like a Romantic daemon, the monster exists within the in-between, an 
intermediary between human and divine worlds, angel and devil, and, in the case 
of Frankenstein, opens a breach in the canon of literature through which the 
monsters were let in. (171) 
 
Language, monstrosity, and post-humanism are all tied to gender in Frankenstein through 
a female author and her literary and symbolic creations. The Creature, as modern stranger, 
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uncannily points to not only the hybridity of the modern world, but also the material and 
social constructs of both the body and gender. Frankenstein has influenced gender 
theorists to take the monstrous, abject qualities of the female body and resacralize them 
within the confines of secularized modernity. Critics such as Anne Kull (2001; 2003; 
2016), Elaine Graham (2002), and Thweatt-Bates ascertain a theological and sacred 
notion to Haraway s anti-essentialist cyborg, alongside with the essay s feminist 
argument According to Thweatt-Bates, 
[t]he theological conclusions generated by [the] appreciation of the cyborg s 
embeddedness within material creation are significant, and provide a foundation 
for an ethics of relationship that is radically inclusive, positing as it does hybrid 
kinship with both the na al  and he echnological  c ea e  e inhabi  he 
world with. These theological engagements with the cyborg, therefore, turn to the 
ecotheological implications of the cyborg s hybridity, materiality, and 
interconnectedness. (142) 
 
Like many things in secularized modernity, post-humanism may seem to be at first anti-
religious and secular but it paradoxically allows for the return of the sacred, for [ ]o long 
as religious motifs continue to inform visions of technological sublime then discourses of 
transcendence and re-enchantment must be directly confronted as part of an enduring 
mbolic of ep e en a ion  (G aham 16). Existing in liminal space, the post-humanist 
cyborg blurs the boundaries of the sacred and profane through the distorting of 
human/machine and male/female dichotomies, by undressing natural identity symbols 
while simultaneously establishing technological new ones.  
A flowing link between Frankenstein s Creature and the Haraway s cyborg is 
Hélène Cixous  of Medusa (Clayton 136-7), which seems to connect the cyborg and 
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Medusa in the liminal space of the abyss.75 Just as Shelley gave a revolutionary voice to 
the Creature, in The La gh of Med a  (1975/1976), Cixous bestows Medusa with a 
voice, in order to speak against the illusions and myths regarding the female that have 
been created by men in an attempt to control them through fear. By re-examining the 
myth of Medusa, Cixous wants us to invert the uncanny monstrousness of the female 
gender to understand that it is merely a deception developed from the uncanny fear men 
ha e of omen ho ha e hi o icall  i e ed [ omen] be een o ho if ing m h : 
be een he Med a and he ab  (885). Al ho gh ocie  ha  di placed omen in o 
the liminal sphere of the monstrous and the unknown, Cixous, like Haraway looks to an 
ncann  p oce  of e end[ing] o el e  i ho  e e  eaching an end  (878). Ci o  
removes the horrifying fear that has enveloped the myth of Medusa and has replaced it 
i h he i onic la gh of he (po )mode n ange : Rewriting the horrifying Medusa of a 
mascuilst mythology, Cixous creates a laughing Medusa who, in the role of the hysteric, 
resists the male view of her sexuality in becoming incomprehensible, unclassifiable, as 
one find  he  onl  in he di ide  (Aneja 58). Q e ioning he e m h  b  looking a  he 
Med a aigh  on , omen ill e ee h o gh he eil of he ma c line eil and 
eali e ha  he s not deadly. She s beautiful and she  la ghing  (Ci o  Med a  
885). Important to this study of postgender and posthumanism is the correlation between 
the posthuman and concept of the abyss. Through the lens Paul Tillich s theological 
understanding of the abyss, alongside more secular ideas of the concept from thinkers 
 
75 Although Medusa is never mentioned in Frankenstein, in the posthumous poem On 
the Medusa of Leonardo Da Vinci in the Florentine Gallery , Pe c  Shelly captures a 
similar revolutionary bea  in Med a  mon o  ga e a  Ci o  doe . Bo h Ma  
Shelle  and he  h band e he mbol of mon o e e , ho e eng h lie  in 
eeing a  m ch a  in being een  (Cla on 132).  
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such as Luce Irigaray, Diane Elam, Linda M. G. Zerilli, I will look to establish a 
connecting point of the modern stranger discussed up to now with the more posthuman, 
postgender, and (post)modern version found in the latter half of twentieth century 
feminist writings.    
After establishing the connection between language, gender, liminal post-
humanism, and the abyss, I will analyze these interconnecting ideas in two works by 
Kathy Acker: Don Quixote, which was a dream (1986) and Empire of the Senseless 
(1988). The liminal act of resacralization, although not initially transparent, is an 
important aspect of Acker s writing, as is the notion of hybridity. Not only is it visible in 
language and genre, as Acker s novels consist of a rewriting or appropriation of various 
famous novels, alongside a style that jumps from fiction to the autobiographical, to essay, 
to journal, but hybridity and liminality are also focal points in regard to many of her 
characters. In both Empire and especially Don Quixote, dicho omie  like male/female, 
white/black, human/animal, master/slave do not exist as such but collide in a 
ca ni ale e ni e e  (Gonz lez 116). In these novels, Acker simultaneously believes 
in and critiques the ability to create one s own language and identity outside the 
boundaries of gender, while also attempting the modern stranger s inadvertent task of 
finding the sacred in a world of liminality. 
FROM SHELLEY’S ‘HIDEOUS PROGENY’ TO HARAWAY’S CYBORG 
 
Mary Shelley indicates that gender was an underlining issue in both 
Frankenstein s nar a i e and a ho hip, e ponding to the question, so frequently asked 
[he ]  he a e , [h]ow I, then a young girl, came to think of, and to dilate upon, so very 
hideous an idea?  (5). Although Shelley was praised for her groundbreaking novel, 
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judging from the interrogative questioning, the novel s subject matter was deemed to be 
inappropriate, or at the very least shocking, for any woman to be writing during the 
nineteenth century. The issue of gender as an absence is an integral theme in the novel. 
Leaving out the female voice is a deliberate act that recognizes and critiques women s 
status in society, both public and private, even going to the lengths of stripping away 
women s traditional role of child-bearers. Mother figures are non-existent, both for 
Victor and his Creature, while most of the female characters are marginalized, ignored, or 
simply disposed of.76 Victor not only seeks to replace God with the discovery of 
immorality but likewise, by creating life without a female counterpart, seeks to establish 
a world operated peerlessly by man. Victor s misogynist inclinations become apparent 
through his rationalizing of not creating a partner for the Creature that is essentially based 
on his opinion that a female creature would be far more hor if ing: she might become 
ten thousand times more malignant than her mate and delight, for its own sake, in murder 
and e chedne  (Shelle  170).  
This is not to suggest that the novel entirely lacks a female voice. As Victor is the 
author or creator of he C ea e, Shelle  i  he c ea o  of he  o n hideo  p ogen  
(10), the novel itself. It is through authorship that the female voice continues to exist. As 
Barbara Johnson (1992) maintains, in Frankenstein the monstrousness of selfhood is 
intimately embedded within the question of female autobiography  (10). Shelley 
correlates imaginative creation and the notion of the female genius with that of 
 
76 Although, the character Safie may be the exception to this argumen . See The  Will 
P o e he T h of M  Tale : Safie  Le e  a  he Femini  Co e of Ma  Shelle  
Frankenstein  (1991) b  Jo ce Zonana.  
 231 
monstrosity and the demonic symbolism through the Creature.77 While the female voice 
is not wholly transparent in the male-dominated plot, Shelley paradoxically enforces it 
through composition, thereby exposing the dread of the monstrous  female gender as an 
uncanny feature that clouds the novel, rather than unveiling it in a more unequivocal 
manner: 
Like the monster, woman in a patriarchal society is defined as an absence, an 
enigma, mystery, or crime, or she is allowed to be a presence only so that she can 
be defined as a lack, a mutilated body that must be repressed to enable men to join 
the symbolic o de  and main ain hei  ma e He  diffe ence place  he  o ide 
culture, and her abominable presence places her within it. Mary Shelley, because 
she writes from this paradoxical position, has been accused of artistic 
fail e B  he  ep e en a ion of the liminal position of women -- and the 
relation of that position to sexual categories of a patriarchal culture -- is precisely 
her achievement (Hodges 162-3).  
 
It is through the connection of the two hideous progenies that Shelley is able to address 
gender and the patriarchal society. The Creature s realization of its ugliness, or rather the 
ugliness projected on to it by a male dominated society,78 correlates to the female 
identity/body in that women tend to see themselves as monstrous and unnatural because 
that is how society views them, due to the impossibility of living up to existing 
 
77 Feilla e pand  on hi  no ion, a g ing ha  d ing Shelle  ime omen ei he  
possess (male) genius and thus are monsters or are possessed by genius (divine 
pi i ) Mo eo e , he de c ip ion of he c ea e a  a daemon throughout the 1818 
edition of Frankenstein further underscores its associations with the figure of 
geni Belonging nei he  o he o ld of h mans nor of the gods, daemons were outside 
the pale of human limitations  moral, physical, social or legal  and were generally 
con ide ed o be nei he  good no  bad, nei he  mo al no  immo al  (168-70). 
78 F e d  p ojec ion heo  and he heo  of he Oedipus complex has been adapted and 
expanded by a feminist psychoanalyst critique. In her book, The Interpretation of the 
Flesh: Freud and Femininity, Teresa Brennan (1992) argues that women sometimes take 
on the physical and psychological manifestations of men  p ojec ed feminini  he e 
[ ]he de i e of he o he , in ho , embodie  an image and a en ion ha  can enhance o  
dimini h one  capaci ie  (226). 
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conventional associations with purity (Gilbert & Gubar 240). Patriarchal history has 
positioned women as the goddess or vamp but never as an equal, which ultimately 
situates them within an abject void. When faced with the possibilities of a potential 
female creature s ability to reinvent social norms, Victor Frankenstein only sees the 
impending danger the female represents and disposes of the dismembered female body 
parts. By doing so, he solidifies the boundaries of the patriarchal and structured society, 
leaving the female body abject, fragmented, and incomplete. The correlation between 
cultural boundaries and that of the physical body are metaphorically found ubiquitously 
in ci ili a ion fo  he h man bod  i  al a  ea ed a  an image of ocie  (Douglas, 
Natural 74). Similar to cultural and social bodies that create boundaries to keep out what 
i  o  of place , he ph ical bod  like i e p od ce  ma gin , in o de  o p od ce a 
division between dirt and purity ince boundaries can represent any boundaries which 
are th ea ened o  p eca io  (Douglas, Purity 82). Contamination exists where there are 
ambiguities and contradictions in social systems as well as within ambiguities of the 
corporeal body, though sex pollution  doe  no  end o flo i h  i hin male o gani ed 
societies (ibid 143).79 The completion of the female counterpart leaves too many 
uncertainties for Frankenstein, and consequently, he fears that he is unable to control the 
 
79 B ilding on Do gla  poll ion bo nda ie , Judith Butler uses her work in relation to 
homosexuality: 
Since anal and oral sex among men clearly establishes certain kinds of bodily 
permeabilities unsanctioned by the hegemonic order, male homosexuality would, 
within such a hegemonic point of view, constitute a site of danger and pollution, 
prior to and ega dle  of he c l al p e ence of AIDS. Simila l , he poll ed  
status of lesbians, regardless of their low-risk status with respect to AIDS, brings 
in o elief he dange  of hei  bodil  e change . Significan l , being o ide  
the hegemonic orde  doe  no  ignif  being in  a a e of fil h  and n id  na e. 
Paradoxically, homosexuality is almost always conceived within the homophobic 
signifying economy as both uncivilized and unnatural. (Gender Trouble 168) 
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discharges from the margins of the body and society, the dirt that threatens order and 
control. Both sexes in the novel are victims of their own pre-ordained gender: the female 
characters are casualties because of their passivity; the male characters suffer due to their 
excessive determination.  
The only character that encompasses both genders is the Creature whose feminine 
gender representationally presides alongside the masculine traits inherited by 
Frankenstein, which intensifies its liminal, post-gender cyborgian stature. The cyborg 
fittingly incorporates an ambiguous notion of gender whose cyborgian and liminal nature, 
challenges the aspects of the masculinity/femininity binary, ultimately destroying any 
illusions of the unitary self. If Frankenstein  C ea e i  p e- e al , i  doe  no  acco n  
for the basis of its identity although ha  i  no  o a  ha  e al abe a ion i  mi ing 
from Shelley s definition of monstrosity: simply, sexuality is always a part of the other 
iden if ing ai  (Halberstam 42). Despite this, in an attempt to become normalized , 
the Creature pleads with Frankenstein to repair society s shattered gender binary that 
con in e  o e i  i hin i : Yo  m  c ea e a female fo  me i h hom I can li e in he 
interchange of those sympa hie  nece a  fo  m  being  (147). Here we can see Bruno 
Latour s (1991/1993) argument that although secularized modernity continuously 
maintains a world apportioned into binaries, it still refuses to acknowledge society s 
c m la i e h b idi a ion , hich i onicall  inc ea e  a  a e l  of hi  p ifica ion  
(11-12). Since society is comprised of a collective of both human and non-humans, 
representing society in a series of binaries, such as natural/artificial, it paradoxically 
clashes against modernity s constant attempt to rationalize everything. As Latour 
contends,  
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By rendering mixtures unthinkable, by emptying, sweeping, cleaning and 
p if ing he a ena ha  i  opened in he cen al pace he mode n  allo ed he 
practice of mediation to recombine all possible monsters without letting them 
have any effect on the social fabric, or even any contact with it. Bizarre as these 
monsters may be, they posed no problem because they did not exist publicly and 
because their monstrous consequences remained untraceable. What the 
premoderns have always ruled out the moderns can allow, since the social order 
never turns out to correspond, point for point, with the natural order. (42) 
 
Frankenstein s Creature wishes to destroy its hybrid and liminal characteristics through 
the creation of a female counterpart, thereby reaffirming modernity s neat binary.  
By attempting to purify society through the destruction of the female companion, 
Victor in reality solidifies the hybridization and taboo, unwilling to create an opposite 
binary for the Creature and as a result, retains and coagulates the Creature s liminal 
nature. The Creature s female companion remains dismembered and dispensable, while 
the Creature itself still exists as an illusionary whole but fundamentally remains as a 
stitched up hybrid of body parts. The Creature, the female companion, and even 
Frankenstein as a text, all express this artificial uncanny fragmentation or mutilation of 
the body (Favert 1992; Salotto 1994) that is often credited to Haraway s cyborg. As Julie 
Clarke (2002) poin  o  [b]o h F anken ein s monster and the cyborg solicit the 
ncannine  a ocia ed i h bod  m ila ion and f agmen a ion  (39), hile Ma g e  
Owens (2005) ee  he C ea e a  he mo  end ing nigh ma e of ha  age  and a 
fundamental illustration and exploration of the fragmented body that would lead to 
fascination of the dismembered body found in twentieth century avant-garde art (12), as 
seen in Beckmann s The Night. This results in a predicament where secularized 
modernity s act of purification is paradoxically in conflict with its tendency to resacralize 
itself within its perpetual liminal space.  
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Jane Bennett (2016) sees Latour  concep  of h b idi a ion a  a mode n fo m of 
magic and a potential site of enchan men , ince he e ence of ch magic a  
mobili  and mo phing an fo ma ion  f om one a e, pace, o  fo m o ano he  (98). 
Although I agree with her statement, the same can be said of the sacred, and since 
Latour s thesis resolves around a constant purification, his sense of hybridization fits 
more within a secular society that tends to continuously search for the sacred, and as a 
result, the concept of the cyborg can also be considered an element of resacralization in 
the modern world. The cyborg that was born in Shelley s novel in order to transgress 
fo bidden bo de  ha  become mo e diffic l  o ep e  in mode n ocie  he e he 
proliferation of monsters is indeed getting completely out of control. The processes of 
purification, which in Latour s opinion have always been illusory, can no longer disguise 
he fac  (L kke 17). 
 Nevertheless, Frankenstein s Creature as cyborg is seriously questioned by Donna 
Haraway in her canonical C bo g  e a . Ha a a  define  he c bo g a  a c ea ure in a 
post-gende  o ld  ha  i  able o b eak do n igid bina ie , b  acco ding o he , goe  
beyond Frankenstein  C ea e ince the cyborg has no origin story in the Western 
sense  and [ ]nlike he hope  of F anken ein s monster, the cyborg does not expect its 
father to save it through a restoration of the garden;... the fabrication of a heterosexual 
ma e, h o gh i  comple ion in a fini hed hole, a ci  and co mo  ( C bo g  9). To 
Haraway, a cyborg is only a cyborg once it extinguishes its historical weight, its 
unwinnable Oedipal battle and its hope for unity. Apprehensive of, or in contradiction to 
the idea of reproduction and (re)birth that are part of the network of what she refers to as 
info ma ic  of domina ion  (ibid. 22, 30), Haraway s cyborg looks to go beyond the 
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creator/created dichotomy and even the anti-technological reading that many originally 
attributed to Shelley s novel. Thweatt-Bates explains that there seems to be division 
between the common portrayal of c bo g  and o he  po h man h b id a  fig e  of 
the monstrous, moral abominations resulting from the transgression of ontological 
bo nda ie  and he he oic defiance of ca ego ical iden i ie  ha  i  he source of 
po e f l ac ion  (ibid. 24-5). Haraway s postgender cyborg is therefore closer to 
Frankenstein s Creature than Haraway would permit, as it exists between the liminal 
plain of both characterizations of the cyborg. The two liminal symbols also share a 
con incing connec ion a  being o ide he pale of h man limi a ion  (Feilla 170), 
particularly because Frankenstein is not the anti-technological novel many have labeled it 
a , and ha  he C ea e, a  Gilbe  and G ba  claim, ma  eall  be a female in 
di g i e (237) The three texts80 the Creature gains its knowledge from link the Creature s 
plight with that of women  h o gh he na ainable glamo  of male he oi m , along 
i h all he ma c line in icacie  ha  ha e been denied o hem d e o their monstrous  
births (ibid 238). Furthermore, Susan Stryker (1994/2006) takes the Creature s liminal 
gendering even further by connecting the monstrousness of Shelley s literary Creature to 
ha  of a an gende , ho e embodimen , like he embodiment of the monster, places its 
subject in an unassimilable, antagonistic, queer relationship to a Nature in which it must 
ne e hele  e i , a condi ion S ke  a g e ha  l ima el  lead  o age (248). S ill, 
Stryker does not see the two related simply by a comparable problematic struggle of 
identity but likewise sees an optimistic and utopian element of constructing one s identity 
ha  e ceed  and ef e  he p po e of he ma e  be een he C ea e and he 
 
80 Mil on  Paradise Lost, Plutarch s Lives, and Johann Wolfgang von Goe he  The 
Sorrows of Werther. 
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transgender (ibid.). For Cathrine Waldby (2004) this is where both the cyborg and 
Frankenstein  C ea e a e in e changeable in ha  bo h a e a  o hink abo  h man 
becoming. To reject them is to reject possible human futures, to refuse to engage with the 
consequences of shifting mode  of embodimen , ep od c ion, and li ing p oce  (36). 
It is correct that in the story the Creature aspires to o ganic holene  h o gh a 
final app op ia ion of all he po e  of he pa  in o a highe  ni  (Ha a a  9), but 
ultimately its desire is never realized, and it remains a liminal entity even when its 
fictional male creator dies. The Creature s search for reproduction and redemption is 
never fulfilled and is altogether abandoned at the novel s end, ushering the spectre of the 
cyborg that preternaturally birthed  a culture of cyborgian hybridity. This entity would 
have to go through transition, for the process of hybridization can be considered as 
cyborgian as its outcome, and as a result, one cannot appraise the first cyborg81 in the 
same way as the contemporary cyborg, for it has been assembled slowly over time 
A SPIRAL DANCE IN THE ABYSS 
 
In jettisoning the past, Haraway s cyborg world nevertheless retains the aspect of 
resacralization of the female gender through the uncanny, the hybrid, and the monstrous. 
Haraway admits that the cyborg is the uncanny doppelgänger to the goddess, standing 
against but also alongside the image of the spiritual deity. The difference between the two 
is that the cyborg s paradoxical perfection  is closer to the artificial and monstrous than 
the idealistic or beautiful natural perfection of the goddess. Initially, the cyborg may 
seem to lack or reject the spiritual or sacredness of the natural body by accepting the 
 
81 While it is debatable what the first cyborg or prototype truly is, I agree with the many 
scholars (Russ 1995; Gray, Mentor, & Figueroa-Sarriera 1995; Fuller 2003; Botting 
2013) that argue that due to the biological and technological orientation of the Creature, 
Shelle  no el con ain  he fi  c bo g.  
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artificial into it Even though Haraway chooses the cyborg over the sacred  goddess, , she 
does acknowledge that they are both bo nd in he pi al dance  ( C bo g  39).  
Could this spiral dance in which both are entangled be in the liminal abyss of the 
resacralization? For instance, the cyborg  an g e ion of bo nda ie  and egene a ion  
(ibid.) of he bod  fo ce  one o e pand he pi i al p ac ice of li ening o and ca ing 
for one  o n bod  (Mercedes &Thweatt-Bates 73). The cyborg merely develops the 
technological and spiritual hybridity of bodies, and the more one understands that the 
cyborg uncannily resembles our natural bodies, the simpler it is to see the spiritual 
potential of the cyborg  b oken bo nda ie  ha  a e able o ec af  he o ld  (ibid. 
77). As a technological stranger, the cyborg pushes the boundaries of sacred/secular by 
relocating, though not necessarily negating transcendence, beyond traditional hierarchical 
and ho i on al con c  in o a nonbina  model of in e ela ion  (Braidotti 205). 
Haraway s cyborg, therefore, does not reject transcendence but rather essentialism (ibid. 
83) and o ali ing na a i e  of l ima e e ol ion and clo e  (Graham 211). The 
spiral dance82 be een he godde  and c bo g, become  a an g e i e bo nda  
c o ing  be een he di embodied o l and embodied eali  (ibid. Po h man 67), 
creating a liminal coil between two liminal figures, one sacred and one profane.  
The cyborg likewise opens up possibilities in regard to gender that were once 
restricted due to its strangeness. Just as the cyborg lives in the posthuman abyss between 
human and machine, it likewise lives in the abyss between genders. Through the rejection 
of biological reproduction, the cyborg uncannily and paradoxically opens up a space for 
 
82 Follo ing Van Genep  cla ifica ion of he i e of pa age, Omofolalabo Soyinka 
Ajayi (1994) states the importance of dancing as a liminal journey of ni ing he 
pi i al i h he ea hl  (187). 
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(re)birth of societal resacralization. Likewise, by reimagining the goddess  of second 
wave feminism, Haraway does not necessarily discard the ascribed spirituality and the 
sacredness but rather seems to remodel it for the technological contemporary world that 
no longer wishes to command gender essentialism. Through a rebirth, the cyborg 
therefore allows for what J di h B le  claim  a  he pa i e medi m  of he bod , o 
once again occur (Gender 165), allowing for it to inscribe a post-gender and anti-Oedipal 
culture or society on to it. Butler connects this tabula rasa of the body to the Christian 
and Ca e ian no ion of he bod  a  ine  ma e  o  a  a p ofane oid  (ibid.) that can 
allow for a liminal space of resacralizing. We see this secularized sacredness in Butler s 
approach to the ritual of gender performance, where she understands Turner s theory of 
ritual performance almost in a Kierkegaardian terms of repetition, being bo h a 
reenactment and re-e pe iencing  (178). B  empha i ing he epea ing face  of T ne s 
concept of the sacred ritual, Bulter liminalizes the theory by stressing the profane, 
therefore allowing us to see ritual as both a transgre i e and no ma i e pe fo mance  
(McKenzie 222).  
Equally, Haraway s techno-feminist cyborg does not entirely dissolve the Judeo-
Christian narratives of Western society that it challenges, where it seems to still be, at 
least symbolically, interconnected. Thweatt-Bates points out that there is a divine/human 
hybridity that exists within Christology that survives in the complex relationship between 
the posthumanism and spirituality of Haraway s cyborg thesis. The cyborg is neither 
essentially secular nor sacred, for the secular, cyborg dances with both the goddess and 
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he Ca holic ac amen ali ,83 in Haraway  o k, a pe pec i e in hich he ma e ial 
become  he ac ed  (Thweatt-Bates 82). The cyborg, therefore, disrupts the boundaries 
of the sacred and secular as it does with nature and technology, and gender. By never 
confining to themselves to either binary, this disruption forces the cyborg to live in the 
midst these often violent borders. Kull (2003) for instance, sees a connection between 
Tillich  a g men  fo  place of the mythos of technology  (240) and Ha a a s cyborg. 
In comparing Tillich s vision of the technical city  and the cyborg, Kull sees both as 
being modern symbols in nde anding our time, our technologies, and ou el e  (ibid. 
241). Modern technology, for Tillich, seems to rest with the liminal space of the abyss 
and ambiguity, between the creative human spirit of autonomy that propels us further in 
becoming, and the soulless and lifeless technological structure that looks to remove that 
freedom. Yet for Tillich, paradoxically the divine and scared are located liminally and  
mbolicall  in he g o nd and ab  of being  (Essential 147), where in the creative 
and destructive ambiguity of the holy void, every form disappears and emerges between 
these boundaries. Boundaries are not just for crossing but are spaces to oscillate and exist 
upon. Living on the boundaries  of the abyss, although difficult, allows for both the 
anc ioning of, b  like i e, he p ing of he con i ing lang age and c l e o 
c ea e ne  e en  of di ine p e ence  (G dma do i  22, 59). A  E gene Ta lo  (2009) 
 
83 Like her cyborg, Haraway herself is caught in a spiral dance of the sacred and profane. 
While claiming he i  a committed atheist and anti-Catholic (Reader 334), she still 
ackno ledge  he infl ence ha  he  Ca holic pb inging ha  had on he  o k: B  I 
am also deeply formed by theology, and particularly by Roman Catholic 
heolog  and p ac ice. I lea ned i . I died i . I  i  deep in m  bone  (ibid. 333). In 
Manifestly Haraway (2016), although reiterating her hatred for the Catholic Church, 
Haraway like  o ee he elf a  a ec la  Ca holic  (267-9).  
Rela edl , ing B le  nde anding of gende  a  pe fo mance, Ali on Web e  (1998) 
similarly argues that the Christian faith has become something you perform and create 
rather than something you obtain in the modern world. 
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a g e , Tillich i ion of he ab  i  a ealm of c ea i e chao  that transcends values. It 
is transmoral. It is mystic illumination-the holy void, the tolerance of ambiguity, the, 
a ac ion o he g a  a ea  of life beca e of hei  hidden po ibili ie  (237). While 
academics (Daly 1973/1985; Ulanov 1999/2005; Althaus-Reid 2000; Gudmarsdottir 
2016) have pointed out some aspect of the untidy relationship of Tillich s theology and 
that of gender, sexuality, and the feminine84, the notion of the abyss itself is nonetheless a 
strong element in feminist thought.  
Feminism open  n o he ab  (Elam 24) and is about keeping sexual 
difference open a  he pace of adical nce ain  (ibid. 55), and in this sense the 
abyss should been seen as a symbolic representation of the infinite, of the unreachability 
of the limits. Diane Elam (1994) defines the liminality of the female abyss, as a space of 
creation and destruction, of support and rupture: 
On the one hand, the abyss fills up with representations of women. What it means 
o be o  ac  a  a oman i  con in all  mo e de e mined On he o he  hand, 
ho e e , he ab al ope a ion i  infini e. The e  filling p lea e  one f ll of 
ab .  The e ies of images in the mise en abyme is without end; each additional 
image changes all the others in the series without ever completely filling up the 
abyss, which gets deeper with each additional determination. (Elam 29-30) 
 
For Irigaray (1987/1993), the abyss exists in the space between men and women.85 
Irigaray argues in maintaining this otherness, otherwise the possibility of coasting back 
 
84 Exloring his ideas of abyssal boundaries, Ann Belford Ulanov notes that in his 
extensive work on the subject, gender is never discussed, however, she does argue 
ha [l]a en  in Tillich  doc ine of mbol  i  he mee ing, mi ing and exchanging of 
ma c line and feminine mode  of being  (232) 
85 Be een man and oman a angene  m  b i  ha  co e pond  o he fac  ha  
they dwell in different worlds. Perceiving such a difference is more difficult than 
perceiving biological or social differences. It remains invisible, as subjectivity itself, but, 
i ho  e pec ing i , e canno  mee  each o he  a  h man  (Key Writings xii). 
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towards the image of the woman in terms of the language and gaze of the man returns.86 
For women to become subjects and free individuals outside of the patriarchal construct, 
Irigaray expresses the need for the female divine: If omen ha e no God, he  a e 
unable either to communicate or commune with one another. They need an infinite if 
they are to share a little  (Sexes 62). The lack of he female di ine pa al e  he infini e 
of becoming a oman  (ibid.). Thi  female di ine ha  Irigaray calls for goes beyond a 
notion of feminine and motherhood that have become part the male hegemonic definition 
of the female. This new female divine, incorporates the infinite and ambiguity of being a 
woman, and consequently, a woman s potential to become a subject of her own. While it 
may be possible for one to transcend the self through the encountering of the other, the 
female subject must begin with cultivating the self in order to return to the self. Therefore, 
Irigaray sees the divine in similar terms as Bloch s spirit of Utopia, in that it needs the 
self needs to burn through the other, simultaneously being inside and outside the 
boundaries of the abyss.  
In more secular terms, although still allied with the idea of resacralization, in 
Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom (2005), Zerilli takes Hannah Arendt s theory of he 
ab  of f eedom  and applie  i  o femini m s call for social revolution. For Arendt the 
abyss of freedom  i  hen he e i  a momen  of pa e o  a legenda  hia  be een end 
and beginning, between a no-longer and a not- e  (205). Ze illi, a  e ha e een i h 
other intellectuals, perceives the abyssal liminal space as a liberating realm of 
transcendence and becoming, in an attempt to locate and recapture what she and Arendt 
 
86 To incl de he o he  in m  ni e e p e en  mee ing i h he o he , he ea  
safeguarding the obscurity and the silence that the other remains for me 
aids in discovering proximity  (ibid. 29). 
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call feminism  lo  ea e , he adical imagina  of poli ical, ocial, and he eb  
gender, freedom. Zerilli  demand fo  [a] f eedom-cen e ed femini m  ha  o ld 
strive to bring about transformation in normative concepts of gender without returning to 
he cla ical no ion of f eedom a  o e eign (180), look  o e cape and go be ond an 
idea of autonomy and equality that is still situated in patriarchal etymology.  
Haraway s spiral dance traverses the same abyssal tensions of finite and infinite, 
between the imaginary and the realistic. Living on the boarders of the abyss between 
profane cyborgian and sacred goddess symbolism, the cyborg both maintains and 
destroys Western and Christian symbiotic elements and thus creating a more complex 
relationship of the two. The sacramentality  in Haraway s work is an uncanny residue 
that allows for reforming, becoming, and resacralizing the notions of gender and the body. 
Through the liminal gaze of the stranger, the cyborg transverses the liminal space of 
utopian dreams and dystopian nightmares. The infinite possibilities that the technological 
female divine  generates must do so in the uncertain hope of technological autonomy, 
while ultimately still battling the patriarchal and capitalist society it exists in: 
The disruption of boundaries that the cyborg myth foregrounds is always, and 
necessarily, ambiguous with respect to its promise. And this ambiguity signals a 
kind of playful daring of the cyborg. Haraway s cyborg signals not a collapse into 
some variant of a return but an advance into the zone of greatest danger. 
Haraway s wager is that the cyborg can find the weak points, the points that offer 
grid of technological domination. (K ll Technona e 243) 
 
The cyborg as stranger, inevitability must move through this liminal chaotic zone of 
uncertainty and danger, however, empowered by Medua s ironic gaze of a monstrous 
beauty, the posthuman and androgynous cyborgian looks to unfasten new ways in 
understanding the symbolic qualities of gender and the body, while navigating through its 
own abyssal vanguard; its no (wo)man s land . 
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CYBORGS, DOGS, AND ABORTIONS: THE ABJECT OF GENDER IN KATHY ACKER’S 
DON QUIXTOE (1986) AND EMPIRE OF THE SENSELESS (1988) 
 
 The (post)modern strangers that exist in Kathy Acker s novels not only belong to 
the fringes of society; anarchist punks, feminists, transvestites, and even pirates, but they 
also belong to the fringes of reality and fiction. From cyborgs to anthropomorphic and 
shapeshifting dogs, Acker constantly blurs both the gender and natural/artificial lines of 
humanity s dichotomy. Moreover, they are characters that are existentially homeless, 
ggling i h a con an  ea ch fo  a be e  place fo  [e]ven freaks need homes, 
count ie , lang age, comm nica ion  (Don Quixote 202). She speaks through her female 
protagonist in Don Quixote, a ing, [i]t is for you, freaks my loves, I am writing and it 
is about you  (ibid.). Language plays an integral part in shaping both reality and fiction 
and Acker uses fiction as a means to reverse the myths of reality. Alex Houen (2012) 
claim  ha  [i]n writing herself other, Acker frequently questions the fictionality of her 
allobiographies by tempering her creativity with plagiarism. Rather than simply willing 
wholesale belief in her fictional world, then, she often suspends the fictionality in order to 
consider how the writing relates to contexts of power  (176). However, Acker takes an 
inno a i e app oach in i ing he elf o he  b  pla ing i h gende  bina ie  h o gh 
language, inducing a desire to capture a post-gender society. Rather than tackling a new 
world in similar language, Acker challenges the old world with new language, trying to 
e cape he hi o  of book  and na e  (Don 14). Renowned novels and stories 
originally about male development or perseverance are reinterpreted by Acker s use of a 
female voice and female struggle. By placing women in celebrated men s roles, Acker 
blurs gender binaries rather than upholding them, more so than the recognized lens of the 
marginalized other could. In order to achieve this, she must battle with the socio-political 
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phallocentric language by simultaneously reversing it, yet still being a part of it: he a  
both a woman therefore she couldn t feel love and a knight in search of Love. She had 
had to become a knight, for she could solve this problem only by becoming pa l  male  
(Don 29). 
 Don Quixote is a non-linear, surrealist tale, about an originally nameless woman, 
who after having to cope with the ordeal of an abortion, sets out on a series of imaginary 
adventures that span between social-political and philosophical ponderings, dreams, and 
even madness. Searching endlessly for love and freedom, Don Quixote strives to 
transform herself beyond what a patriarchal and capitalist America is able to offer her. 
Acker s virtually androgynous reinterpretation of Miguel de Cervantes  famous character 
repurposes the myth of the quixotic knight in the secularized modern world of nihilistic 
and capitalist urges. It also allows for a woman to take on the role of the hero and knight 
that takes on the symbolic enemies of society instead of the illusionary ones of de 
Cervantes  tale (Worthington 245). Although it may seem an impossibility to accomplish 
in a con me  and nihili ic ocie , he nigh -knigh  (Don 10) of Acker s Don Quixote 
foolishly sea che  fo  he  Hol  G ail  (Ibid. 9): love. Don Quixote pursues a form of 
love in which a woman is a subject and not an object, for according to her, objec  can t 
lo e  (ibid. 28). This quest for ultimate love that Don Quixote embarks on is a utopian 
pursuit for a love that is not produced and controlled my men. 
Like most liminal journeys of the modern stranger, Don Quixote s quest is not 
only shrouded in lang age ha  ee  ildl  be een he ac ed and the profane  
(O Donnell 528) but also language that is violent or abhorrent. As a female character, she 
is especially a witness and victim of the language of sexual violence. By embracing the 
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traditional oedipal narrative structure and the misogynist violence inherent in i  Acke  i  
able to explore that structu e fo  i e  of feminine agenc  (Worthington 244), where 
violence opens up the liminal world of resacralization and becoming through a form of 
anguish. The originally nameless protagonist of Acker s Don Quixote is born again  
after she goes through the procedure of an abortion. It is paradoxically through death that 
she is able to live again. Her death and subsequent rebirth allow her the freedom and 
ability to resist the social confines of the female and her maternal role as a woman, what 
Ellen G. Friedman (1989) describes as a precondition for surrendering the constructed 
self  (42). Don Quixote s abortion places her on the road to secular knighthood  because 
it allows her to become a hole-l  (Don 13) subject but still allowing for the 
transcendent act of reclaiming her body, thereby aborting  her past identity. By naming 
herself, Don Quixote has the opportunity to become her own creator and authority over 
her identity. Here, Don Quixote takes the symbolic power God had gifted to Adam in her 
own hands. In the creation story of Genesis, God gives Adam the power and authority 
over the creatures around him, including Eve, through the act of naming (Schimmel 
1989; Leonard 1990; Thwaites 2017) ince b  naming he o ld e impo e a pa e n 
and a meaning hich allo   o manip la e he o ld  (Spender 163). In order to take 
back the power over her own life, identity, and body, away from the external 
monstrousness placed on her by the male gaze and a phallocentric society, Don Quixote 
must name herself.  
In The La gh of Med , Cixous a g e  ha  [b]  i ing he  elf, oman ill 
return to the body which has been more than confiscated from her, which has been turned 
into the uncanny stranger on display-the ailing or dead figure, which so often turns out to 
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be he na  companion, he ca e and loca ion of inhibi ion  (880). A comparable 
revolutionary Medusa briefly appears in Acker s novel. Unlike Cervantes  protagonist 
who is symbolic of Medusa s slayer Perseus, Acker s Don Quixote is closer linked with 
Med a. A  [he  nake  i he a o nd nail  a ni hed b  he Blood of Je  Ch i  
(Don Quixote 28), virtually appropriating or resacralizing the power of the messianic, 
Medusa quickly interchanges with Don Quixote as a formidable force of the feminine. In 
the face of man, represented as a dog, Medusa shouts: I m your desire s object, dog, 
because I can  be a bjec . What you name love , I name nothingness a  long a  
you cling to a dualistic reality, which is a reality molded by power, women will not exist 
i h o When o  lo e , o  hate u , beca e e ha e o den  o  (ibid.). This 
d ali ic eali  ha  Med a a g e  omen a e apped in einfo ce  he gende  
hierarchy, places the female gender as other, and relegates the feminine to the realm of 
animals. Nonetheless, Acker s representation of man as dog uncannily places them on an 
equal plane, maintaining that the animal or monstrous qualities, if they exist in humanity, 
represent a hybridity that exist in both genders. Acker s Medusa reflects the abject back 
towards the social order, exposing its fragmentation, hybridity, and more importantly, its 
hypocrisy. Acker s Medusa is more liminal than Cixous  however, in that while its gaze 
reflects the monstrousness back on male dominated society and therefore keeping it in 
context of Cixous  revolutionary interpretation, Acker does not inverse Medusa as a 
representation of beauty like Cixous does. Instead, Acker retains her monstrousness terror, 
as an uncanny gaze reflected back to patriarchal society and thus rejecting Cixous  
female essentialism and ubiquitousness. 
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Analogously, one of the novel s main protagonists in The Empire of the Senseless 
is the mixed-race cyborg named Abhor. Abhor i  an o ca , a con c  c n  (Empire 
37) that ep e en  a liminal o  mbolic i e of gende  conflic  (Pi chfo d 98). Abhor s 
tragic Oedipal story of being raped by her father is told by her male lover Thivai, at the 
beginning of the novel through his language, and not hers. Acker is not subtle in naming 
her protagonist; disgust and violence have labeled her, while her identity has been 
fashioned by language that is not her own, a language that creates a myth that confines 
one to the monstrosity they have been historically labeled as. While raping her, Abhor s 
father gives her sacred power by calling her his God but instantly removes it from her by 
referring to himself as God s creator and asserts that he bo h made  and i  making  
her87. Abhor s father takes away her power by being in control of her body, in order to 
punish her for believing that she was the one in control of it and her sexuality. By 
creating God, he thereby controls her past, present, and future identity. Because of this 
and her mother s passivity, Abhor is disgusted by the word mother (15) and cannot help 
but see all heterosexual love as resembling rape to some degree. While it is a 
misconception that Andrea Dworkin or Catherine Macinnon state that all heterosexual 
love is rape 88, Dworkin (1987/2007) doe  a g e ha  [v]iolation is a synonym for 
in e co e (163), while MacKinnon (1989) claims that in a patriarchal society 
he e o e ali  institutionalizes male sexual dominance and female e al bmi ion  
 
87 I Kno  o e mine!!! I made o !!!...I m making o M  father explained again, 
I am f cking God and I made God  (Empire 15). 
88 Dworkin rejects this interpretation of her work a ing, [ ]hat I think is that sex must 
not put women in a subordinate position. It must be reciprocal and not an act of 
aggression from a man looking only to sa i f  him elf. Tha  m  poin  (ci ed in Kelso 
89). Moreover, in Intercourse, she also argues that sex is also a comm nion, a ha ing, 
m al po e ion of an eno mo  m e , and he efo e ha  he in en i  and 
magnificence of iolen  feeling an fo med in o ende ne  (81). 
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(113). While all heterosexual love is not rape, as Irigaray argues, it outside the realm of 
an cendence: hen a male lo e  lo e  him elf in he dep h  of he belo ed oman s 
sensual pleasure, he swells within her as in an abyss, an unfathomable depth. Both of 
hem a e lo , each in he o he , on he ong ide, o  he o he  ide, of an cendence  
(194). This lack of autonomy similarly forces Don Quixote to experience lesbian sex for 
he a g e  hen I make lo e o a oman or myself, I m controlling the body. Loving a 
woman is controlling. Whereas, when I make love to a man, I m he oppo i e  (127). 
This inability or lack of control in society is at its most abject when it is endorsed during 
an act of love between two people.  
Paradoxically, it is this abjection that spurs Don Quixote s quest to find this 
taboo  or impossible notion of love. When it comes to the abject, Kristeva and Bulter 
both emphasize the necessity of trauma both internally and externally, between self/other; 
subject/object, as it uncannily discloses what is hidden or repulsive of the self just as 
m ch a  i  doe  i h ocie . A  B le  a g e , [ ]he abjec  de igna e  ha  hich ha  
been expelled from the body, discharged as excrement, literally rendered O he  
(Gender 168). This appears as an expulsion of alien elements, but the alien is effectively 
establi hed h o gh hi  e p l ion. The con c ion of he no  me  a  he abjec  
establishes boundaries which are also the first contours of the subjec  (ibid. 169). 
Through abjection, the destruction or blurring of boundaries allows for the abject subject 
to create individual and newly formed boundaries of the self. As Abhor s lover argues, 
GET RID OF MEANING. YOUR MIND IS A NIGHTMARE THAT HAS BEEN 
EATING YOU: NOW EAT YOUR MIND  (Empire 38). Although Thivai s message is 
accurate, he is also a significant part of the constructed meaning  that is causing these 
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nightmares. Abhor only begins to gain her freedom when she goes off on her own 
adventure without Thivai, when she is able to gaze into the abject monstrousness and 
write her own story.  
ACKER’S RESACRLIZATION OF THE SYMBOLIC 
 
The problem that Acker and her gender defying protagonists face is that despite 
the fact that they deconstruct the language and boundaries of society, they are still 
confined to using the language and binaries given to them. As Acker states in the 
epigraph to the second part of Don Quixote, [b]eing dead, Don Quixote could no longer 
speak. Being born into and part of a male world, she had no speech of her own. All she 
could do was read male texts which weren t hers  (39). This has led many of her critics 
(Friedman; Muth 2011; Hume 2001) to question Acker s linguistic goal, even calling her 
o k a triumphal fail e  (Redding 301) or at the very least, problematic in that her 
o k a e  o a p io  em of o de  ill e  m ch ope a ional  (Hume 486). Acker 
herself acknowledges this through the voice of Abhor:  
Ten years ago it seemed possible to destroy language through language: to destroy 
language which normalizes and controls by cutting that language. Nonsense 
would attack the empire-making (empirical) empire of language, the prisons of 
meaning. But this nonsense, since it depended on sense, simply pointed back to 
the normalizing institutions (Empire 134). 
 
Ultimately, it is difficult to think one can simply get rid of meaning  or separate 
language from its connotation, especially through the medium of literature. Acker s 
imaginative utopia clashes against constructed reality, resulting in Acker and her 
protagonists collapsing under the weight of their utopian values being resisted against and 
eventually pushed down on them. For instance, Abhor shares many attributes with 
Haraway s conception of the cyborg; however, she does not reach any utopian  status 
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because of it. Technology has not changed her standing as a male object or a commodity 
but has instead strengthened it. The blurring of natural and artificial has not dissolved 
Abhor s Oedipal constructed past since it is consonant with the capitalistic society that 
surrounds her. With Don Quixote, the protagonist s rebirth does not culminate in equality 
in the outside world and as the novel progresses, Don Quixote, like Cervantes  character, 
is swayed back to reality at the end, and the genderless identifying of the character slowly 
fades back towards gender specific pronouns. 
However, to deem Acker and subsequently, her protagonists  mission as a failure 
misses the entire hybrid and liminal scope of the novels, especially since both Don 
Quixote and Empire acknowledge this failure  to some degree. Her novels take place in 
the liminal sphere of utopian dream and harsh reality, resulting in the character s constant 
oscillation and alienation both internally and externally. Acker s Don Quixote evokes the 
spirit of Cervantes  original character, who himself was displaced and alienated from the 
world around him; however, the chief distinction is that although Acker s Don Quixote, 
and for the matter Abhor, are displaced, they are modern strangers and not just 
marginalized others because they are uncanny and symbolic representations of the 
fragmented and liminal society that created and house them. New York is a paradoxical 
place that represents both the ability to find one s identity and simultaneously, a city that 
i  able o den  i . Ne  Yo k i h i  neon and street lights  ha  give out an artificial 
poll ed ligh  (Don 18), allows for an artificially constructed emptiness where one s 
expectations can be born. But, as Cristina Garrig s Gonz lez (1996) points out, Don 
Quixote i  a no el abo  lo e and violence, but it is also about the power of a city, New 
Yo k, o e  a oman  (114). One of the novel s outcasts discourages Don Quixote when 
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she realizes that the city is a hellish capitalist space, which only amplified the strangeness 
or abnormality that she felt from the home she previously ran away from (Don 115). Don 
Quixote s quest to find love is therefore even more absurd in he ma e iali ic, machi  
and sexist world in which we live. A city like New York represents all the western values 
carried o an e eme  (Gonz lez 116). 
Equally, the landscape of Empire s dystopian Paris is itself hellish, suffering from 
disease, capitalist nihilism, crime, and poverty, while the Algerian revolution that sought 
to bring about a transformation in the end changed no hing  (110). Abho  ecogni e  he  
liminal and fragmented identity being reflected by the city: in hi  Pa i  dea h and life 
were fucking. Just like my father gave birth to me and wanted to kill me. In Paris, death 
smelled like life and vice- e a, e peciall  in h man being  (ibid. 82). For a male 
outcast, like Thi ai, Pa i  i  ill [ ]he e ci  of d eam  a ci  in hich a pe on 
co ld do an hing  (ibid 147). On the other hand, for Abhor, the city is far more uncanny 
in its utopian spirit. Abhor sees herself stuck between the otherness of both men and 
women, leaving her with a fragmented and liminal identity. The men that controlled the 
ci , he dead , e e ne e  een, hile he omen, he m an , were the only ones 
i ible: The ban a ea  of he We e n o ld e e no  compo ed of dead and m an . 
I was confused to the point of psychosis because I wasn  e ha  I a  (Empire 110). 
Unable to locate her identity in these binaries, her liminal existence once again brings up 
gender ambiguity, an ambiguity that is reflected in the glass buildings of the Parisian 
cityscape: 
Since I was a mutant from outer space who was living in exile in Paris, Paris 
looked as if it was made up of glass. Glass cuts through the flesh. Paris was a 
bloody city. Rectangular blocks of mirrored glass intersected tall buildings of 
black glass about a quarter wa  do n hei  leng h Unde  he bank, he e a  a 
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building of opaque grey glass which was nameless. nameless  meant useful ; 
he e a  no end o he dep h of he b ilding.  (ibid 110) 
 
Paris  violent nature, which cuts symbolically through the physical body, unveils the 
indistinctness of both the body and the city. Although one could become anything within 
this emptiness, Acker conveys emptiness as an uncertainty and seriously questions 
whether any utopian reflections can grow from it. Abhor doubts the notion of being 
useful  as being a distinguishing feature of utopia, since usefulness is a sign of a 
commodity culture and objectification. According to Henri Lefebvre (1991), space is 
never neutral nor is it an empty container waiting to be filled by social human activity. 
Space in a capitalist and phallocentric society is always produced from the ideologies that 
control it. Lefebvre argues, he pace h  p od ced al o e e  a  a ool of ho gh  and 
of ac ion  and in addi ion o being a mean  of p od c ion it is also a means of control, 
and hence of domina ion, of po e  (26). However, these spaces for Lefebvre, produce 
more than a means of control. They al o ha e ange effec  (97), which seem to blur 
the lines between the external and inner o ld of he indi id al. Lefeb e a e , [ ]he 
pace of he d eam i  ange and alien, e  a  he ame ime a  clo e o  a  i  po ible  
b  none hele  i  ill ha  a en al-sensory character. It is a theatrical space even more 
than a quotidian or poe ic one: a p ing in o image  of one elf, fo  one elf  (208-209).  
 The space of the dream is analogous to the space of the city, strange and alien but 
also recognizable due to its recurring elements. Acker s novels exist within physical and 
imaginativ  ac   a  c d  a  a d adhere to the oedipal rules in an 
endeavor to examine the narrative possibilities for empowerment in death  (Worthington 
244). By obeying at the same time as resisting these narratives, Acker s modern strangers 
exist in a liminal zone of reality and dream, horror and beauty. J  a  [h]er father s 
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transgression introduces her to a complexity in the world, which is both more painful and 
mo e hf l  (Conte 16), the city also offers a similar backdrop for a world of 
experience and suffering that releases harsh reality from dream or illusion, and vice versa.  
Despite Acker s association of utopian thinking with the act of suffering, the 
torment her characters go through does not necessarily bring any sort of transcendence or 
any elucidation. Just as her characters  liminal identities do not bring about equality of 
the sexes, suffering likewise does not result in a utopian outcome. Instead, she 
problematizes the idea of suffering as a tool of transcendence. Throughout Don Quixote, 
Acker associates Catholicism with madness because of its belief that surrendering to 
suffering is the pathway to being healed. Although Don Quixote, like a Jesus figure, is 
attracted to sinners  and loves others who suffer, thereby linking suffering and her quest 
for love, the characters are not healed by this suffering but instead continue to endure 
more. Suffering is not a requirement to reach a different plane of spiritual consciousness 
but is something one must go through simply because to love and to be human is 
grounded in suffering. Her conversation with God at the end of the novel allows her to 
realize that a quest in search of any idealism was doomed from the beginning. The 
genderless God89 she encounters is a self-proclaimed meal  mo hed h poc i e, 
dishonest  whore , ho poin  o  Its monstrous imperfections and tells the night  to 
look inwards: God con in ed condemning Him- o  He elf: So no  ha  o  kno  I m 
imperfect, night, that you can t turn to Me: turn to yourself (Don 207). The Me  ha  
God refers to, seems to be the idealistic and essential representation of God or love that 
Don Quixote chases after, which she acknowledges is impossible after she understands 
 
89 God con in ed condemning Him- o  He elf: So no  ha  o  kno  I m impe fec , 
nigh , ha  o  can  n o Me: n o o elf 
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that she actually is made in God s monstrous and fragmented image. In this sense, she 
maintains the Christian doctrine of God s omnipresence but deconstructs the idealism 
that has held God as superior and perfect.  
Acker does not just deconstruct the sacred into the secular but reconstructs and 
resacralizes it through the sacred self and the liminal act of becoming. Suffering and 
torment does not lead to a healed or unified self but continue in reaffirming estrangement 
from the fractured self. While the transcendence that exists in the beginning of the novel 
is one of gender, at the end Don Quixote s transcendence is one of perception that makes 
the quest of essentialism, he  ickne  (18) fade away. Don Quixote neither fulfills nor 
abandons her quest, nor does she wake up from her dream and back into reality. In the 
end, she awakens to a hybrid of the two, invoking Baudelaire  a iom of [b]e d nk 
al a  (73).90 Don Quixote breaks another set of chains and once again begins her life 
ane : I ho gh  abo  God fo  one more minute and forgot it. I closed my eyes, head 
drooping, like a person drunk for so long she no longer knows she s drunk, and then 
d nk, a oke o he o ld hich la  befo e me  (Don 207). The message of Don Quixote 
might be summed up by Acker herself when speaking about creating your own values: 
[p]eople a e searching for their centers (be they centers of pleasure, pain, whatever) but 
really, in a way, it  a ea ch fo  God  (Last Interview 147). Don Quixote s search ends 
with finding God, but that ultimately leads to her realizing the ugly truth that perfect love, 
with another human or even God, does not really exist and that it is a complicated, flawed, 
and monstrous emotion. Yet despite Don Quixote repetitious cycle of failures in her quest 
 
90 Be d nk al a . No hing el e ma e ; he e a e no o he  bjec . Not to feel the 
grime weight of Time breaking your backs and bending you double, you must get drunk 
and a  d nk  (73). 
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for love, her utopian spirit is not diminished. The utopian fragments and residue from her 
quest still linger but reformed outside the realm of ideals, residing in a hybrid but 
symbolic place. For example, Don Quixote romanticizes the notion of the musician 
Prince, an artist famous for blurring the lines of gender, race, and morality, as being the 
perfect president of the United States of America (ibid. 21). Furthermore, despite what 
may be seen as failure, Don Quixote and Acker may have been triumphant in what 
Ci io  main ain  a  o i ing he  elf , al ho gh in a mo e liminal nde anding of 
what constitutes the female self, and therefore, arriving much closer to Haraway s claim 
o li e on he bo nda ie , o i e i ho  he fo nding m h of o iginal holene  
( C bo g  33). 
In Empire, Abhor correspondingly ends the novel in an ambiguous state. Abhor 
learns to ride a motorcycle, which acts as both a gender abolishing act and a mode of 
personal freedom. Not only does Abhor reject the Oedipal and capitalist culture 
surrounding her, she also refuses to join its antagonistic other in Thivai s terrorism or the 
typical rebellious outfit of the motorcycle gang (Horn 142). By refusing to be a slave to 
Thivai s violent cause or to join a gang consisting solely of men, she substitutes these 
options with her own cause: that is, becoming her own gang and as a result, allowing her 
hope despite not knowing what it is besides its existing within disgust:  
I ood he e, he e in he nligh , and ho gh  ha  I didn t as yet know what I 
wanted. I now fully knew what I didn t want and whom I hated. That was 
something. 
And then I thought that, one day, maybe, there I d [sic] be a human 
society in a world which is beautiful, a society which wasn t just disgust. (Empire 
227)  
 
Since she is unable to put utopian ideals into words, Acker moves away from trying to 
blur binary divisions through language in exchange for symbolic representations. Tattoos 
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b c   d  b     d    a b  c a  a  ( b d. 
130). Acc d   Ac   a        b  c   
concerns taking over, doing your own sign- a T    b d  a d, ,  
 (Friedman, C a  17-18). Abhor maintains this when claiming that early 
Christian tattoos were seen as stigmata indicating exile and tribal identity (Empire 130). 
Acker uses the tattoo  ac d a d d a a  ( b d.) c  a   a  a d 
resacralized symbol of the stranger, for it instantaneously represents the sacred/profane, 
masculine/feminine, dream/taboo hybridity of modern secularized life that can only be 
expressed through symbolic and liminal representations; representations that she can live 
within. In On Revolution (1963), Arendt suggests that the best way to navigate through 
 ab   d    ca  a d  a   a b , a b  a  (33),    
at risk of collapsing under itself. To write oneself female, is to exist in the abyssal and 
liminal space between iconoclastic ambiguity and tangible reality. 
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CONCLUSION: SPECTRAL MONSTERS AND MODERN 
STRANGERS 
 
In the beginning there is ruin. Ruin is what remains or returns as the spectre from the moment one first 
looks at oneself and a figuration is eclipsed. The figure, the face, then sees its visibility being eaten away  
  - Jacques Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind 
 
Monsters are our children. They can be pushed to the farthest margins of geography and discourse, hidden 
away at the edges of the world and in the forbidden recesses of our mind, but they always return.  
- Jeffe  Je ome Cohen, Mon e  C l e (Se en The e )  
 
The phantom is therefore also a metapsychological fact: what haunts are not the dead, but the gaps left 
within us by the secrets of others. 
  - Nichola  Ab aham, No e  on he Phan om   
 
Thus strangely are our souls constructed, and by such slight ligaments are we bound to prosperity or ruin. 
(Victor Frankenstein)    
- Mary Shelley, Frankenstein  
 
SPECTRES AND MONSTERS 
 
Monstrosity has been discussed, and relatedly Shelley s Creature, throughout this 
dissertation as a sort of hauntological theme or thread across many of the modern stranger 
figures discussed. This haunting quality is why, when examining Frankenstein in the 
opening chapter, I allocated the Creature, modernity s first mythological monster, more 
to Derrida s concept of the spectre than that of monstrosity. In most cases, the 
philosophical uses of the spectre and monster is not always distinguishable, but I believe 
they exist within the same liminal and preternatural plane. The differences, if any, and 
similarities between the two can conceivably be as subtle and equivocal as Derrida s 
estimation of spirit and spectre91. Historically, it was corporeal and ethereal divisions that 
chiefly distinguished monsters and spectres from one another. Where the monster 
 
91 The pi i , he pec e  a e no  he ame hing, and e ill ha e o ha pen hi  
difference; but as for what they have in common, one does not know what it is, what it is 
presently. It is something that one does not know, precisely, and one does not know if 
p eci el  i  i , if i  e i , if i  e pond  o a name and co e pond  o an e ence   
(Specters 5). 
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exemplified something that is alive and physical, the spectre was an imaginary, 
supernatural representation of the return of the dead. A Spec e , o  Appa i ion,  a g e  
Catholic demonologist Pierre Le Loyer in his Treatise of Specters (1586), i  an 
Imagination of a Substance without a Bodie, the which presenteth itself sensibly unto 
men, against the order and course of Nature, and make h hem af aid  (1).92 This 
distinction between the two did not drastically alter during the Gothic era. Gothic 
mon e  ep e en  iolence, adi m, and n a o  appe i e  ha  li e on he edge  of 
reason, whereas Gothic spectres are predominately seen as representations of the human 
imagination or illusionary supernaturalism that ultimately become discredited as 
fabrications (Brittan 30). While one entity appears to question reason from its own 
liminal surroundings, the other exists to eventually restore order and reason through the 
dispelling of superstition. It is with Frankenstein that these binaural, though delicate 
distinctions, become radically intertwined, giving us a modern experiment that results in 
creating the first spectral-monster that, as we have seen, both haunts and embodies 
secularized modernity and its uncanny strangers. Consequently, I would like to bring the 
discussion back to Frankenstein, monstrosity, and the spectral, in an attempt to return to 
the dead , as it were.  
One way to argue the Creature, and accordingly, the modern stranger, is both 
monster and spectre is to say that it goes through its own liminal Bildungsroman, 
advancing from a teratological to a hauntological entity, originating with the monstrous 
and unnatural birth that eventually culminates with the spectral after the Creature s 
development and assumed death. However, this reading can be somewhat misleading 
 
92 The fi  ime he o d pec e  appea ed in Engli h a  ac all  in the 1605 English 
translation of Le Loyer s treatise by Zacharie Jones (Chesters 146, n. 18) 
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since it depicts a linear progress or transformation from monster to spectre, which can be 
problematic for two reasons. First, the Creature in Frankenstein is continuously both a 
pec e and mon e  f om bi h, ome hing e en Vic o  F anken ein add e e : I hen 
reflected, and the thought made me shiver, that the creature whom I had left in my 
apartment might still be there, alive, and walking about. I dreaded to behold this 
monster.... I threw the door forcibly open, as children are accustomed to do when they 
e pec  a pec e o and in ai ing fo  hem on he o he  ide; b  no hing appea ed  (88). 
Secondly, this interpretation in isolation puts the spectral on a higher or superior 
spectrum than that of the monstrous, indicating a movement of progress or transcendence 
from one to the other. Rather, Shelley s revolutionary influence on the subjects is 
achieved by making the two interchangeable by formulating the spectre into flesh, 
something also Derrida (1994/2005) ackno ledge  b  a g ing, Ma  Shelle  b o gh  
o  a en ion o he anag am ha  make  he pec e in e pec  i ible again  (288). By 
making the spectre corporal, Shelley paradoxically brings the spectre into the monstrous 
and vice versa, thereby symbolically bringing it from the realm of superstition into the 
uncanny and liminal edges of reason to stand alongside its uncanny cousin. It is with 
Frankenstein that both the spectre and monster are spoken and listened to,93 and more 
importantly, also possibly respected.94  
Returning to Derrida s language concerning the monster and spectre, it is obvious 
that they share many fundamental characteristics. Both operate in uncanny territories of 
 
93 He should learn to live by learning not how to make conversation with the ghost but 
how to talk with him, with her, how to let them speak or how to give them back speech, 
even if it is in oneself, in the other, in the other in oneself: they are always there, specters, 
even if they do not exist, even if they are no longer, even if they are not yet  (Specters 
221). 
94 Respect for the spect e, a  Ma  Shelle  o ld a  (De ida, Politics 73). 
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liminality, exploring the unknown and indefinable, and thereby are seen as symbolic 
warnings or threats that continuously haunt us. More importantly, they are also entities 
we may be able to see but which nonetheless, through an abject absence, interrogate and 
question the notion of the self, otherness, and the concept of being present. To Derrida 
(1992/1995) and other scholars such as Jeffery Cohen (1996), monsters are fully realized 
and alive, and if they exist within our imaginaries, they do so predominately within a 
realm, though not limited to, of hybridity. Spectres, on the other hand, seem to be even 
mo e liminal o De ida, in ha  he  eem o go be ond he h b idi a ion  of 
monstrosity (Points 386). A spectre is something that is neither present nor real, but 
nonetheless, is still able to intersect itself into our present and real worlds. Although 
ghostly in nature, spectres still to some degree, exist within the visible, corporal, and 
material world, presenting themselves as an image of individuals from our past.  
The fundamental difference between the two may very well be centered on a 
negligible variation of paradox, where the spectre operates in disjunction, residing within 
the neither/nor category while the hybrid monster exists within the conjunction of the 
both and the same. However, if examined closely, there does not seem to be much degree 
of separation between the two uncanny forces, yet, although contemplated prior in an 
interview in 1990 (Points), Derrida never really brings up monsters in Specters  
hauntological narrative, although many others (Shildrick 2002; Ganteau 2015) have 
written on the obvious connection. The purely monstrous is thus, for Derrida, an 
impossibility. 
Derrida must have seen Shelley s Creature as more in line with the spectre than 
monstrosity, especially since true monstrousness for Derrida is unable to sustain itself, 
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while his reluctance to connect the two could be accorded to the fact that monsters lose 
their monstrosity, potency, and strength over us, once they are perceived or recognized as 
monsters (Points 386) and as a result, vanquished. Regardless of its initial monstrosity 
and abjection, the uncanny monster, even though it helps alter culture, slowly dilutes 
itself into a canny familiarity, into the very thing it threatened.95 This is what Derrida 
call  he mo emen  of c l e  (ibid. 387), a ela ion hip akin o he 
secularization/resacralization process. Ironically, the Creature is always regarded as a 
monster by the humans it interacts with, a projection that the monster itself is forced to 
embody, yet this does not remove the threat it poses to us. What the monster is never 
given by Victor is an identity. If to name something is to have power over it, the Creature 
may very well have retained its power over Victor because it was never named and as a 
result, remained unknown and haunting even to its creator, despite it being perceived by 
Frankenstein and as a result, itself, as a monster. Still, notwithstanding, the Creature 
never loses its hauntological threat and therefore, is never tamed.96  
SPECTRES AND PHANTOMS 
 
One discernible reason for the omission of the monster in Specters is that 
Derrida s spectre is largely tied to his definition of messianic time. The spectre is neither 
pa  no  f e fo  De ida, and con e en l , allo  he pec al momen  o no longer 
belong o ime  (Specters xix). Since the spectre is simultaneously revenant and arrivant, 
 
95 from the moment they enter into culture, the movement of acculturation, precisely, 
of dome ica ion, of no mali a ion ha  al ead  beg n  (Derrida, Points 386). 
96 Thi  eading foc e  of Shelle  no el, ho e e , h o gh pop la  c l e, ch a  he 
Uni e al Frankenstein  films (1931-39), the Creature/Monster slowly becomes tamed. 
While Jame  Whale  1931 film doe  no  name he C ea e, hi  i  ome hing that 
de eloped o e  ime, i  doe  begin o dimini h he C ea e  in elligence, empa h , and 
individualism, and as a result, its uncanniness.  
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the past is just as ambiguous or unknown as the future, and he efo e, m  ca  be ond 
p e en  life  (ibid.). Time fo  De ida, a  i  did i h Benjamin, i  a c cial a pec  of he 
messianic, and there seems to be a difference between the monstrous moment  and that 
of the messianic moment  that the spectre embodies. While the monster does represent 
an arrivant, a warning or threat of a possible future97, and even a questioning of 
humanity s traditional values, Derrida ironically does not seem to allocate any sort of past, 
and therefore any messianic character, to it. The spectre is messianic in that it disrupts 
time, epitomized by Derrida s use of the Hamlet o e, ime i  o  of join , he eb  
blurring the lines between past, present, and future. The spectre is simultaneously an 
inheritance from the pa  and f e, hich p ecede  an  e pe ience be ond he li ing 
p e en  in gene al  (Specters xix). Time, fo  De ida, i  a e ie  of modali ed p e en  
(ibid), therefore, messianic time cannot exist in the present but rather outside of it. The 
monstrous moment, on the other hand, seems to exist in instances, in the abruption of 
time directly associated with the present-future but not the past-present-future of 
disjointed time.  
Frankenstein itself, both in structure and genre, also refuses to be confined to a 
certain moment in time but nonetheless captures a moment where time has been 
disrupted; it simultaneously captures the monstrous living in the messianic. Derrida must 
have accepted a spectral element in Shelley s Creature specifically due to it being a 
hybridization of dead body parts. Frankenstein s Creature also contains a history and past 
and represents a return of the dead  just as much as the spectre does, simply one that is 
more fragmented, uncanny, and subconscious. Even though it is not originally weighed 
 
97 A future that would not be mon o  o ld no  be a f e  (ibid. 387) 
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down by it, at least until it develops an obsession with its creator, the Creature still carries 
the dead with it at birth in ways that may not be so easily recognized or decipherable as 
the image of a spectre, but conveys a culturally miscellaneous past nonetheless. If the 
spectre is an image of an individual that translates it to the collective, the monster is an 
image of the collective that channels itself unknowingly in the individual; to borrow 
Bloch s utopian symbolism, one is Kant burning through Hegel, while the other is Hegel 
burning through Kant.  
However, for Cohen, all monsters, not just Shelley , a e a c l al bod  e en 
in origin (4), as the monster is part of a larger cultural perspective and is neither born nor 
exists entirely in isolation. To say Frankenstein s Creature is free of history and is 
therefore completely free to cultivate itself (Gilbert & Gubar 1979; Armitt 2012) is a 
half-truth. Because it is made up of parts and not a solitary body, the Creature is not tied 
to anything specific, as in a spectre of communism, the French Revolution, or 
messianism, and therefore is autonomous to some extent, but it nonetheless carries the 
ruins of the past that haunt it in secrecy and silence.  
Accordingly, we could argue that it is haunting in a language that is far more 
reminiscent of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok s psychoanalytic concept of the 
transgenerational phantom 98 than Derrida s spectre. Abraham first raised the issue in 
No e  on he Phan om  (1975/1994), before further developing the concept of 
cryptonymy during his collaboration with Torok. Abraham and Torok s phantom may be 
 
98 The transgenerational phantom is a phenomenon where horrifying secrets are silently 
passed down from past generations to their offspring through the unconscious. However, 
a  Rand main ain , [a] pec  of hi  concep  ha e he po en ial o ill mina e he gene is 
of social institutions and may provide a new perspective for inquiring into the 
psychological roots of cultural patterns and political ideology  (Edi o  No e, The Shell 
169). 
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more applicable to Frankenstein s Creature for a few reasons. A side, though overarching 
argument entangled in this idea is that the notion of phantasmagorical goes beyond an 
ill a ion of he fan a ic b  al o efe  o a bi a e o  fan a ic combina ion, 
collec ion, o  a emblage  (Me iam-Webster)99, efficiently summing up the Creature s 
m l ifa io  make p. Mo eo e , in he In od c ion  o Ab aham and To ok s The Shell 
and the Kernel (1987/1994), Nicholas T. Rand (1994) describes the phantom as an 
nfel  mo ning, na imila ed a ma, he n i ing p chical inhe i ance of omeone 
else s secrets  drive a wedge between us and o  ocie  (22). Similar to Derrida s 
spectre, the phantom is a product of displacement and moreover, a symbol of the return 
of the dead.100 Yet, despite these eerily similarities to Derrida s spectre, Colin Davis 
(2007) maintains that the main separation for Abraham and Torok s phantom to that of 
Derrida s specter lies in the problem of secrecy:  
The c cial diffe ence be een he o i  o be fo nd in he a  of he ec e . 
The secrets of Abraham and Torok s lying phantoms are unspeakable in the 
restricted sense of being a subject of shame and prohibition. It is not at all that 
they cannot be spoken; on the contrary, they can and should be put into words so 
that the phantom and its noxious effects on the living can be exorcised. For 
Derrida the ghost and its secrets are unspeakable in a quite different sense. 
Abraham and Torok seek to return the ghost to the order of knowledge; Derrida 
wants to avoid any such restoration and to encounter what is strange, unheard, 
o he , abo  he gho The ec e  i  no  unspeakable because it is taboo, but 
because it cannot (yet) be articulated in the languages available to us. The ghost 
p he  a  he bo nda ie  of lang age and ho gh .  (13) 
 
While discussing secrecy in Chapter 1, I mentioned how secrecy lies between two liminal 
worlds, and how the responsibility of modernity s monstrous secret sits on the shoulders 
of Frankenstein s human creator. The Creature may very well be Victor s, as well as our 
 
99 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/phantasmagoria 
100 he phan om hich returns to haunt bears witness to the existence of the dead 
b ied i hin he o he  (Abraham 175). 
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spectre, however in regard to the Creature, the unconscious and historical secret resides 
silently within The Creature s own body. Frankenstein instantly acknowledges the secret 
of secularized modernity s monstrous ambiguity when he witnesses the spectre  a e  
e e . Ho e e , hi  ec e  ambig i , this transgenerational phantom, haunts the 
Creature unknowingly from within. While it tries to cultivate itself in a rising secularized, 
technological , and unrestricted world, the sacred past haunts the Creature soundlessly. 
The Creature s attempt to exorcise this phantom of the abyss through resacralization is 
extinguished when Frankenstein refuses its wish for love and companionship, ensuing the 
Creature s permanent state within liminality. Ultimately, it may have always been a false 
hope since even the Creature acknowledges this outcome would not exorcise its 
mon o i  b  a he  o ld olidif  i : I  i  e, e hall be mon e , c  off f om all 
he o ld; b  on ha  acco n  e hall be mo e a ached o one ano he  (Shelle  148). 
The Creature wishes for a binaural utopia of monstrosity and strangerhood, completely 
removed from the rest of normal society, though it is fated to manifest itself through 
secularized modernity s movement of culture, as a monster, phantom, spectre, and 
modern stranger.  
ADDRESSING THE MONSTER IN THE SPECTERAL ROOM 
 
Derrida s hauntology has taken precedent over Abraham and Torok s cryptonymy 
in contemporary criticism, and if Davis  distinction is correct, it may be that Derrida s 
deconstruction theory is more influential d e o i  ehabili a ion of gho  (Da i  8) 
and on its insistence that we should in fact let the dead speak and not exorcise them. This, 
however, does not explain why Derrida is extremely silent on Abraham and Torok s 
theory. Not only being friends with Abraham, Derrida was very much informed about 
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their theory since he wrote the foreword to The Wolf Man s Magic Word: A Cryptonymy 
(1977), the first time that Abraham and Torok collaborated on the subject.101 Unlike 
Davis, Zolt n Dragon (2005) does not see much difference between their works, arguing 
ha  he o ha n ological end do no  e cl de each o he  (257). D agon goe  on o 
argue that Derrida s spectre is in fact haunted by Abraham and Torok s silent phantom: 
Derrida thus incorporates the pivotal concepts of cryptonymy, and utilizes them to 
a deconstructive end  thus silencing the psychoanalytic background or 
inheritance. This forms an uncanny kernel in his own discourse that gains its final 
fo m la ion in hi  p og am of hauntology, being present via its very absence. 
Thus, the very program of hauntology or spectropoetics is already haunted by a 
silent and effective phantom, whose effect is the transmission of the Derridean 
crypt on and on. (269) 
 
I bring this up in order to re-address the monster that is hiding in Derrida s 
spectre/messianic theory. By saying Shelley is the first to make the spectre visible, 
Derrida must downplay the monstrousness within Frankenstein s Creature, and 
subsequently, his own secular idea of messianism. Derrida (1967) does not shy away 
from connecting the monster to deconstructionism (Of Grammatology 5), conceivably 
e en connec ing i  o he c i i e of a adi ion defo med b  a h mani  ie  (John on, 
La  261). Though, by questionably ignoring the revenant characteristics of the 
mon e , De ida, like Vic o  F anken ein, doe  eem o n hi  e e  a a 102 from the 
monstrous act that leads to the ruin and instead, focuses on the ruins that make up the 
spectre/messianic. In this sense, for Derrida, the spectre as spectator undermines the actor 
 
101 The only time Derrida mentions them is when he references his foreword, Fo  in 
Specters of Marx, but not their actual work. 
102 I employ these words, I admit, with a glance toward the business of childbearing--but 
also with a glance toward those who, in a company from which I do not exclude myself, 
turn their eyes away in the face of the as yet unnamable, which is proclaiming itself and 
which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species 
of the non-species in the formless, mute, infant, and e if ing fo m of mon o i  
(Derrida, Writing and Difference 370).  
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that is monster, since actions can themselves be monstrous, as seen with both 
Frankenstein s Creature and its creator, and can be difficult to extrapolate from one 
another.  
From this perspective, it would be akin to Ernst Bloch removing the horrors of 
WWI from his utopian spirit. Although the horrors of the Great War, or any horrific event, 
are not something anyone would encourage, it would be impossible to build Bloch s 
utopian spirit without the monstrous event. Yet, as mentioned in Chapter 3, we run into 
problems when we base our utopian and secularized messianism around such horrific 
e en  of de c ion. De ida canno  dome ica e  (Points 386) his monsters just as he 
understood we could not exorcise our phantoms and spectres. In evaluating Eliade s 
traditional idea that monsters are a threat to the religious and sacred order, Timothy K. 
Beal (2002) bl  he e di ine bina ie  of ac ed and mon o , a g ing ha  ha  
[monsters] often reveal is a divinity or a sacredness that is like many of our religions and 
like many of ourselves, caught in endless, irreducible tensions between order and chaos, 
orientation and disorientation, self and other, foundation and abyss. Religion is never 
i ho  i  mon e  (10). Like he ncann  ha  i  i  o clo el  a ocia ed i h he 
monstrum i  a me age ha  b eak  in o hi  o ld f om he ealm of he di ine  (ibid. 7). 
The monster might very well be the human liminal kernel that balances the flawlessness 
of the human spirit, as Leopardi believed.  
Consequently, the modern stranger can be the true spectral-monster or spect-actor, 
and therefore its uncanny role in secular messianism becomes challenging. Even though 
it is born on the ruins of the sacred and attempts in various ways to resacralize the 
spiritual gaps that secularized modernity instigated, it either may not be the most ideal 
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archetype of the messianic, something it probably does not desire to be associated with 
anyway, or more appropriately, we need to finally address the uncanny and chilling 
warning (because that is what both monsters and spectres do) that our messianic impulses, 
both as individuals and collectives, can sometimes in fact be monstrous.  
ADAPTATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE MODERN STRANGER - A CODA 
 
The uncanny spectres of modernity have left a liminal underpinning to our 
contemporary world, while its cultural monsters are still being challenged. Like humans 
themselves, traditions and cultures, whether being a well-established or a loosely 
connected concept, need to adapt to the changing world. Just as Baudelaire, who despised 
the destruction of the Arcades and the Paris he knew and loved, adapted his poetry to find 
beauty in the new ugliness  of the modern metropolis, traditions should also adapt. 
While, Adorno  a g men  ha  ho e ho an  o adap  m  lea n inc ea ingl  o c b 
hei  imagina ion  (Culture 192), rings true to some degree, adaptation does not 
necessarily mean conforming to societal conventions and expectations. Society also 
needs to adapt to involve strangers, whose feelings of boredom, alienation, ennui, and 
marginalization are largely ignored or dismissed. Inclusion is an important aspect of the 
modern stranger, as despite a close relation, strangers are not necessarily outsiders; they 
have not rejected or abandoned modern society but rather have chosen to be immersed 
within it, becoming an intrinsic part of secularized modernity itself, even if it means 
residing in the uncanny shadows and voids that modernity has created within itself. 
Baudelaire s flâneur, for example, is the quintessential symbol of being both 
simultaneously physically and spiritually engaged and detached within modern society, 
though this modern/anti-modern sentiment is likewise realized in Acker s 
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experimentation of language as being a part of, yet instantaneously disconnected from the 
society she lives in. The absence of a complete rejection of both traditional and modern 
societal norms and customs, despite one s disinclination towards them, leaves the modern 
stranger almost in a love-hate relationship with secularized modernity and its discontents. 
This liminal perspective allows them to criticize, from within; a panoptical gaze that 
allows for a re-imagining or a resacralizing of the past, creating a viewpoint that is 
extremely beneficial and valuable to any society, if listened to. Yet, we must ask 
ourselves, does further adapting the modern stranger to society put an end to the concept 
of modern stranger, and moreover, should it be the goal of a society to end strangerhood 
once and for all? There is a danger of excessive liminality, to be sure, though there is a 
greater danger in removing the liminality of the stranger. Making the outlook of the 
stranger the new status quo dissolves the constructive aspects that made the modern 
stranger such a valuable figure in both defining, redefining, and resacralizing secularized 
modernity in the first place; consequently, it is imperative to listen to the voices of 
modern strangers while they adapt to society, something always attempted, though 
ultimately never truly achieved.  
Yet, despite retaining a common uncanny strangeness the same spiritual and 
physiological principle, the contemporary stranger has changed into more of a visible and 
geographical entity that make up a big part of what Ahmad (2014) refers to as affect 
aliens. In many ways, the modern stranger has become more complicated and challenging, 
as its more traditional definition of binaural and fully marginalized outsider  seems to be 
in conflict with Simmel s more modern and liminal meaning, encompassing people who 
go beyond simply the psychological or even spiritual inability to blend in and out of 
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society as with the modern stranger. This raises questions as to whether modernity is 
truly over or is it simply continuing in its altering process. If modernity is possibly over, 
it may very well be because the stranger has altered; modernity s monster, its spectre, its 
resacralizing spirit, may have finally transformed beyond what modernity entails, and 
thus ultimately changing it into something new. Or are we still caught in liminal 
modernity since many aspects of our recent past seem to be repeating. Are the spectres of 
the totalitarianism and fascism of the twentieth century being renewed, or equally, the 
chaotic colliding of alternate ideas that existed at the turn of the century, as presented in 
Musil s Qualities, where meaning and truth are constantly being questioned. It remains to 
be seen if we have completely exhausted modernity, and as a result, the idea of the 
stranger, or has modernity itself become the spectre. Yet, whether still in modernity s 
changing course or not, and whether if its modern  or beyond, the uncanny stranger must 
nonetheless resist the urge to faithfully conform to any new status quo or binary, even 
ones based on them. The liminality of the stranger is too important to lose if we expect to 
acclimatize to an ever-evolving society in nourishing and introspective ways  
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